



**M. A. (POLITICAL SCIENCE) PART II
(Semester-III)**

**OPTION - I
(POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY)**

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Lesson No.

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CASTE, CLASS AND POLITICS: A STUDY OF INTER-RELATIONS

Caste is exclusively an Indian phenomenon although social institutions that resemble caste in one respect or the other are not different to find elsewhere. No comparable institution to be seen elsewhere has anything like the complexity, elaboration and rigidity of caste in India. There are about three thousand castes in India.¹ Though caste is, undoubtedly, an all India phenomenon in the sense that there are everywhere hereditary endogamous groups which form a hierarchy, and the each of these groups has a traditional association with one or two occupations, yet it mainly exists and functions as a regional system. The existence of some universal features should not lead anyone to ignore the significant regional differences.

Caste: Meaning and Essential Features

The term 'caste' is not used for the traditional and largely imaginary classification of Hindu society into four orders or varna-the *Brahmins* (priests), *Kshatriyas* (warriors), *Viashas* (Farmers and traders) and *shudras* (the service classes). The contemporary concept of caste is more complex than this fourfold Brahmin cal model. Etymologically, the word 'caste' signifying breed, race or kind. The first use of this word in the restricted sense of what we now understand by caste seems to date from 1563 when Garica de Orta wrote that "No one changes from his father's trade and all those of the same caste (casta) of shoemakers are the same".²

Though large volume of literature has been produced regarding caste, yet most of the authors have found it difficult to define the concept of caste. The difficulties in definition have arisen mainly from two sources: firstly, the extreme diversity, taking India as a whole, of these social units, and secondly, disagreements among the scholars as to the essential characteristics either of the individual castes or of the system as a whole. However, some definitions have been provided, which may be analyzed in brief. Andre Beteille defines castes as "hierarchically ranked groups or categories based on hereditary membership which maintains their social identity by strict rules of endogamy. It fixes the social status of the individual at birth and prevents his movement from one group or category to another."³ This definition lacks in describing the relationship between one's occupation and caste. In his analysis of the caste in

India, Dumont has relied on the Bougle's definition which runs as: "The caste system divides the whole society into large number of hereditary groups, distinguished from one another and connected together by three characteristics: separation in matters of marriage and contact, whether direct or indirect (food); division of labour, each group having, in theory or by tradition, a profession from which their members can depart only within certain limits and finally hierarchy, which ranks the groups as relatively superior or inferior to one another."⁴

Senart has given an elaborative definition of caste. He states that "we must conceive of a group, united, closed, and at least in theory hereditary, provided with a measure of organization which is traditional and independent, with a headman, and with a council; a group that meets when need be in more or less full assembly; that is bound together by a common occupation and shares common customs in regard particularly to marriage, to the consumption of food and drink, and to various cases of pollution; finally a group which has the power to maintain its authority of the community effectively felt by the imposition of various penalties, the most important being permanent or temporary expulsion from the group: such in epitome, as it seems to us, is a caste."⁵ Senart's definition, however, lacks universal applicability. For instance, a number of castes do not have a headman or council. Besides, on the other hand, emphasizes on the factors of common descent. He defines caste as "collection of families or groups of families bearing a common name; claiming a common descent from a mythical ancestor, human or divine: professing to follow the same hereditary calling; and regarded by those who are competent to give an opinion as forming a single homogenous community."⁶ This definition stands questioned on the ground that descent from a mythical ancestor is claimed rather by the *gotra* (sub-caste), the internal exogamous division of the endogamous caste, then by the caste as a whole.

In his analysis of caste, Ketkar has stated that "the membership to a caste is confined to those who are born of members and includes all persons so born."⁷ Though the statement is generally valid yet there are certain exceptions in this regard also. For instance, members of a number of castes in Southern India have been recruited from the mixed offspring of other castes which are not members of the caste itself. Similarly, there are certain parts of India where caste is fluid enough to make it possible for persons to acquire a caste to which they are not born. Kroeber, on the other hand, has defined caste as "an endogamous and hereditary sub-division of an ethnic unit occupying a position of superior or inferior rank or social esteem in comparison with other such sub-divisions."⁸ He has ascribed caste system as systems of social stratification, as examples of ranked aggregates of people, that are usually rigid birth-ascribed,

and permit no individual mobility. Evidently his emphasis is on endogamy and rank.

A precise definition of caste has been given by Hardgrave. He describes caste as "a culturally distinct, endogamous community sharing traditionally a common occupation and a particular position in the localized hierarchy of caste ranking."⁹ Thus, caste is generally defined as a group that is hereditary, usually localized, and associated with a particular occupation; its members do not marry outside the group. There are complex relationships of superiority and inferiority among caste groups, including restrictions on eating and drinking with one another.

According to Max Weber, caste is and remains essentially, a social rank. "By its very nature the caste is always a purely social and possibly occupational association."¹⁰ Kathleen Gough also states that "castes in Hindu India are ranked, birth-status groups."¹¹ As is evident, caste is viewed by them essentially as a particular kind of status group. Harold A. Gould, in his recent account of castes and politics in India, states that the caste system is simply the most elaborate version of ascription oriented social stratification ever known. Yet, despite its complexity, it depends for its full and intergraded operation upon the functional social structure of non-industrial complex society.¹² Thus, caste functions as a system only in the context of small communities where the primary group is supreme, where occupational and other key specialized roles can be feasibly acquired and reinforced on the basis of some notion of heredity, and where technology makes possible the support of limited urban elite who can appropriate the surpluses of the peasantry without being able to be the instruments of the promulgation of a technology which strikes at the heart of the peasant eco-system.¹³

From the above analysis of the attempts at defining the caste, it is evident that all of the definitions have usually taken the form of a list of cultural traits which are supposed to form a syndrome. The scholars, while admitting a great range of detailed variation, have generally maintained that there is a certain minimal set of primary characteristics which together embody the real essence of caste everywhere. G.S. Ghurye has listed six essential features of caste system in India: (a) the segmental division of society into distinct groups with membership determined by birth; (b) hierarchy according to a definite scheme of social precedence with the Brahmin as the head of the hierarchy; (c) restrictions on inter-dining and social intercourse arising out of notions of ritual pollution; (d) varying civil and religious disabilities and privileges of the different segments; (e) restrictions on occupation; and (f) endogamy.¹⁴ In his analysis of caste in India, Hutton has also followed the same criteria.¹⁵ Thus, the fundamental characteristics of caste may be summarized as: endogamy, hierarchical

gradation, food taboos, heredity, occupational division and notion of pollution. It may, however, be added that all of the above features lack universal application. For instance, *Brahmins* do not enjoy superior rank in Punjab.

It may also be mentioned that though most of the scholars generally agree with Ghurye's list, yet there has been variance of opinion as to the relative importance of the characteristics discerned. To begin with, Ghurye himself, while arguing the primacy of notions of racial and ritual purity, sees endogamy as the principal feature of the caste system.¹⁶ Prior to Ghurye, Westermarck had also considered endogamy as the essence of the caste system.¹⁷ Hutton, Hocart, S.C. Roy and N.K. Dutt have also viewed endogamy as the principal feature of the caste system. M.N. Srinivas¹⁸ has also supported this view. Yet, some other scholars have emphasized on the factor of occupational differentiation as the primary basis of caste formation. Long ago, H.A. Rose, in his study of caste of North India and Punjab, had stated that "The more one studies the caste in the works of Nesfield, Ibbetson, Risely and other writers, the more one sees, I think, that caste like law may be defined as a function of economics."¹⁹ It is also mentioned by the supporters of this view that the change in the political and economic status of a caste is accompanied by a change in its ritual status and that latter change is invariably preceded by the former.²⁰ However, some sociologists view caste as an extreme form of social stratification, characterized and a complete absence of vertical mobility for individuals.²¹ Gould views caste as a system of social stratification. He states that, 'sociologically speaking' the caste system, its Hinduness notwithstanding, is a system of social stratification rooted in an occupational zed division of labour not different in its fundamental characteristics, qua social stratification, from that associated with all of the old world civilizatrion.²² He, however, does not consider the caste system as rigid as is thought by some other sociologists.

Furthermore, there has been a long debate in the literature over whether the caste system is a unique social phenomenon or simply one manifestation of processes of social stratification which have a wider generality. The scholars like Dumont, Pocock, Marriot, Inden and Leach have stressed the element of uniqueness. On the other hand, Bailey, berreman, Passion, De Vos, Wegatsuma and Gould have stressed the opposite perspective. It may, however, be pointed out that the choice between these two positions is not an absolute one despite the often stringent assertions to the contrary emanating from the partisans of the one or the other. Whether the caste system in viewed from the standpoint of that which makes it indigenously Indian and Hindu, i.e., mere a cultural entity or which links it, to use Gould's terminology, to 'ascription-oriented stratifications,' i.e., a social entity, depends on what one choose to emphasize. But, on the whole, the caste system represents a particular conjecture between

a pattern of religious values, viz., Hinduism and system of social stratification fundamentally similar to be found in other societies as well.

Caste Mobility

One of the important aspects of the caste system in India has been the caste mobility. It has been a distinguishing characteristic of social changes in India. It results mainly from the consistent efforts by members of the lower castes to raise their ranking in the social hierarchy. The higher castes usually oppose them in order to preserve their own superior rank. But some of the lower castes do succeed in time in raising their status. Similarly, a higher caste may fall in rank. However, such shifts signify positional and not structural changes. The social structure remains quite the same even though one group is now accepted as higher than its former superior and its members outrank those of a previously higher set.

Caste mobility includes both economic and political mobility. Generally, men who accrue wealth or new political resources typically try to translate them into a gain in ritual rank in order to legitimate their rise and fix it against the passage of time. However, individual mobility, by itself, is limited and ephemeral. It is limited because even though a man becomes wealthy and personally powerful in his locality his neighbors of higher rank still deal with him according to ritual attributes of his *Jati* (caste). It is ephemeral because members of a rising family must find brides and grooms for their children from comparably eminent families. Unless other families of their *Jati* (caste) have raised in similar proportion the status gains of one family may fade away after a generation.²³ Hence, mobility in rank must be collective if it is to be fruitful and durable.

M.N. Srinivas has coined the concepts of 'Sanskritisation' and 'Westernization' to analyze caste mobility in India. Sanskritisation denotes a process by which a low Hindu caste, or tribal or other group, changes its customs ritual, ideology and way of life in the direction of a high, and frequently 'twice-born'²⁴ caste.²⁵ According to Srinivas, the castes occupying the top position in the hierarchy are more Sanskritized than castes in the lower and middle ranks of the hierarchy. Thus, in order to raise their position, the lower castes begin to adopt the customs and way of life of the higher castes. In their efforts to achieve higher status, the lower castes may also try to adopt the way of life of the castes that are dominant in their region. Taking together, the economic betterment of a group, the acquisition of political power, education, leadership and a desire to move up in the hierarchy are all relevant factors in sanskritisation.²⁶ However, it may be noted that Sanskritisation does not automatically result in the achievement of a higher status for the group. The group must put forward the

claim that they belong to a particular varna- the *Brahmin*, the *Kshatriya* or the *Vaishya*. In accordance with their claim they must change their customs, diet and the way of life. The groups have to wait for an indefinite period, extending over a generation or two, before its claim begins to be recognized. It may also be noted that the process of Sanskritisation has occurred more in the South where a number of lower castes followed the Brahminical model to rise in status. In North too certain lower castes have opted to follow either the *Kshatriya* or the *Vaishya* model in order to raise their status.

Another concept to explain caste mobility, as used by Srinivas, is that of westernization. It is used to refer to the modern repertoire, to those adopted practices and ideas that originated outside Indian civilization.²⁷ He used the term, in particular, to characterize the change brought about in India society and culture as a result of over one hundred and fifty years of British rule. It denoted changes occurring at different levels-technology, ideology and values.²⁸ However, the more appropriate term to explain the impact of non-Indian civilizations on social change in India is considered to be 'modernization'. While agreeing with Daniel Lerner, who opted for the use of modernization, Srinivas himself admitted that westernization is unsuitable for several reasons: It is too local a label, and the model which is imitated may not be a western country but Russia, Turkey, Japan, or India.²⁹ In what follows is brief look at the impact of the process of modernization on the caste system in India.

Caste: Changing Nature and Functions

Marx and predicted (1853) that modern industry, resulting from the railway system, will dissolve the hereditary division of labour upon which rest the Indian caste, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and Indian power.³⁰ It is true that the process of industrialization, as it began under the British rule, has resulted in the change in the functions of caste but it has not resulted in destruction of caste system. Gould notes in this regard that with the impact of British rule, which injected modernity in every walk of life of the Indian people, the caste system and patterns of mobility began to assume new forms. In the case of c caste system common economic and political action by castes became possible over a far wider circumference than heretofore by the mere virtue that communication facilities made contacts between people easier than before. This set in motion the process of decay of localized hierarchies of traditional power and authority which is today moving rapidly towards its culmination as consequence of such political reforms as the introduction of the secret ballot in village elections and Panchayati Raj.³¹

The Western economic, political and cultural ideas and institutions began to influence India around the sixteenth century onward. Since then a continuous

structural transition has been occurring from the traditional caste system to caste as it is found in modernizing Indian society. Gould has observed that under the growing impact of modernity,³² a progressively sharper differentiation took place between the socio-religious and the ethnic dimensions of caste. To an important degree this occurred because the new revolution removed occupations, in principle, from the control of kin-groups and placed under the 'bureaucratically integrated' groups. Occupations in the modern sector of society became too complex, required too much technical skill, were part of far too massive and complex productive and administrative institutions, for their behavioral content to be determined by the member of the corporate kin-group, guilds and other traditionally integrated units of production.³³ It should also be noted that the hereditary status groups from which occupations were progressively removed retained their residual sub-cultural characteristics, both because they were vital to the perpetuation of individual human identity and because such sub-culturally integrated social formations proved highly functional as adaptive mechanisms in the context of the modernizing state system.

Over the years, India has shown strong propensity of transform rather supersede traditional corporate structure, to move imperceptibly from traditional to modern corporatism without so marked an intervening individualist phase as the West has said so experienced. Caste has not only survived the impact of British imperialism but has transformed and transvalued itself. In doing so, it has helped to dissolve, what Marx called "the village system" including a caste-based hierarchy and contributed to the success of political democracy by helping India's mass electorate to participate meaningfully and effectively in it.³⁴ In his latest analysis of the caste and politics in India, Gould observes that the hopes and expectations of modernist politicians, and social impact of an industrial economy, a Westminster democracy, and the coercive power of the modern state, have simply not materlized. Nor has it possible to wish them away by ideological flourish, moral suasion or bureaucrat fiat. The reality is that caste, religion, nationality, and other particularistic formations proved themselves to be 'functional' in the Indian case not because India's attempt to modernize herself was an outright failure or that for some reason the experiment went awry and led to 'aberrant' or 'distorted' political institutions. A sober examination of the historical experience would show, on the contrary, that what India experienced in the process of developing a modern polity differed very little from what merging modern societies generally experienced, especially those with highly pluralized and economically differentiated populations.³⁵ Gould also asserts that even in the West, ethnic conflict and the accommodation of particularistic ally

integrated group interests have always been crucially important aspect of modern state formations.³⁶

Furthermore, the political evolution has been a key aspect of modernizing process which so fundamentally affected the nature of caste. Taking together, with the impact of industrialization and its co-related socio-cultural, economic and political institutions, the ethnic and sub-cultural aspects of the caste system found increasing operational scope. Liberal education, governmental patronage and slowly expanding franchise have been the three influences that have penetrated the caste system and involved it by stages. The involvement came as a result of mutual give and take. Economic opportunity, administrative patronage and positions of power offered by the new institutions and the new leadership drew the articulate sections of society into the modernist network. In return, the leadership was provided with a basis of support that kept expanding from urban centers into the interior, and from one caste to such an involvement of the traditional structure and its leadership. Two results followed. The caste system made available to the leadership structural and ideological bases for political mobilization, providing it with both a segmental organization and an identification system on which support could be crystallized. Second, the leadership was forced to make concession to local opinion, take its cue from consensus that existed as regards claims to power, articulate political competition on traditional lines and, in turn, organize castes for economic and political purposes. With this came in to being a new species of political organization, articulates around particularistic divisions, yet giving to these a secular and associational orientation.³⁷ Thus, the rise of the nation state and advent of the gradual involvement and cooptation of more and more strata in the political decision-making processes. Rajni Kothari, an eminent Indian scholar, observes in this regard that in many responded to English education and was the first to benefit from political and administrative power and with a slow expansion of the franchise and the party system others came in.³⁸ In some other regions, where the *Brahmins* were never so dominant and certain agricultural castes wield social power, the later provided the basis for political recruitment.

Thus, caste is not same as it was before. There are a number of perceptible changes in the functions and nature of caste in India Today. In the traditional structure of India's villages, the cleavages of caste, class, and power tended much more than today to run along the same grooves. In his study o village in India, Andre Beteille has observed that the *Brahmins* were the landowners, and they also constituted the traditional elite. This is no longer the case at present. The social system has acquired a much more complex and dynamic character and now there is tendency for cleavages to cut across one another. Today there

are many areas of life which are becoming progressively "caste-free". Thus, landownership, occupation, and even education are not to the same extent dependent upon caste. Today education not only enables the Non-*Brahmins* and Adi-Dravidas to compete on more equal terms with the *Brahmins* for white collar jobs, but also provides them with the more equal chances of political participation.³⁹ At the same time, however, Betiella also notes that 'Yet the physical structure of the village continues to be consistent with the cleavages in its traditional social structure. Not only is there even now a strong feeling of identity within each segment of the village legacy from the past, but certain political developments tend to heighten this feeling of identity.⁴⁰ Thus, the process of continuity and change is going on side by side.

In the changed conditions, the so-called high- castes no longer enjoy an upper hand in the power structure on account of tradition only. What increasingly counts more today is the numbers. Gould has noted in this regard that *Brahmins* or *Thakurs* do not enjoy automatic high status in village anymore in the sphere affecting real power. They must win that power in competition with other groups who in the old social order were entirely voiceless, and they must undertake to do so within a framework of rules which impose many handicaps upon them as castes.⁴¹ Democratic decentralization and the secret ballot have meant the ever increasing emergence of rule by numbers in villages which means in effect rule by those who can command the largest number of votes. According to Gould in the modernizing Indian society the future of India's villages appears destined to rest increasingly in the hands of a kind of middle-class peasantry who represent an amalgam of endogamous castes that were formerly far more differentiated ritually, economically, occupationally and politically than they are now or even will be again.⁴² In the economic sphere, one important change is that the caste community is no longer homogenous in occupation and wealth, for caste is today, according to Kathleen Gough, a limiting rather than determining factor in the choice of occupation.⁴³

Caste and Class

The analysis of caste-class relationship has been one of the important aspects of the study of caste and politics in India. To begin with, caste and class are not antithetical to each other. According to K.L. Sharma, 'both are viewed as concomitant and co-existent as dimensions of the same social formations.⁴⁴ In fact, different forms of cleavages co-exist in the social structures at different levels of dominance and dormancy. The components of social structure, experiencing certain configuration of forces at a certain time, exhibit 'class' characteristics, and the same structure allows caste to be dominant identity at another point of time under a different configuration of forces.⁴⁵ In terms of actual process, various bases of stratification operation in combination and in a

cumulative manner, gather salience in a particular time context. Such changes give rise to different kinds of illusions of disappearance, or emergence of certain factors. At the very next moment, the factor that looked like 'disappearing' emerges again, often with stronger thrust and the other factors that seemed to be 'merging' is no longer perceptible.⁴⁶

However, caste has been more important than class. Even a communist leader and thinker, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, admitted that 'there is a certain amount of intermingling between the two factors, class and caste. In the pre-capitalist society such as ours, caste is the main form through which class manifests itself.'⁴⁷ Gould has also observed that caste and class have never been entirely mutually exclusive categories of social organization in India. The problem has been, of course, that until very recently, class formations have always been compelled to take a back seat to the far more prominent and dominant complex of caste relationships.⁴⁸ Moreover, ethnic identities have tended to obfuscate class-identities, and there can be few countries on earth where the potentiality and impetus for such obfuscation have been greater.⁴⁹

Far from being anti-theatrical, caste and class supplement each other. There is a caste basis of class and class basis of caste, hence both are variable and consequences of one another. There is a class basis of rituals, pollution purity, and other apparently non-material aspects of social life. For instance, to quote K.L. Sharma, '*Jat Sabha* is not a simple caste association; in effect, it is a peasants' organization. *Kisan Sabha* is not a simple peasants' organization; it is very much an association of castes engaged in agriculture, particularly *Jats* in Northern Indian and their counterparts in other states.⁵⁰ The other side of the picture, however, is that since all the members of a caste do not enjoy a similar economic position, caste and class can not be equated. There are economic differentiations, though not always antagonistic, within each caste, and the dominant political elite of the caste by and large comes from or with the support of upper economic strata. In order to seek the support of the caste members in political sphere, the elite appeal to the caste sentiments and invoke caste consciousness so that harmony among the members is maintained despite economic differentiations. Thus, economic differentiations tend to develop classes within caste and caste ideology, that is a sense of the same social status of the members based on the principle of pollution and purity, attempts to blur the differentiations and to invoke a sense of oneness among the members. At the same time, the political elite of the upper economic class ally, whenever necessary, with the members of the same class outside their caste to attain and maintain politico-economic dominance.⁵¹

It may, however, be noted that there is no uniform pattern of the relationship between caste and class. For instance, castes occupying leading positions in the

competitive economy of the Punjab are also leading castes among Sikhs and Hindus. These dominant castes are in a position to mobilize their respective fellowmen to defend their economic and political interests. On the contrary, the situation is quite different in Bihar where caste is used openly in a most virulent form to divide the society into real life situations. Castes are presenting themselves as confederations and *senas* (armies) against one another. The state is divided into forwards, backwards, *Harijans*, *Adivasis* and Muslims. Caste encounters, occupying by fights, feuds, murders, etc. have been quite frequent.⁵²

Caste-class relationship is also analyzed in the context of modernization. It is repeatedly argued that the process of modernization will result in replacement, if not disappearance, of the caste basis of stratification. Andre Beteille, for instance, point out that in the traditional structure the cleavages of caste, class, and power tended much more than today to run along the same grooves. This is no longer the case at present. The social system has acquired a much more complex and dynamic character, and now there is a tendency for cleavages to cut across one another.⁵³ Furthermore, the process of economic change and political modernization have led to the productive system and the organization of power to acquire an increasing degree of autonomy.⁵⁴ In the concrete, the overlap between hierarchies of caste class, and power has been progressively reduced.

Gould is more specific in tracing the impacts of modernization on caste vis-à-vis class. He states that by the nineteen seventies a new sociological plateau was being reached. The national social stratification system had acquired a more comprehensive look. While the national system of social stratification, whose development accompanied these changes fell far short of dissolving (as Marx put it) the traditional division of labour, it had become a potent competitor of caste as a basis for ordering human relationships. By now the raw material for class formation were in place. There were a number of nationally integrated social strata with membership numerous enough and interests sufficiently in common to have the potentiality to become true social classes in the sense of engaging in self-conscious political mobilization. These included the cultivating peasantry, the business laborers, government servants and the military. At least three had already shown the signs of incipient class formation by the seventies: the cultivating peasantry (as an outgrowth of the Green Revolution), the business community (those sections of it that were urbanized and reliant upon modern productive, financial and marketing technologies), and the industrial work force (especially in the major urban centers and largest industrial enterprises).⁵⁵ Undoubtedly, however, one of the first indications that economic development had finally progressed enough to facilitate class-

based mobilization on a significant scale was the sociological impact which the Green Revolution had on its principal beneficiaries, the agricultural producers, in different parts of India. In the Hindi belt, it resulted in the emergence of peasant leaders, such as the late Chaudhri Charan Singh, and Jairam Verma of U.P., and Karpoori Thankur of Bihar, who molded the middle- caste into an increasingly self-conscious political force by asserting that, shared economic interest's transcended caste and communal differences.⁵⁶

It is predicted that if there is anything about India's sociological future that bears watching, it is the possibility that after more than four decades of life as 'transitional' society in which caste, community and other ascriptive structures have virtually monopolized the field of political mobilization, class formation may at last be on the verge of gaining some measure of ascendancy. At the very least, the future appears to indicate a significant alteration in the relationship between these modes of social stratification.⁵⁷ In support of this assertion, Gould, while analyzing the results of the Eighth General Elections in India (1984) presented the thesis that "class formations are assuming increasing importance in Indian Political life."⁵⁸ But he also admitted at the same time that the eighth general elections and the assembly elections which followed on its heels made it clear that 'the more traditional structures of power and political interaction still played crucial roles in the out-come of events.'⁵⁹ It may, thus be stated that both caste and class are going side by side as the basis of mobilization in India.

The Concept of Dominant Caste

In the study of the interaction between caste and politics in India the concept of 'dominant caste' has been very important. It was coined by professor M.N. Srinivas during early nineteen fifties. It first appeared in his work: "The Social system of a Mysore Village" but found more elaborate explanation in his study: "The Dominant Caste in Rampura." A number of scholars have relied on it while examining the relationship of caste and politics at the state and village levels. At the same time, it has also been criticized on certain grounds.

Initially, the dominant caste was defined by Srinivas in the following words: "A Caste may said to be 'dominant' when it preponderates numerically over the other castes, and when it also wields preponderant economic and political power. A large and powerful caste group can more easily be dominant if its position in the local caste hierarchy is not too low."⁶⁰ This definition suggests that for a caste to be dominant it is not necessary that it must be ritually superior but what is necessary is the numerical strength and 'preponderant economic and political power.' In another article' Srinivas noted the rise of 'dominant castes' in politics everywhere in India. He stated that the general

elections of 1957 have confirmed Indian observers in their assessment of the political role of caste. It is particularly the so-called 'dominant' castes which have emerged as the focal points of political power. There is a shift of importance from the numerically small castes of highest ritual status and a tradition of literacy and learning, which enabled them to benefit most from Western education, to numerically stronger castes of great economic power, which nowadays dominate village affairs and through the voting power of their numbers make their influence felt right up to the cabinets of states.⁶¹ He also noted that the creation of linguistic states has enhanced the influence of some of the dominant castes.

Srinivas's concept of dominant caste was criticized particularly by Lewis Dumont.⁶² He opined that the ownership of land, or the possession of superior rights in land, is the sole source of dominance, and further argued that the question of the strength of the numbers of a caste at the village or other local levels is irrelevant to dominance, since landowners are able to obtain the services of the landless through the institution of the clientship. Thus, unlike Srinivas, who gives more importance to the numerical factor in determining the locus of domination in terms of caste, Dumont places a far greater emphasis upon the factor of land-holding. Hence, whatever may be the numerical situation, Dumont would call any caste dominant if it enjoys the economic and political power based on the control of the land.⁶³ Dumont's major contention was that the strength of number's is not a pre-condition for a caste to be dominant.

In response to Dumont's criticism, M.N.Srinivas, in his work: "The Dominant Caste and Other Essays", claims that a caste section, even belonging to low status, may be able to win the respect of other castes if it had strength of numbers. The strength of numbers thus provides some protection against the worst forms of oppression and abuse, particularly for non-untouchable castes. In other words, strength of numbers can be translated into social rank. On the other hand, the high status castes lacking in strength of numbers may feel unsafe.⁶⁴ Srinivas, however, concedes the importance of clientship but considers it insufficient for a caste to be dominant. In his study of Rampur village⁶⁵, he states that "while clientship was important in binding together members of different castes together, it alone was not enough to ensure a miniscule caste owing a great deal of land to become dominant."⁶⁶ Moreover, it seems that in view of Dumont, landownership is everything and numbers are nothing that landowning caste is able to control the other residents in the village through the institution of clientship which gives the latter dependent rights in land, or to a share in the produce of specific piece of land. Srinivas disagrees with Dumont's assumption that clientship always meant total

subservience and loyalty to the patron is difficult to justify. He states that factions were always a part of the rural social structure and marginal clients were prone to change patrons. Besides, there was always the horizontal tie of caste pulling against the patron-client tie.⁶⁷

Like Dumont, S.C. Dube also have reservations in agreeing with Srinivas's concept of dominant caste. Though he concedes that numerical strength is an important element of dominance yet it does not necessarily make a caste dominant.⁶⁸ He states that it will be meaningful to speak of 'dominant caste' only when power is diffused in the group or at least a sizeable part of it. When there are pronounced inequalities of wealth, prestige, and power between different individuals in a so-called dominant caste and where dominant individuals exploit the weaker elements in their own caste as well as the non-dominant caste it will perhaps be inappropriate to think of it as dominant caste. Dube is of the view that "unity and concerted before we locate dominance in a caste on the basis of criteria specified by Srinivas."⁶⁹ He further states that the fact that a number of dominant individuals occupying most of the power position belong to a particular caste is, by itself, not enough to characterize the caste as dominant caste. Where these conditions exist a caste can become dominant. In their absence, however, the community power structure can be best understood in reference to dominant individual, dominant faction and their complex alignment.⁷⁰

On his part Srinivas does not agree with Dube's notions of 'dominant individuals' and 'dominant factions.' he contends that both 'dominant individuals' and 'dominant factions' owe their dominance to the fact that they are a part of the dominant caste.⁷¹ He further adds that if not all, the leaders of the 'dominant faction' hail from the dominant caste except in areas where there are two rival castes each striving to establish its dominance. Furthermore, the unit of caste, particularly that of a dominant caste, is not something static and constant, but dynamic and contextual. Srinivas, however, concedes that "I have never claimed that dominant caste provided the total explanation for the phenomenon of power in rural India."⁷²

Despite the above criticism, the concept of dominant caste may help to understand the interplay of caste and politics at the village and state levels with some exceptions. All in all, as Srinivas has observed, post-independence India is certainly at the regional level, the India of dominant castes. The dominant castes are prominent in politics and the professions, and they have left their mark on every institution, and on the culture of each state. This has been accomplished more thoroughly in those states which possess very large and powerful dominant castes such as Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka.

Furthermore, in pre-independence period, the castes with high ritual status and owing large quantity of local land could exercise dominance in village despite being the fact that they could be less in numbers. But in recent years dominance is tending till more towards caste which are populous. Srinivas has also stated in this regard that since independence the forces of democracy and secularization have been so strong that power tends to more inexorably in favour of numbers.⁷³ But, he also states that since castes which are dominant today are both numerically strong and own a substantial quantity of land, they are clearly the most popular section of the rural population in India. The case of *Jats* in Punjab is in the instance. The poorer members of the village are bound to them by ties of clientship. Factions weaken dominant castes no doubt but then they also weaken dependent castes. Weakening clientship makes clients less reliable but the presence of large numbers of the poor and landless ensures a constant supply of clients to rich patrons.⁷⁴

Interplay of Caste and Politics

The interplay of caste and politics is studied in terms of modernity and tradition. The relationship between modernity and tradition is no longer viewed as dictomous. This is evidently clear from a number of developing areas.⁷⁵ The development process is analyzed in the context of democratic politics. The political and developmental institutions do not anywhere function in a vacuum. They tend, of necessity, to find bases in society either through existing organizational forms or by invoking new structures that cut across these forms. Moreover, a society that cares for legitimacy on wider basis, and democratic society is pre-eminently such a society, can proceed only by a conversation between the old and the new, a fusion of elements, and the readiness on the part of both the moderns and the ancients to be flexible and accommodative.⁷⁶

In fact, there is a close association between the processes of democratization and modernization. With competitive politics both Individuals and a society can fuses elements of modern cosmopolitan world with their own historic sense of individuality. This process of blending lies at the heart of modernizing process.⁷⁷ For its successful conduct, and out of necessity too, the democratic politics must be built upon a bargaining process in which the particular interests of all are respected and in which the politician seeks to perform a brokerage role in aggregating interests into various policy mixes. Out of the tension between special and general interests arise both the dynamic basis for democratic politics and the fundamental consensus which moulds diversity and flexibility into the unity and strength of modern polity.⁷⁸ Moreover, the Rudolphs have emphasized that modernity do necessarily incorporate traditional aspects. For instance, "The persistence of caste communities in contemporary Indian politics and ethnic and religious ones in modern American

politics suggests that political modernity, contrary to broadly shared assumptions, may involve ascriptive and corporative features."⁷⁹

While studying the politics of developing areas, Almond and Coleman have also observed that as a matter of fact "No political system is either absolutely 'traditional' or 'modern' all political systems are 'mixed' systems in the cultural sense. There are no 'all-modern' cultures and structures, in the sense of rationality and no 'all-primitive' ones in the sense of traditionally. Between the 'primitive' and the 'modern' there is a continuum and not dictomous distinctions."⁸⁰ It is also to be noted that the process of political development involves a shift from the values and sentiments which held people together in traditional political communities and structures to those necessary for more developed ones.⁸¹ For instance, Lucian W. Pye has observed regarding the political development in the societies like India, that, "if these new societies are going to achieve a new level of integration, they must find methods for giving representation to both cosmopolitan and parochial forces. Out of the interplay of representative politics it is possible for a society to realize a fundamental fusion of the world culture and the indigenous traditions."⁸² Moreover, a 'modernizing' society is neither modern nor traditional. It simply moves from one threshold of integration and performance to another, in process transforming both the indigenous structure and attitudes and the newly introduced institutions and ideas.⁸³

It is generally observed that natural associations based on religion, language, ethnicity and locality have not been assimilated or dissolved in modern nations.⁸⁴ In fact, they continue to play important, sometimes decisive, roles in their societies and politics. Indeed, the crosscutting forces that arise in modern pluralist societies have not prevented their formally voluntary structures from taking on ascriptive features.⁸⁵ Moreover, it is also observed that in low-income and traditional societies people are primarily motivated by religious, cultural or other non-materialistic considerations while in developed societies people are motivated by economic considerations of gain and find psychic satisfaction from innovating all manner of development.⁸⁶ Highlighting the potentiality of the primordial ties to influence political process, Almond and Coleman have noted that, "in larger and more complex societies (as is found in India) caste and religious community, along with village and other affiliations, may constitute particularistic sub-systems; and membership in the larger territorial and political socialization to it may be viable these sub-systems."⁸⁷ Thus, it may be said that the primordial identities play an important role in the politics of modern and particularly of transitional societies.

The dominant characteristic of the political system in India is that there has not yet emerged sphere of political articulation which is clearly separated from the

mere basic pattern of social and personal relations. Indeed, social loyalty, ethnic identity and personal affiliations tend to influence the pattern of mobilization and behaviour.⁸⁸ Rajni Kothari states in this regard that the "incipient dissolution of the traditional structure of affiliations and loyalties at a time when the new structures are still in a fluid form inevitably leads to fitful state of both parochial and universalistic loyalties, and exposes the political structure to both traditionalist and modernist pulls."⁸⁹ The role played by primordial identities in India has been so persistent that it led one prominent scholar on Indian politics to say that "the identities of language, religion, and caste have been used so persistently for the mobilization of political support in the last forty years that they have now come to be regarded as unalterable features of our political landscape."⁹⁰

In fact, caste is so tacitly and so completely accepted by all, including, those most vocal in condemning it, that it is everywhere the unit of social action.⁹¹ It is deeply rooted in Hindu mind, that no amount of intellectual enlightenment compels it to quit its hold.⁹² In India, castes and sub-castes dominate social life, and inevitably influence their members' attitude to other, groupings of social or political character.⁹³ Far from being disappeared caste grouping and more formal caste associations have become mediating and mobilizing institutions in Indian politics.⁹⁴ Srinivas argues in this regard that the development of modern communications, the spread of education and literacy and rising prosperity, have contributed, not to the disintegration of caste, but to its strengthening. With its growing solidarity, caste has been politicized and drawn into the political system as a major actor.⁹⁵ He concludes that roads, railways, postage, telegraph, cheap paper, and printing have enabled castes to organize as they have never done before.

In fact, the interaction between caste and politics is a two-way traffic. By drawing the caste system into its web of organization politics finds material for its articulation and moulds into its own design. In making politics their sphere of activity, caste and kin groups, on the other hand, get a chance to assert their identity and to strive for positions.⁹⁶ Politics seeks its basis in society. But politics is not necessarily a blue print of social forces nor always and end product of other determinants. It is itself an independent variable. It is potential force for social change.

The modern state manipulates social-cultural diversity. It is "not merely the impartial arbiter of the socio-cultural diversity which it encompassed (whatever form the diversity must take but rather, through concerted efforts of power-holding, self-interested elites, the active manipulator of that diversity."⁹⁷ In fact, the rise of modern democratic institutions provided, what Rajni Kothari calls, "a new scheme of universalistic-particularistic relationships."⁹⁸ Within which the

sub-cultural, class, and ethnic attributes of caste prove highly functional in the contemporary social order. Caste has become functional in response to the demands of competitive democratic politics. It provides, "channels of communication and bases of leadership and organization which enable those still submerging in the traditional society and culture to transcend the technical-political illiteracy which would otherwise handicap their ability to participate in democratic politics."⁹⁹ The operation of competitive politics has drawn caste out of its a political context and given it a new status and identity that the " caste system" has hitherto known has begun to disintegrate.¹⁰⁰ The role of caste in Indian politics suggests the broader process by which an atomized and divided community gains consciousness and unity, entering the political system as a major actor.¹⁰¹

The relationship that caste bears to politics has been understood in terms of three types of political mobilization, each suggestive of different phases of political development: vertical, horizontal and differentia. Vertical mobilization is the marshalling of political support by traditional notables in local societies that are organized and integrated by rank, mutual dependence and the legitimacy of traditional authority. Notables reach vertically into such social system by attaching dependents and socially inferior groups to themselves through their interests and deference. Vertical mobilization remain a viable strategy until dependents, tenants and clients become sufficiently politicized by ideological appeals to class or community interests or sentiments.¹⁰² On the other, horizontal mobilization involves the marshalling of popular support by class or community leaders and their specialized organization. Ignoring the leaders and members of natural associations or little platoons, they made direct ideological appeals to classes or communities. Horizontal mobilization of solidarities among class or community equals introduces a new pattern of cleavage by challenging the vertical solidarities and structure of traditional societies. In India a central structure for this purpose has been transformed version the marshalling of direct and indirect political support by political parties (and other internally differentiated communities through parallel appeals to ideology, sentiment, and interest. The agent of mobilization in this case is the political party rather than the local notable or community association.¹⁰⁴

The relationship of the caste to social and political change and to the conduct of government and politics depends upon many factors. Some of the factors that affect its role include (1) the number and size of other caste actors, (2) regional differences and their effect on the caste profile of particular states; (3) differences in the levels and characteristics of relevant political system; (4) the relative significance of dominant and subject castes and the related propensities

toward vertical and horizontal mobilization; (5) changes over time in the social and political environment in which particular castes operate; (6) the degree of self-consciousness and cohesion that characterize particular castes; and (7) the countervailing of other castes, interest groups, and integrative forces, particularly political parties.¹⁰⁵

When caste as such is drawn into political arena, it can compete for position, but it cannot be separate. Caste seeks to be accommodated. When caste moves upwards into the modern political structure that is when caste affiliation acquires significance in super-local politics it looks for effective means of improving its position within the established order. On occasion such means have seemed to present themselves in the form of distinct political organizations.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, when castes come to mobilize themselves politically, they are concerned with the distribution of values, status, and resources within a political system. Their role in politics is more akin to that of interest and ethnic groups.

Caste-Politics Interaction at Different Levels

The politics of caste varies with context and level. Disparate, though interacting political system of village, block, district, state legislative assembly and national parliamentary constituencies, and state affect the form and force of caste factors in politics.¹⁰⁷ So far, it has been observed that caste influences politics more at the farther one moves from the district level, i.e., towards the state and national level, the more important universalistically integrated social formations (i.e. classes or social structure heavily infused with class values) become. Down in the assembly segments which are the 'elemental' units for elections to legislative bodies (and building blocks for parliamentary constituencies), caste, community and micro-party still count in the effort to assemble coalitions of interests of sufficient breadth and diversity to win elections. Branches of the party organization operating at this level concert their energies and patronage resources on reaching out to those sections of the local population likely to support candidates not merely because their ideology and that of their party corresponds to their perceived economic interest but because the candidate's sponsor) is right as well.¹⁰⁸

Moreover, it is easier in the face-to-face political community of the village and the immediate locality than in distant and impersonal settings to manipulate caste cleavages for political purposes. On the other hand, at higher levels of politics, politicians, must have recourse to the representation of independent interests and to ideological and programmatic appeals through more manifest and specialized political structures, particularly the political party.¹⁰⁹ Morris Jones, who has viewed that the politics in India is conducted through three

idioms, viz., modern, traditional, and the saintly, has observed that at the stage level, in particular, the political representatives speak both the languages—traditional as well as modern. A member of legislative assembly becomes "bilingual." He adds that "even state ministers have to operate in the two languages. Indeed, one might say that the successful chief Ministers are those who are equally skilled in both idioms (i.e., traditional as well as modern)."¹¹⁰

In the words of Iqbal Narain the primordial ties based on 'caste, religion language, and region (which constitute the infrastructure) form, besides class, the key-board of state politics.'¹¹¹ In particular, as M.N. Srinivas has observed, that no explanation of provincial politics in any [part of India is possible without reference to caste. The principle of caste is so firmly entrenched in our social and political life that everyone, including the leaders, has accepted tacitly that, in the provincial cabinets at any rate, each major caste should have a minister.¹¹² Thus, as Gould observes, it is at the provincial or more-specifically at the district level that the primordial ties play greater role in shaping the contours of politics. In fact, caste community and a variety of other inter-related personality social networks form the basis for tightly compacted local structures of power. At this level, the interplay between universalistically integrated social structures in opposite from what is found at national level. Caste content at this end of the continuum.¹¹³ The Rudolphs have also observed that because castes are ordinarily bounded by language, they have affected Indian political life more at the state and local levels than at the national level. In the South, where efforts have been made to draw linguistic and state boundaries congruently, castes do not reach beyond the state. In the North, along with Hindi belt, castes can be found in more than one sometimes in all four Hindi-speaking states. Despite the possibilities that northern situation creates, castes have not yet been mobilized politically across state boundaries.¹¹⁴

The 'delinking' of national and provincial elections which began toward the end of the sixties, made a further contribution to the current structure of Indian polity. Delinking produced much higher order of differentiation between political behaviour of the national level and provincial levels that was true from 1971. It has heightened even further the double-tiered character of the Indian political system which was present in some measure from its inception.¹¹⁵ In this two-tiered political system both tiers articulate with one another differently depending upon whether elections are national or provincial in focus. Gould is of the view that the processes which have been producing nationally integrated social structures give every indication of expanding their scope still further as time passes. Caste, community and other personalistically-rooted structures of local power may yield further ground to universalistically rationalization, mass-media development, educational expansion and the ramification of the

consumer economy.¹¹⁶ Under such conditions, Gould opines that, it is possible that the two-tiered political system, which currently give such a different character to national and provincial elections, and sustains such wide variety of political parties, will in time become more homogeneous.¹¹⁷

Caste Associations and Caste Federations

Caste association and caste federations have been the important agencies of transmission between the traditional and modern sectors and between caste and politics in particular. Caste associations are viewed as 'para-communities that enable members of castes to pursue social mobility, political power, and economic advantage.'¹¹⁸ According to the Rudolphs, caste association is no longer an ascriptive association in the sense in which caste taken as *Jati* was and is. It has taken on the features of the voluntary association.¹¹⁹ they also opine that the caste associations are the product of the impacts of modernity on Indian society. The emergence of caste associations was associated with many of the objective changes. Those were: improved means of communication, western education and the subjective and objective efforts of new economic opportunities associated with the growth of marked economy and the penetration of state economic activity. On the one hand, these forces undermined the hold of the traditional culture and society as it was organized in relatively autonomous units, on the other hand, they created the conditions under which local sub-castes (*Jatis*) could be linked together in geographically extended associations.¹²⁰

Although the caste associations functioned in the social realm for a cause which was primarily social, they nevertheless prepared the background for transforming social identity into political identity. By providing a structure for the pursuit of political power, social status, and economic interest, the 'paracommunity' based on caste sentiment and interest makes secular concerns and representative democracy comprehensible and manageable to ordinary Indians. The most significant aspect of the caste associations in the contemporary era is said to be its capacity to organize what appears to be a politically illiterate mass electorate. Doing so enabled it to realize in some measure its new formed aspirations and to educate its members in the methods and values of political democracy. The Rudolphs has stated that 'It is the caste association that has given caste a new vitality and it is political democracy with has transformed caste and enabled it to play its paradoxical role in India. Rather than providing the bases for reaction caste has absorbed and strengthened some of the new democratic values. It is the association which links the mass electorate to the new democratic process and makes them comprehensible in traditional terms to a population still largely politically illiterate.'¹²¹

Some other scholars, however, do not attach much importance to the role played by caste associations in the realm of politics. Andre Beteille, for instance, states that 'many people have drawn attention the part played by caste associations in the articulation of interests, but in general their political role has been greatly exaggerated. Often they exist only on paper or engage in minor welfare activities.'¹²² He further states that, 'even in Tamilnadu important political have won elections without knowing the names of the office-bearers of their respective caste associations. In Bengal, where such associations proliferated greatly a few decades ago, they are now almost wholly defunct. Even where very powerful caste associations exist, as in Kerala, they do not stand in a simple on-to-one relationship with political parties. Generally, all the major parties draw support from all the major caste groups, though in unequal degree.'¹²³ Hence, the diversity in views exists over the relate importance of caste associations for politics.

Although caste federations are almost equally important as linkage agencies, yet they have received less attention than caste associations. In contrast to caste associations, caste federations are 'composed of not one but several castes which may sometimes be socially homogeneous but which may at other times simply have some special interest or political object in common. The interesting thing about the caste federation is that, once formed on the basis of caste identities, it goes on to acquire non-caste functions, becomes more flexible in organization as time passes, even begins to accept members and leaders from castes other than those with which it started, stretches out to new regions, and also makes common cause with other voluntary associations, interest groups and political parties. In course of time, the federation becomes a distinctly political group, wielding considerable bargaining strength and numerical power, but still able to appeal to caste sentiments and consciousness by adopting a common label. Caste Federations have gone far beyond the earlier caste associations in articulating group interests along political channels.

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5. Senart, as quoted by Hutton, *op.cit.*, p. 50.
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10. See, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1964), p. 399.
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12. According to Harold A. Gould, a non-industrial society is characterized by the following features: (1) Production within the framework of kinship groups: All goods and services created by persons working as members of corporate kin groups of some kind and inheriting their occupation thereby; (2) Peasant-Village Committees: essentially small to medium-sized clusters of households engaged primarily in subsistence and secondarily in the productions of agricultural and other surpluses which are administratively appropriated by non agricultural urban elites for their own maintenance and apotheosis and, (3) Small-scale urban centers: comprising ten per cent or less of the total population; cities house the ruling classes, administrative professionals, specialists in the productions of practical, sacerdotal and cultural objects and services, unskilled workers, soldiers, traders, merchants, adventures, etc. (See, Harold A. Gould, *Politics & caste*, Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1990), p. 164-65.
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21. See, for instance, R.H. Lowie, *Social Organisation*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), p. 274.
22. Harold A. Gould, *The Hindu Caste System*, (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1987), pp. 1-2.
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24. The term 'twice-born' is a generalized category for the upper three varnas (Brahmin, Kashtriya and Vaishya) from the scriptural sacrament of the second 'birth', the *Upanayanan* rite, at which a boy is formally separated from his pre-initiation status and takes a last meal as a child with his mother. He undergoes a token transition status, acting for a few moments or hours as an ascetic student bound for the great religious center, Benaras. He is incorporated in his new status when he receives a sacred verse from his spiritual mentor and is invested with the sacred thread worn across the left shoulder.
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27. See, M.N. Srinivas, social change in Modern India, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-56.
28. In this regard, see also Srinivas, *Caste in Modern India and Other Essays*, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), pp. 42-41.3.
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30. Karl Marx, *The British Rule in India*, Selected Works, Vol.II, pp.661-62, as quoted by Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 22.
31. Gould, *Politics and Caste*, op. cit., p. 117.
32. In order to have a thorough view of the impacts of modernity on caste system and the latter's adaptability, see, in particular, Harold A. Gould, *The Hindu Caste System*, Vol. II., Caste Adapting in Modernizing Indian Society, (Delhi: Chanakaya Publications, (1988), and Srinivas, *Caste in Modern India and Other Essays*, op. cit.
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34. Lloyd Rudolph and Sussane Hoerber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 23-24.
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POLITICAL CULTURE: MEANING, SIGNIFICANCE AND TYPES

STRUCTURE

2.2.0 Objectives

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2.2.0 Objectives

By the end of this chapter, the student shall be able to:

- To understand the meaning of political culture.
- To know the types of political culture.
- To explore different theories of political culture.
- To understand the significance and contribution of political culture.

- To know the future of a theory of political culture.

2.2.1 Meaning and Definitions of Political Culture

The term '**political culture**' is used in the field of social science. It refers to historically-based, widely-shared beliefs, feelings, and values about the nature of political systems, which can serve as a link between citizens and government. Different countries have different political cultures, which can help us understand how and why their governments are organized in a certain way, why democracies succeed or fail, or why some countries still have monarchies. Understanding our own political culture can also provide clues to political relationships, such as those we share with each other or our governments.

In the United States, we may be tempted to think of political culture in terms of our voting status as a Democrat or Republican. However, it's important to understand that political culture differs from political ideology. The term '**political ideology**' refers to a code of beliefs or views about governments and politics that may influence the way we vote or whether or not we support certain legislative actions.

For example, two people can share a political culture, but have different political ideologies. In other words, a right-wing conservative can be from the same political culture as a left-wing liberal. In other words, political culture is something we share, while a political ideology is something we use to define ourselves and make political decisions.

Political Culture encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences.

Political culture is a recent term which seeks to make more explicit and systematic much of the understanding associated with such long-standing concepts as political ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political psychology, and the fundamental values of a people. Political culture, by embracing the political orientations of both leaders and citizens, is more inclusive than such terms as political style or operational code, which focus on elite behavior. On the other hand, the term is more explicitly political and hence more restrictive than such concepts as public opinion and national character.

The concept of political culture can be seen as a natural evolution in the growth of the behavioral approach in political analysis, for it represents an attempt to apply to problems of aggregate or systemic analysis the kinds of insights and knowledge which were developed initially by studying the political behavior of individuals and small groups.

More specifically, the concept of political culture was developed in response to the need to bridge a growing gap in the behavioral approach between the level of microanalysis, based on the psychological interpretations of the individual's political behavior, and the level of macroanalysis, based on the variables common to political sociology. In this sense the concept constitutes an attempt to integrate psychology and sociology so as to be able to apply to dynamic political analysis both the revolutionary findings of modern depth psychology and recent advances in sociological techniques for measuring attitudes in mass societies. Within the discipline of political science, the emphasis on political culture signals an effort to apply an

essentially behavioral form of analysis to the study of such traditional problems as political ideology, legitimacy, sovereignty, nationhood, and the rule of law.

Political culture is defined by the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences as the "set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system". It encompasses both the political ideals and operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the history of a political system and the histories of the members. Thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experience. Maria Eugenia Vázquez Semadeni defines political culture as "the set of discourses and symbolic practices by means of which both individuals and groups articulate their relationship to power, elaborate their political demands and put them at stake."

2.2.2 Conceptions

In 1963, two Americans, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, outlined three pure types of political culture that can combine to create civic culture. These three key features expressed by both men were composed to establish a link between the public and the government. The first of these features is "deference", which considers the concepts of respect, acknowledgment of "inferiority" or "superiority", and authority in society.

The second key feature is "consensus", which represents the key link between government and public agreement and appeasement. Support for appeasement may not always be shared by the whole nation, but as a whole people agree to sustain it, meaning it is a common agreement. There are various "Examples of Consensus" in British political culture: how we are governed as a whole, consensus regarding the welfare state, agreement as to who acts as head of state, and with what powers.

The third feature of British political culture is "homogeneity". Church attendance as a whole is decreasing. Sections of the Scottish and Welsh populations have called for independence.

2.2.3 Political philosophy of political culture

The term political culture was brought into political science to promote the American political system. The concept was used by Gabriel Almond in the late 50s, and outlined in The Civic Culture (1963, Almond & Verba), but was soon opposed by two European political scientists, Gerhard Lehbruch and Arend Lijphart. Lehbruch analysed politics in Switzerland and Austria and Lijphart analysed politics in Netherlands. Both argued that there are political systems that are more stable than the one in the USA.

2.2.4 Types of Political Culture

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture outlined four pure types of political culture based on level and type of political participation and the nature of people's attitudes toward politics:

1. Parochial Political Culture:

Where the people have no understanding of the national political system, do not possess any tendency to participate in the input processes and have no consciousness of the output

processes, such a type of political culture is called parochial political culture. African tribes and Eskimos fall in this category. Such types of people have no role to play in the political culture. Where citizens are only remotely aware of the presence of central government, and live their lives near enough regardless of the decisions taken by the state, distant and unaware of political phenomena. They have neither knowledge nor interest in politics. This type of political culture is in general congruent with a traditional political structure.

2. Subject political Culture:

This type of political culture is found in the subject countries and monarchies. There the people are aware of the governmental system whether they like it or not. They also know the role of the government regarding law making, enforcement of laws and tax collection etc. In this type of culture people are not taught to participate in the input functions. Sometimes they are not allowed to do so, so the people find it difficult how to influence the working of the political system. Where citizens are aware of central government, and are heavily subjected to its decisions with little scope for dissent. The individual is aware of politics, its actors and institutions. It is affectively oriented towards politics, yet it is on the "downward flow" side of the politics. In general, it is congruent with a centralized authoritarian structure.

3. Participant political Culture:

In this type of political culture people are quite keen to participate in the political system and influence its working. They are always busy making reasonable demands on the political system and are involved in the making of decisions. They develop a particular attitude towards the political system. Political parties and pressure groups (interest groups) fall in this category and decide for themselves what role they can play. Citizens are able to influence the government in various ways and they are affected by it. The individual is oriented toward the system as a whole, to both the political and administrative structures and processes (to both the input and output aspects). In general, it is congruent with a democratic political structure.

4. Political Sub-culture:

It is not necessary that all the groups in habiting a particular country may be equally advanced; some may be more advanced, while others may be less advanced. Therefore those groups who are more advanced, develop a participatory culture while others may still retain subject or parochial-culture. This is due to the reason that in many countries of the world there are different ethnic groups. Differences in political culture amongst them develop due to the difference in education, political training, economic and social background. Therefore the backward develop a political sub-culture of their own. Sub-culture also develops when the political system is unable to advance rapidly according to the fast-changing needs of the society, Sometimes new political structure may be introduced by the elite but certain people may not be able to cope with it.

Different typologies of political culture have been proposed. According to political scientist William S. Stewart, all political behavior can be explained as participating in one or more of eight political cultures: anarchism, oligarchy, Tory corporatism, fascism, classical liberalism, radical liberalism, democratic socialism, and Leninist socialism. Societies that exemplify each of these cultures have existed historically.

Almond and Verba wrote that these types of political culture can combine to create the civic culture, which mixes the best elements of each.

Arend Lijphart wrote that there are different classifications of political culture:

First classification:

- Mass political culture
- Elite political culture

Second classification (of elite political culture):

- Coalitional
- Contradictive

Lijphart also classified the structure of society:

- Homogeneous
- Heterogeneous

Structure of society (right) Political culture of elites (down)	homogeneous	heterogeneous
Coalitional	depoliticalised democracy	consecutive democracy
Contradictive	centripetal democracy	centrifugal democracy

2.2.5 Theories of Political Culture

In 1963, two political scientists, **Gabriel Almond** and **Sydney Verba**, published a study of the political cultures associated with five democratic countries: Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to Almond and Verba, there are three basic types of political culture, which can be used to explain why people do or do not participate in political processes.

In a **parochial political culture**, like Mexico, citizens are mostly uninformed and unaware of their government and take little interest in the political process. In a **subject political culture**, such as those found in Germany and Italy, citizens are somewhat informed and aware of their government and occasionally participate in the political process. In a **participant political culture**, like the United Kingdom and the United States, citizens are informed and actively participate in the political process.

Other theories of political culture address how political culture takes root and is transferred from generation to generation through **political socialization** and include Seymour Martin Lipset's **formative events theory**, which describes the long-lasting effects of key events that took place when a country was founded; Louis Hartz's **fragment theory**, which explains the long-lasting effects of European colonization on countries and societies; and Roger Inglehart's **post-materialism theory**, which explains the long-lasting effects of childhood economic and social conditions.

2.2.6 Examples of political culture

At the beginning of the lesson, we talked about how different countries have different political cultures. For example, American political culture can be defined according to some basic and commonly shared beliefs, such as our commitment to democracy, equality, free enterprise, and

individualism. Concepts related to liberty, nationalism, and reliance on a legislative body, instead of an individual ruler, are also unique to our political culture. The historical origins of our political culture can be traced to the American Revolution and the desire for liberty as well as our Puritan roots.

In this way different sections of the society may have different political orientations. So when a particular section of the society is clearly distinguishable from others in the same political system, then we find that it has developed a distinct political sub-culture of its own, France is the classic example of such sub-cultures. Generally, the various groups do not make the same effective contribution in a political system but in times of grave national crisis, they do so. In developing countries also political sub-cultures develop because of the differences of language, religion, class and caste. In India also, we find such sub-cultures among the tribal areas.

Moreover, there is always a fundamental difference between the political culture of the rulers (political leaders and bureaucrats) and the ruled. The ruled generally vote for a particular party at the time of general election.

After the formation of a government, they do not exercise any control over it. They only read something about the working of the government in the newspapers. The rulers develop a particular attitude or superiority complex towards the governed. In this way, we find the difference between the elite and mass political culture. Where the rulers, whatever they pretend, belong to elite culture; the ruled belong to mass culture. In this way, Myron Weiner has analysed Indian political culture with the help of a distinction between mass and elite political culture.

2.2.7 Political culture and socialization

Intellectual curiosity about the roots of national differences in politics dates from the writing of Herodotus, and possibly no recent studies have achieved the richness of understanding of such classic studies of national temperament as those by Tocqueville, Bryce, and Emerson. But the dynamic intellectual tradition which inspired political culture studies comes almost entirely from the studies of national character and the psycho-cultural analyses of the 1930s and 1940s. Benedict (1934; 1946), Mead (1942; 1953), Gorer (1948; 1953; 1955), Fromm (1941), and Klineberg (1950) all sought to utilize the findings of psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology to provide deeper understanding of national political behavior. A major objection to these studies was their failure to recognize that the political sphere constitutes a distinct subculture with its own rules of conduct and its distinct processes of socialization. The practice of moving directly from the stage of child training to the level of national decision making meant that crucial intervening processes were neglected.

2.2.8 Stages of socialization and political culture

The notion of political culture seeks to retain the psychological subtleties of the earlier national character studies while giving appropriate attention to the distinctive features of the political sphere and to the intervening stages of personality development between childhood and induction into adult political life. This is achieved by conceiving of two stages of socialization; the first is the induction into the general culture, while the second is the more particular, and usually more explicit, socialization to political life. In some forms of analysis it is useful to distinguish an additional stage, political recruitment to special roles within the political process. These stages

are not necessarily sequential; explicit political socialization can occur at a very early point, when the individual is still being socialized into his general culture.

Basic to the analysis of political cultures is the investigation of the relationships between the various stages of socialization and between the final political socialization process and the dominant patterns of behavior in the political culture. In some systems there is a fundamental congruence between the content of the various socialization processes and the existing political culture. Such congruences existed historically in the traditional political cultures of Japan, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Turkey (see Ward, pp. 27–82; Binder, pp. 396–449; Levine, pp. 245–281; Rustow, pp. 171–198 in Pye & Verba 1965). In such systems the values and attitudes internalized during the general socialization process are consistent with and reinforced by the attitudes and values stressed in the process of more explicitly political socialization; and the combined socialization processes tend in turn to support and reinforce the current political culture. Under such conditions the prospects are for the continued existence of a coherent and relatively stable political culture.

It is, however, also possible to distinguish various kinds of tensions and instabilities in political cultures according to the types of contradictions and inconsistencies in the socialization processes and between these processes and the requirements of the political system. The most dramatic examples of such contradictions are to be found in revolutionary systems in which the elite political culture is either shaped by a highly explicit and unculture-bound ideology or is the product of an exogenous historical experience such as colonialism.

In some societies the primary process of socialization tends to provide people with a strongly optimistic view of life and a deep sense of basic trust in human relations, while the later stages of political socialization emphasize cynicism and suspicion of political actors. As a result, the political culture is characterized by a critical and contemptuous view of existing political practices but is also colored by a strong Utopian faith that reform can ultimately remedy the existing situation. Thus cynicism is balanced by the expectation that reforms are worth seeking. This appears to have been the character of the cynicism which inspired the muckraking tradition in American politics. The same dynamics seem to be at work in the Philippines political culture (Grossholtz 1964). In other societies distrust of contemporary political institutions and personages is preceded by an earlier socialization process which instills a sense of fundamental distrust and suspicion, with the result that people have little faith in reformist solutions and feel that political improvement requires cataclysmic changes. Burma provides an example of this process.

2.2.9 Socializing agents of political culture

In shaping the political culture the political socialization process operates in terms of various socializing agents. Some of these agents, such as the family, tend to be prominent at the early phases of the socialization process, and thus their influences are most closely related to personality characteristics fundamental to the political culture. Other socializing agents, such as the mass media and political parties, tend to become critical at later stages and thus are primarily involved in influencing the more cognitive aspects of the political culture.

Much current research on different political cultures has sought to determine the relative importance of different kinds of socializing agents in shaping different aspects of the political culture and, thus, in evaluating the links between the sociological structure of the society and the political process. The family, for example, according to Hyman (1959), is peculiarly potent in the

United States in determining party loyalties, while formal education, according to Almond and Verba (1963) is most vital in producing commitment to democratic values. In studies of the transitional political systems of the underdeveloped countries, it has become apparent that the intensely politicized nature of these societies is often the result of the dominant role of partisan as against nonpartisan or constitutional agents of socialization. It is noteworthy that the trend toward one-party systems in sub-Saharan Africa is closely associated with the fact that nationalist parties were the only strong agency for socializing most of the newly politically conscious masses (Hanna 1964). When nonpartisan or politically neutral socializing agents are weak, social life tends to become highly politicized, and little appreciation is likely to exist for such fundamental constitutional institutions as an impartial bureaucracy and the rule of law. Studies of the process of nation building in societies in which the mass media are weak and cannot provide an objective view of national events suggests that constitutional development cannot become readily institutionalized under such conditions (see Conference ... 1963; Schramm 1964). This relationship between the socialization process and the ensuing political culture explains some basic difficulties in creating national institutions in countries where popular political consciousness was inspired by highly partisan and ideologically oriented independence movements.

2.2.10 Elite and mass subcultures

In all societies there are inevitably some differences between the political orientations of those who have responsibility for decisions and those who are only observers or participating citizens. A national political culture thus consists of both an elite subculture and a mass subculture, and the relationship between the two is another critical factor determining the performance of the political system. The relationship determines such crucial matters as the basis of legitimacy of government, the freedom and limitations of leadership, the limits of political mobilization, and the possibilities for orderly transfers of power.

Mass subcultures are rarely homogeneous, for there are usually significant differences between the politically attentive strata of the society and the elements who are little concerned with politics. In some cases the mass political culture is highly heterogeneous and sharp differences exist according to region, social and economic class, or ethnic community. In such cases, the pattern of relationships among the various subcultures becomes a crucial factor in describing the mass political culture.

In analyzing the extent to which the elite and mass subcultures contain complementary sets of values, it is useful to distinguish between those systems in which recruitment into the elite subculture is generally preceded by socialization into the mass subculture and those in which the channels of socialization are completely separate. In most stable, modern democratic societies the general pattern is for individuals to be socialized into the mass culture before being recruited to leading political roles, and thus the elite, in spite of gaining highly specialized skills and political knowledge, can still appreciate the basic values of the citizenry as a whole. It does not, of course, follow that in all cases people who rise out of the mass subculture will continue to be sympathetic or responsive to their background; indeed, in transitional societies leadership elements often have deep resentments against what they feel are the backward attitudes of those with whom they were once associated.

In most traditional, and many transitional, systems those destined for leadership positions tend to have quite different career lines, receive quite different forms of education, and have quite different social experiences from the mass of their followers. Even in many transitional societies the very basis of legitimacy of the leaders rests on the popular belief that they are men inherently set apart from others at birth.

A basic problem in the dynamics of political cultures relates to uneven changes in the socialization patterns of the two subcultures. Serious difficulties for the political system can arise when rulers discover that the mass subculture is no longer responsive to traditional leadership patterns but that they themselves have little skill in more modern ways of ruling. Or the opposite problem can arise when the elite subculture has been changed significantly by new patterns of elite socialization but the mass culture remains largely unchanged. Under such conditions leaders may be impatient for change, and in displaying little understanding and even outright scorn for the essential qualities of the mass culture they may create resentment in the population, who may feel that their leaders have lost their sense of the proprieties of ruling.

2.2.11 The content of political cultures

The content of political cultures is in large measure unique to each particular society. Studies of different political cultures therefore tend to emphasize different themes, and the ultimate test of the utility of a theory of political culture will depend upon its value for comparative and generalized analysis. Already there have been promising pioneering advances in comparative analysis in which similar qualities of political cultures have been related to a common type of political system. For example, Almond and Verba (1963) have identified the “civic culture” which underlies democratic political systems.

It would seem possible also to isolate some universal dimensions of political cultures in terms of certain inherent qualities of both political systems and the processes of personality formation.

Nathan Leites (1951; 1953) has demonstrated the value of analyzing elite political behavior character logically. It seems likely that further research will reveal that political cultures tend to manifest definable syndromes that are related either to recognized patterns of personality development or to general patterns of historical development, or to both. At this stage of knowledge it is possible only to suggest certain universal problems or themes with which all political cultures must deal in one manner or another.

2.2.12 Scope and function of political culture

Every political culture must define for its society the generally accepted scope or limits of politics and the legitimate boundaries between the public and private spheres of life. Scope involves definition of the accepted *participants* in the political process, the range of permissible *issues*, and the recognized *functions* of both the political process as a whole and the separate agencies or domains of decision making which collectively constitute the political process.

The scope of participants is in most systems formally defined by the requirements of citizenship, but in all systems there are usually also formal or informal limits relating to age, sex, social status, training, family connections, and the like which govern the recruitment process.

Similarly, in most political cultures certain issues are recognized as being outside the domain of politics or the jurisdiction of particular parts or agencies of the political process. The relationship of issues and functions can be highly specialized in the sense that particular issues are recognized

as being the special responsibility of special forms of decision making, such as electoral, parliamentary, bureaucratic, juridical, or technocratic expertise.

In democratic political cultures there is usually a clear sense of the appropriate boundaries of political life, explicit recognition of new issues as they arise, and respect to some degree for functional specialization in the handling of issues and for the relative autonomy of the different domains of political decision making. In totalitarian cultures there are few established boundaries of the political sphere of activity, explicit knowledge that all issues can become political, and some respect for functional specializations but little for the autonomy of the different domains. In transitional systems there are usually no clearly accepted boundaries of political life, but the impotence of politics provides actual limits: there is an expectation that all matters can become politicized, and there is little functional specialization or autonomy in the various domains of political decision making.

2.2.13 Concepts of power and authority

The process of legitimizing power has a critical bearing on the performance of a political system. Usually legitimization involves restraining the uses of potential power and placing limits upon the range of actions of particular institutions and power holders. This has been particularly true in Western political cultures and in the development of American constitutional theory in relation to the division of powers. These restraints of legitimacy sometimes take an absolutist form, with the result that no single institution or political actor can perform decisively and with full efficiency. In a few political cultures the process of legitimizing power proceeds in the opposite direction, so that legitimacy is conferred only upon those who can and do act decisively and effectively. This is particularly true in countries which have experienced a period of national humiliation as a result of weakness in international affairs. For example, the very effectiveness of the Chinese communists has been one of the most critical factors in giving the Peking government a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects. In democratic political cultures there are often ambiguous feelings about the need to restrain all power and the need for legitimate power to be effective. In transitional societies it is often difficult for any forms of power to become legitimized because all seem to have so much difficulty in being effective.

In all political cultures, concepts about power and authority have deep psychological dimensions because of the fundamental role of parental authority in the early socialization process. The skills that children develop in coping with family authority tend to provide a lasting basis for adult styles in dealing with authority. Thus, in some cultures it is widely assumed that authority can best be constrained by stressing issues of justice and fairness in a spirit of friendly informality, while in others the style is that of winning favor by displaying complete and abject submission.

2.2.14 Political integration

In varying ways and in differing degrees, political cultures provide people with a sense of national identity and a feeling of belonging to particular political systems. Basic to the problems of the integration of the political system is that of establishing a sense of national identity, and the problem of national identity is in turn a function of the process by which individuals realize their own separate senses of identity. This basic relationship between national identity and personal identity provides a fundamental link between the socialization process and the integration of the political process.

2.2.15 Evaluating performance

All political cultures contain standards for evaluating the effectiveness and competence of those performing specialized roles in the political system. Such standards generally depend upon popular views as to how national and community-wide problems should best be solved. In traditional cultures, problem solving was usually associated with the correct performance of rituals, and hence evaluation of performance was strongly influenced by skills displayed in ceremonies. Although modern political cultures recognize the central place of rationality in problem solving, there tend to be great differences among cultures in what is accepted as being rational. Judgment about skill in leadership is also influenced by the extent to which a society values the personal magnetism of leadership or the abilities of technical specialists and experts. Changes in the evaluative dimension of political cultures occur as new skills and professions are recognized as being relevant for solving national problems.

The evaluative aspect of political cultures must also reflect the inescapable fact that politics deals with future contingencies which lie beyond the range of ready prediction. Each political culture must provide some basis of faith in the forecasting powers of acceptable leaders. Traditionally, this faith was usually placed in the mystical and charismatic powers of personal leadership. In other cultures either divine or secularly inspired doctrines are presumed to be endowed with all necessary predictive powers. In still other cultures the very massiveness and essentially esoteric operation of bureaucracies and the complex machineries of government are enough to generate a popular faith that those in power have a grasp of the future. The ultimate test of leadership in all cases is skill in maintaining popular faith in the leader's capacity to deal with all possible contingencies.

2.2.16 Citizenship

Political culture is connected to notions of **citizenship** because political culture frequently includes an idea of what makes people good citizens. A **citizen** is a legal member of a political community, with certain rights and obligations. Because each country has its own requirements for citizenship and attendant rights, the definition of "citizen" varies around the world.

2.2.17 Political Culture and Change

Political culture changes over time, but these changes often happen slowly. People frequently become set in their ways and refuse to alter their attitudes on significant issues. Sometimes it can take generations for major shifts to occur in a nation's political culture.

2.2.18 Nation-Building and Political Culture

Political culture has presented great difficulties to the military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan engaged in nation-building during the early years of the twenty-first century. The United States is trying to build liberal democracies in these states, but in both places, long-held attitudes toward women and other ethnic groups, along with habits of obedience shaped by years of tyranny, have interfered. As a result, establishing democracies in these states could take a very long time.

2.2.19 Contribution of Political Culture

Political Culture is an important method to judge the development and modernization of a country. It has made a significant contribution to Political Science. Prof. S.P. Verma has highlighted the five main contributions of this approach.

First it has made Political Science a more complete social science.

Secondly, it has focused our attention on the study of political community or society as distinct from the individual and thus on the total political system.

Thirdly, it has encouraged political scientists to take up the study of social and cultural factors which are responsible for giving a political culture of a country its broad shape. Fourthly, it has helped us in combining the study of the national factors which shape the actions of the individuals to a large extent.

Lastly, it is the political culture approach which helped us to understand why different political societies inevitably moved in different directions of political development, or may be political development, or may be found, themselves suffering from severe constraints, socio-economic as well as political, which free them to move towards political decay”.

2.2.20 The future of a theory of political culture

As the foregoing discussion shows, there is an increasing body of propositions that seeks to relate aggregate and individual behavior in different political systems, so that it is now possible to talk of the growth of a *theory* of political culture. However, it is also appropriate to note several criticisms of this theory which reflect its current early stage of development.

It has been suggested that the concept represents little more than a new label for old ideas. To a degree, this is a valid observation but one that ignores the central purpose of the theory, which is to search for a new way of connecting psychological theory to the performance of the total political system.

At present the mere term “political culture” is capable of evoking quick intuitive understanding, so that people often feel that without further and explicit definition they can appreciate its meanings and freely use it. The very ease, with which the term can be used, however, means that there is considerable danger that it will be employed as a “missing link” to fill in anything that cannot be explained in political analysis.

This danger of tautology is particularly great in precisely the area which is now the most important for the future development of the theory—the relationship between political culture and political structures or institutions. If the concept of political culture is to be effectively utilized, it needs to be supplemented with structural analysis, but the difficulty is that political structures can be seen on the one hand as products reflecting the political culture, while on the other hand they are also important “givens” which shape the political culture.

These are problems which must be surmounted if the theory of political culture is to realize its early promise. The prospect is excellent that current research is going to set aside most of these objections and greatly advance the utility of a political culture theory. Recent systematic comparative research, based on survey methods, promises to clarify further the relationship between the political socialization processes and numerous dimensions of the political culture. The work of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba in identifying the components of the democratic political culture has already stimulated new attempts to evaluate the factors affecting democratic development throughout the world. In the 1960s Verba was directing a study applying

some of the hypotheses of *The Civic Culture* to India, Japan, Nigeria, and Mexico. The basic concepts of *The Civic Culture* have been utilized by Ward in analyzing Japanese developments, by Scott for Mexico, by Rose for England, and by Barghoorn for the Soviet Union (see pp. 83–129; 330–395; 450–511 in Pye & Verba 1965). Other research on the political and psychological inhibitions to economic growth is suggesting further critical dimensions to the modern political culture, whether democratic or not (McClelland 1961; Hagen 1962).

Even in its current state, the theory of political culture represents a significant advance in the direction of integrating psychology and sociology with political science to produce a richer and fuller understanding of politics.

2.2.21 Criticism

Almond and Powell have realised that the approach of political culture to the political system is inadequate. Critics have pointed out that the following difficulties come in the wake of this study:

- (1) The concept is merely a new label for an old idea;
- (2) Its definition is vague. Various political writers have given it a meaning of their own. So, this concept conveys conflicting ideas.
- (3) It is difficult to distinguish those elements which contribute to political culture from the elements which are generally found in the political culture.
- (4) It is not clear whether political institutions and practices are parts of the political culture or are its products.

CHECK YOUR KNOWLEDGE

1. Define political culture and discuss its types?

2. Discuss the significance, scope and future of the theory of political culture?

3. Criticize the theory of political culture.

2.2.22 Summary

Political culture is defined by the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences as the "set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system". It encompasses both the political ideals and operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the history of a political system and the histories of the members. Thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experience. María Eugenia Vázquez Semadeni defines political culture as "the set of discourses and symbolic practices by means of which both

individuals and groups articulate their relationship to power, elaborate their political demands and put them at stake."

In 1963, two Americans, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, outlined three pure types of political culture that can combine to create civic culture. These three key features expressed by both men were composed to establish a link between the public and the government. The first of these features is "deference", which considers the concepts of respect, acknowledgment of "inferiority" or "superiority", and authority in society. The second key feature is "consensus", which represents the key link between government and public agreement and appeasement. Support for appeasement may not always be shared by the whole nation, but as a whole people agree to sustain it, meaning it is a common agreement. There are various "Examples of Consensus" in British political culture: how we are governed as a whole, consensus regarding the welfare state, agreement as to who acts as head of state, and with what powers. The third feature of British political culture is "homogeneity". Church attendance as a whole is decreasing. Sections of the Scottish and Welsh populations have called for independence.

The term political culture was brought into political science to promote the American political system. The concept was used by Gabriel Almond in the late 50s, and outlined in The Civic Culture (1963, Almond & Verba), but was soon opposed by two European political scientists, Gerhard Lehmbruch and Arend Lijphart. Lehmbruch analysed politics in Switzerland and Austria and Lijphart analysed politics in Netherlands. Both argued that there are political systems that are more stable than the one in the USA.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture outlined four pure types of political culture based on level and type of political participation and the nature of people's attitudes toward politics:

1. Parochial Political Culture
2. Subject political Culture
3. Participant political Culture
4. Political Sub-culture

Every political culture must define for its society the generally accepted scope or limits of politics and the legitimate boundaries between the public and private spheres of life. Scope involves definition of the accepted *participants* in the political process, the range of permissible *issues*, and the recognized *functions* of both the political process as a whole and the separate agencies or domains of decision making which collectively constitute the political process.

All political cultures contain standards for evaluating the effectiveness and competence of those performing specialized roles in the political system. Such standards generally depend upon popular views as to how national and community-wide problems should best be solved.

Political culture is connected to notions of **citizenship** because political culture frequently includes an idea of what makes people good citizens. A **citizen** is a legal member of a political community, with certain rights and obligations. Because each country has its own requirements for citizenship and attendant rights, the definition of "citizen" varies around the world.

Political culture changes over time, but these changes often happen slowly. People frequently become set in their ways and refuse to alter their attitudes on significant issues. Sometimes it can take generations for major shifts to occur in a nation's political culture.

Political culture has presented great difficulties to the military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan engaged in nation-building during the early years of the twenty-first century. The United States is trying to build liberal democracies in these states, but in both places, long-held attitudes toward women and other ethnic groups, along with habits of obedience shaped by years of tyranny, have interfered. As a result, establishing democracies in these states could take a very long time.

Political Culture is an important method to judge the development and modernization of a country. It has made a significant contribution to Political Science. Prof. S.P. Verma has highlighted the five main contributions of this approach.

First it has made Political Science a more complete social science.

Secondly, it has focused our attention on the study of political community or society as distinct from the individual and thus on the total political system.

Thirdly, it has encouraged political scientists to take up the study of social and cultural factors which are responsible for giving a political culture of a country its broad shape. Fourthly, it has helped us in combining the study of the national factors which shape the actions of the individuals to a large extent.

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(4) It is not clear whether political institutions and practices are parts of the political culture or are its products.

2.2.23 Key Concepts/Words

Political Culture: Political Culture is defined by the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences as the "set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system". It encompasses both the political ideals and operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the history of a political system and the histories of the members. Thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experience. María Eugenia Vázquez Semadeni defines political culture as "the set of discourses and symbolic practices by means of which both individuals and groups articulate their relationship to power, elaborate their political demands and put them at stake."

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Parochial Political Culture: Where the people have no understanding of the national political system, do not possess any tendency to participate in the input processes and have no consciousness of the output processes, such a type of political culture is called parochial political culture. African tribes and Eskimos fall in this category. Such types of people have no role to play in the political culture. Where citizens are only remotely aware of the presence of central government, and live their lives near enough regardless of the decisions taken by the state, distant and unaware of political phenomena. They have neither knowledge nor interest in politics. This type of political culture is in general congruent with a traditional political structure.

Subject political Culture: This type of political culture is found in the subject countries and monarchies. There the people are aware of the governmental system whether they like it or not. They also know the role of the government regarding law making, enforcement of laws and tax collection etc. In this type of culture people are not taught to participate in the input functions. Sometimes they are not allowed to do so, so the people find it difficult how to influence the working of the political system. Where citizens are aware of central government, and are heavily subjected to its decisions with little scope for dissent. The individual is aware of politics, its actors and institutions. It is affectively oriented towards politics, yet it is on the "downward flow" side of the politics. In general, it is congruent with a centralized authoritarian structure.

Participant political Culture: In this type of political culture people are quite keen to participate in the political system and influence its working. They are always busy making reasonable demands on the political system and are involved in the making of decisions. They develop a particular attitude towards the political system. Political parties and pressure groups (interest groups) fall in this category and decide for themselves what role they can play. Citizens are able to influence the government in various ways and they are affected by it. The individual is oriented toward the system as a whole, to both the political and administrative structures and processes (to both the input and output aspects). In general, it is congruent with a democratic political structure.

Political Sub-culture: It is not necessary that all the groups inhabiting a particular country may be equally advanced; some may be more advanced, while others may be less advanced. Therefore those groups who are more advanced, develop a participatory culture while others may still retain subject or parochial-culture. This is due to the reason that in many countries of the world there are different ethnic groups. Differences in political culture amongst them develop due to the difference in education, political training, economic and social background. Therefore the backward develop a political sub-culture of their own. Sub-culture also develops when the political system is unable to advance rapidly according to the fast-changing needs of the society. Sometimes new political structure may be introduced by the elite but certain people may not be able to cope with it.

The content of political cultures: The content of political cultures is in large measure unique to each particular society. Studies of different political cultures therefore tend to emphasize

different themes, and the ultimate test of the utility of a theory of political culture will depend upon its value for comparative and generalized analysis. Already there have been promising pioneering advances in comparative analysis in which similar qualities of political cultures have been related to a common type of political system. For example, Almond and Verba (1963) have identified the “civic culture” which underlies democratic political systems.

It would seem possible also to isolate some universal dimensions of political cultures in terms of certain inherent qualities of both political systems and the processes of personality formation. Nathan Leites (1951; 1953) has demonstrated the value of analyzing elite political behavior character logically. It seems likely that further research will reveal that political cultures tend to manifest definable syndromes that are related either to recognized patterns of personality development or to general patterns of historical development, or to both. At this stage of knowledge it is possible only to suggest certain universal problems or themes with which all political cultures must deal in one manner or another.

Scope and function of political culture: Every political culture must define for its society the generally accepted scope or limits of politics and the legitimate boundaries between the public and private spheres of life. Scope involves definition of the accepted *participants* in the political process, the range of permissible *issues*, and the recognized *functions* of both the political process as a whole and the separate agencies or domains of decision making which collectively constitute the political process.

The scope of participants is in most systems formally defined by the requirements of citizenship, but in all systems there are usually also formal or informal limits relating to age, sex, social status, training, family connections, and the like which govern the recruitment process.

Similarly, in most political cultures certain issues are recognized as being outside the domain of politics or the jurisdiction of particular parts or agencies of the political process. The relationship of issues and functions can be highly specialized in the sense that particular issues are recognized as being the special responsibility of special forms of decision making, such as electoral, parliamentary, bureaucratic, juridical, or technocratic expertise.

In democratic political cultures there is usually a clear sense of the appropriate boundaries of political life, explicit recognition of new issues as they arise, and respect to some degree for functional specialization in the handling of issues and for the relative autonomy of the different domains of political decision making. In totalitarian cultures there are few established boundaries of the political sphere of activity, explicit knowledge that all issues can become political, and some respect for functional specializations but little for the autonomy of the different domains. In transitional systems there are usually no clearly accepted boundaries of political life, but the impotence of politics provides actual limits: there is an expectation that all matters can become politicized, and there is little functional specialization or autonomy in the various domains of political decision making.

Contribution of Political Culture: Political Culture is an important method to judge the development and modernization of a country. It has made a significant contribution to Political Science. Prof. S.P. Verma has highlighted the five main contributions of this approach.

First it has made Political Science a more complete social science.

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2.2.24 Exercise Questions

1. Define political culture?
2. Discuss the types and significance of political culture?
3. Explain the different theories of political culture?
4. Explain the future of the theory of political culture?
5. Criticize the concept of political culture.

2.2.25 Short Questions

1. Political Culture
2. Types of Political Culture
3. Significance of Political Culture
4. Elaborate examples of political culture
5. Future of theory of political culture

2.2.26 Reading List

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POLITICAL SOCIALISATION

Meaning and Definition :

According to Rush, political socialisation is a process by which an individual becomes acquainted with the political systems which determines his reaction to political phenomena. It involves the impact of social, economic or cultural environment of society upon the individual and upon his political attitudes and values.

The definition given by David Easton and Jack Dennis includes various factors of political socialisation. They define political socialisation simply as those developmental processes through which persons acquire political orientation and pattern of behaviour.

For Almond and Verba, political socialisation is the process by which political cultures are maintained and changed. Political culture is a sociological concept, whereas political socialisation is a psychological concept. Political socialisation concerns itself with the orientation towards political objects. It can be studied in the elite, the masses, the deviant groups and social movements. As their attitudes, orientations and values change through time, they bring about a change in political culture as well.

Political socialisation is a learning process and goes on throughout life. Through this process norms and behaviour acceptable to a well-running political system, are transmitted from one generation to another. It seeks to train or develop, individuals in a way that they become well-functioning members of a political community.

This learning process is a gradual and imperceptible one. It works without being noticed. Political values are not simply acquired during active political participation, but also in the period before an individual engages in any explicit political activity. In this sense, political socialisation includes all formal, deliberate or unplanned learning at every stage of the life cycle.

Further, the process by which political culture is shaped at the individual level and at the community level and passed on from one generation to another is called political socialisation. The political culture which an individual or community comes to have is a matter of learned behaviour,

though not necessarily a conscious process. This learning process involving an *internalisation* of the existing cultural pattern is called socialisation. But when this process acquires a political context, it is known as political socialisation.

The Effects of Political Socialisation

Political socialisation includes both political learning and non-political learning of politically relevant issues. It also involves the acquisition of politically relevant personality traits.

Political learning has a clear bearing on the later behaviour of men who are exposed to socialising influences, including the political system. Most commonly, socialisation seems to have conservative consequences for existing political arrangements. These conservative effects are not necessarily in the direction of encouraging political stability. Nonetheless, they are likely to maintain existing patterns both in stable and non-stable systems.

In a way, socialisation may prove to be a potential source of change. It is possible that the link may be broken in the attempt to transmit one generation's values and beliefs to the next. And since the training of the young is in part future oriented, one generation may deliberately transmit the next generation such values as may differ from its own. Further, wherever different generations are exposed to different experiences the needs of change are present.

Thus, political socialisation not only shapes and transmits a society's political culture but also maintains, transforms and sometimes creates the political culture of the people. Under stable conditions, the task of maintenance, that is, of transmitting a society's political culture successfully from one generation to next receives greater importance. But stable conditions are a rare phenomenon in the modern world. Most nations are seen struggling to transform the old order or to erect new political structures with new social arrangements. It is here that political socialisation assumes the transforming role. Some countries, especially the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, are often found striving for completely new political order, a new political socialisation becomes highly significant in such countries.

In this way, political socialisation has three distinct roles.

1. Maintaining existing political culture.
2. Transforming existing political culture.
3. Creating new political culture.

Which of these roles would receive greater importance would depend on several factors. These are as follows :

- (a) a country's historical development.
- (b) the type of social and international environment.

- (c) the character of the existing traditional outlook towards the political life, and finally,
- (d) the goals and means of leaders and citizens.

However, these roles of political socialisation maintaining, transforming and creating political culture are not mutually exclusive. They rather represent a continuum. In nutshell, the process of political socialisation in every society involves a combination of all these three roles, that of maintenance, transformation and creation of political culture.

Political socialisation may be of two types:

1. Direct or manifest.
2. Indirect or latent.

Direct or Manifest Political Socialisation : This refers to the process in which the content of the transmitted information, values or attitudes is clearly political. For example, an individual under the influence of family, teachers or some other agencies like the peer group or occupational group, learns in clear terms, the pattern and functions of the government. Further, he learns the views of a political party or gets convinced of the superiority of a particular ideology. Since the objects of his orientations are specifically political, these are instances of direct or manifest political socialisation.

Indirect or Latent Political Socialisation :

As a result of his relationship with parents, teachers, or some other socialising agencies, an individual may develop an attitude to authority in general. Subsequently, this attitude may be directed to political authority in particular. Thus, the orientation with a non- Political object is ultimately transformed into a political orientation. This is an example of indirect or latent political socialisation. This includes the transmission of non-political orientations that ultimately affect objects.

It is wrong to think that manifest socialisation is intentional and latent socialisation unintentional. Actually both manifest and latent political socialisation may be intentional as well as unintentional depending upon the context. For instance when a school teacher urges his students to be public spirited and law abiding citizens, he is promoting intentional manifest political socialisation, but when a child starts fearing a policeman by watching how a member of his family has been mercilessly beaten up by him, there occurs an unintentional transmission of political orientation. Again, when a child is taught that good boy is one who obeys his elders, intentional latent socialisation is being intended. But when a child begins to learn the necessity of rules by participating for the first time in children's sports, there occurs unintentional latent socialisation.

Political socialisation is transmitted through a variety of agents and the way in which transmission takes place may also vary. There are three main ways in which the elements of political socialisation are transmitted from one person or a group of persons to another or even from one generation to the next. There are :

- (i) Imitation
- (ii) Instruction
- (iii) Motivation

Robert Le Wane suggests that these are mechanisms of political socialisation in childhood. But there is no reason why they should not be applicable to the whole socialisation process.

Imitation : Children learn through imitation which implies that they copy the behaviour of other individuals. This factor has great importance in childhood socialisation.

Instruction : An individual may acquire most of his learning and experience through instruction. For example, there is various types of vocational training 'On the job', some of this may be relevant for political behaviour. The practice in some organisations to form discussion groups is an explicit, yet informal type of instruction.

Motivation : Although both imitation and instructions are specific types of experience, yet motivation is most closely identified with experience. Motivation is the learning of what Le Wane has described as 'appropriate behaviour' learned through a process of trial and error.

In this way, manifest political socialisation may operate through imitation, anticipatory behaviour, political education or political experience. Imitation, is very important way of learning and therefore of political socialisation. Thus, a child may imitate the party preferences of his parents. Or a rural migrant that of urban people only to make him self more acceptable to his new associates.

Further, political socialisation may start through a process of anticipatory behaviour. For instance, a student with a political ambition may already begin to prepare himself for political offices even before he becomes legally competent to do so. In anticipation of holding office, he may show mannerisms and styles associated with this office. Similarly, a child on being taught the rules of citizenship, may start behaving like a good citizen, in anticipation of his future citizenship.

Political socialisation may also result through direct political education. Instruction in political things is given by the family, the school, the government, political parties and other political agencies and also by various

groups and organisations. The peculiarity of such direct political socialisation lies in the fact that here the initiative is not with the individual who is socialised but in the socialising agency itself. Most societies have both formal and non-formal channels for the direct teaching of socially valued political attitudes and behaviour.

Finally, political socialisation may also be carried out with the help of experiences, Thus, an individual's political ideas and beliefs are shaped by his observations of the experiences in the political process. It is through a process of continuous interaction with political personalities, structures and events that his ideas and beliefs become mature and explicit. Here the more important thing to note is that this form of manifest political socialisation is not deliberately initiated by the socialising agencies but results from intra-personal interactions and political experiences in case of the individual. Moreover, this socialising process takes place only in relation to adults rather than in case of children.

On the other hand, latent or indirect political socialisation may take place through three ways. These are :

1. Interpersonal transference
2. Apprenticeship
3. Generalisation

1. Interpersonal Transference :

Indirect political socialisation occurs through interpersonal transference. It means the transmission to an individual of values and ideas through the influence of other persons. For example, a child growing within an authoritarian family is likely to learn to submit to authority without question. In this way, he may come to have a docile attitude towards governmental authority. On the contrary, democratic or participant family experiences are likely to inculcate democratic orientations to political authority.

2. Apprenticeship :

One acquires through apprenticeship, skill, habits, behaviours and practices appropriate for political activities. Unlike interpersonal transference, apprenticeship does not involve direct transference of explicit orientations. It only means the development and skills useful for an individual's political life. In this respect, non-political activities, serve as an apprenticeship for future political activities. For example, an individual's role with the family, the school or the job, may be taken as an apprenticeship for future political activities.

3. Generalisations :

Latent or indirect political socialisation may also involve generalising from

general social values to political objects. For instance, it is significant to note how the lack of an interpersonal trust in France, Ethiopia and Italy make the people there quite cynical about government and politics. Again, in India, the chief cause of people's fatalistic resignation to authority lies in their blind faith in fate. In this way, indirect political socialisation assumes the form of generalisation.

Political socialisation is a life-long process. It is not a process confined to the early years of one's life. It goes on throughout the life span of an individual. An individual goes through varied social experiences from childhood to old age. Political beliefs and attitudes developed in the early part of life may undergo continuous changes from one stage of life to another. A submissive or docile attitude to governmental authorities derived in childhood from one's authoritarian family environment may in later age be replaced by a hostile attitude developed under the influence of say, new friendships, educational patterns, job experiences or some extraordinary national events.

Incomplete Socialisation : The socialisation of a child is bound to be an incomplete socialisation. Alone, it cannot enable a child to successfully cope with all it encounters later as an adult. Why socialisation remains incomplete may be due to the following reasons :

First, rapid technological and social changes make it almost impossible to anticipate what exactly would be the future. One's future being so uncertain it is not possible to socialise somebody, especially child in a definite direction. Secondly, modern society is highly pluralistic and varied. It indicates too many social roles and experiences which cannot be fully foreseen by the agencies socialising the child.

Thirdly, geographical and social mobility in adult life may tend to efface much of the effects of early socialisation.

Lastly, the agencies for child socialisation are highly specialised. Their knowledge of the world is usually restricted. This tends to result in incomplete socialisation of the child.

This inevitability of incomplete socialisation makes it imperative to examine the interrelationship between the different agencies working for an individual's socialisation at different stages of life. It is essential to study whether the different agencies complement each other or whether the relation between them is always one of conflict. The fewer are the cases of this conflict, the more stable will be the polity.

Most studies indicate that in a political system, the different agencies of political socialisation complement each other. Yet no study can claim complete

immunity from discontinuity. The degree of this discontinuity may vary from one society to another, in a stable society, it is of a lesser magnitude. But in a transitional or unstable society discontinuities are well marked.

Discontinuity : Discontinuity refers to conditions in which socialisation agencies and experiences do not correctly anticipate the attitude and behaviour associated with adult political positions. These agencies do not prepare the maturing individual for them. Moreover, there are always situations in which an individual learns one type of political values from some agencies of socialisation and different values from other agencies. The discontinuity of political socialisation may be explained mainly in terms of two factors, viz. incongruence and inconsistency.

Incongruence : There is usually to be found an incongruence between the ideas and beliefs of an individual and the realities and demands of the political world. This is more or less a common phenomena in every society, more especially in societies, undergoing rapid changes. Here discontinuity is invariably much higher than in the more stable societies. Early socialisation of a child or what is generally attempted in early age cannot be comprehensive or complete enough to fully prepare the child for the far too complex roles of adulthood. Some gaps always remain between the youthful anticipation and the real world. In this way, the roots of incongruence are to be found in the very process of political socialisation itself.

Inconsistency : Another cause of discontinuity of political socialisation can be seen in the message communicated by the different agencies of political socialisation. These messages often lack consistency. For instance, on the one hand, one hears in india at the family level, much talk about the insincerity of political leaders and the failure of the government, but on the other, at the outer sphere, from school and college curriculum, from the mass media and government agencies, one hears about the greatness of political leaders their sacrifices and the successes of governmental programmes. This type of inconsistency of messages among different agencies of political socialisation is not a speciality of India, but can be noticed more or less, almost in every society. In changing societies especially those moving from a traditional to a modern order, this phenomenon is more frequently observed and in a more acute form. One may conclude from this that some amount of discontinuity is a distinctive feature of the process of political socialisation everywhere.

There are many reasons for this discontinuity.

These may be summarised as follow :

1. It is due to a time lag between early socialisation of an individual

and when he actually assumes the political role, this time lag tends to give rise to incongruity between ideas imbibed in early years and hard realities of politics which an individual comes to learn much later. Further, during this time gap, many changes of far-reaching nature may take place resulting in vital changes in the pattern and structure of politics. This may further lead to an incongruence between the prior change perception, ideas and beliefs of an individual and the altered political order.

2. Discontinuity is also caused by the multiplicity of socialising agents and wide diversity in regard to their nature and structure. The more complex is the society, the greater is the number of socialising agents. It is these which, in the context of their different structure and nature, try to push the individual in different directions. For example, political socialisation confined to the close, personal relationship of family is likely to be inconsistent with what takes place within the framework of more formal impersonal relationship of secondary institutions. This gap naturally widens in a society marked by heterogeneous cultural sub-groups and specialised secondary institutions.
3. Another important cause of discontinuity lies in social and geographic mobility. People moving upwards on the social class ladder tend to acquire political values and attitudes much different from what they imbibe in the course of their early socialisation.
4. Similarly, geographic mobility may also result in discontinuity. Movement from one geographic region to another, from one population sub-group to another, from one social or economic structure to another may create discontinuities in political maturation. This migration from rural to urban area or vice versa or the movement of a low class boy to a high status occupation is bound to confront him with his previous experience.
5. Finally, political change may result in the discontinuity of political socialisation. Rapid and profound changes in the structure and process of government may upset the existing continuities in the socialisation process due to the absence of a corresponding growth of a political culture congruent with them.

Development and Dimensions of Political Socialisation :

Childhood : A child is not a born socialised being. He imbibes society's norms by means of a learning process. The process is a continuous one. It starts when the child becomes aware of a wide environment and feels

increasingly perceptive in response to particular situations. At a fairly early age a child acquires some idea of what authority is say a policeman. Gradually; a child's picture becomes more complete, more coherent. His political knowledge increase, values are formed and attitudes developed. Finally, some feelings of political competence may also arise.

Most political scientists believe that political socialisation begins as early as fourth and even third years of life. As a child, one perceives for the first time some basic political object such as policeman. At the same time, he learns that he is a member of a wider group than his own family. From six to eighteen, the child lives at home and attends a school or college. From his parents and other socialising agents, he not only acquires such basic skills as reading and arithmetic, but also learns a good deal about the political world.

Adolescence : Most psychologists look upon adolescence as the most painful and difficult phase in one's personality development when sexuality emerges. The typical adolescent tends to express his suppressed desires in an aggressive manner. He gives vent to his innate rebellion in active political ways.

Adulthood : The process of socialisation continues even after the period of adolescence. It marks another stage in political socialisation. Some of the contacts made during childhood and adolescence may continue somewhat in a similar form through friendship and familiarity. Others may be received through mediums such as reading materials and mass media. The knowledge, values and attitudes acquired in childhood and adolescence may be reinforced, undermined or modified by the new experiences. According to Rush, if the process of political socialisation tends to reinforce the attitudes and beliefs of childhood and adolescence, the degree of change may be limited. It is likely to increase conservatism in old age. But where conflict occurs, the radical changes in political behaviour may take place. Such a conflict may have its roots in early political socialisation, but it may also be explained in terms of the experiences of later socialisation.

This discussion on dimension of political socialisation shows that the process covers the whole life of man.

Agents of Political Socialisation :

The family, peer, groups, educational institutions, secondary groups, the mass media, political system and party agencies are regarded as chief agents of political socialisation which is a life long process is effected through them. Among these agents, the family comes first.

Family : Family plays a key role in the socialising process. It transmits

political culture from one generation to the next. Major part of an individual's personality is shaped by his family influences (from the age of 3 to 15). Many studies on political socialisation have revealed that what an individual acquires from his family outlasts the influences flowing from other socialising agents in his later life. In the United States, three-fourths of the children share the party preferences of their parents. This is so despite the two generations having been kept in quite different socio-economic environment.

Family's key role in the socialisation process may be explained by several factors. These are summarised as follows :

1. Family holds a crucial position in the life of the child because it is the only agency during one's formative years. For a fairly long period, it meets one's emotional and physical needs. It provides the child both love and approval. He is also given a status by the family. In this way, child has to depend on his family for both moral and material needs. In the process he comes to subscribe to the political beliefs and attitudes of his family. Similarly, he readily accepts the parental version of what is right and wrong, good and bad, or proper and improper.
2. Child learns through imitation. There is a natural tendency in a child to imitate his parents. In most cases, the ideal role model for a son is his father and for a daughter is her mother. But the influence of this parental model diminishes as the child grows older. He begins drawing new models for himself from the wider social sphere where he then moves about. However, the memory of the parental model does not totally disappear with age. It remains very much intact especially in persons not endowed with high intelligence and not receiving higher education.
3. All family members live in the same environment. They are influenced by the same neighbours and neighbourhoods. They have the same circle of friends, who usually share with the family such social characteristics as class, religion and ethnicity. They are further influenced by the same economic forces of the area and of the father's occupations. The family members read the same newspapers and listen to the same preacher and other local opinion leaders. Further, they gather the same gossip and hear the same stories. All this tends to give a family, a marked uniformity of thinking and belief. As a result, the children are likely to share the political orientation of their parents.

This does not mean that individual sticks to these parental political orientations and never abandons some of them in later life. In fact he tries

to test their validity in terms of his own experiences of society and politics which he acquires later in his life. In this process, he changes many of the political orientations of his parents which he might have acquired from his family. But in spite of these changes, some prominent traces of the family influence still persist in him till the last.

Invariably it has been noticed that political socialisation which takes place within the family is essentially conservative in character. A family has an inherent tendency to preserve and perpetuate traditional practices and ideas. As a result political socialisation performed through family tends to slow down the process of change in political change. This cultural lag in political system leads to condition which social scientists have called '*Anomic*' (Following Durkheim).

It is usually noticed that while political institutions of a society undergo change, families continue transmitting political attitudes to the next generation which are not appropriate to the changed political order. These transmitted political orientations are appropriate to situations prior to this change. This phenomenon is frequently observed in the modern developing societies aiming at vital changes in the social and political order. This aspect of the political socialisation through family is essentially retrogressive. For family, in this context, works as an obstacle to rapid and widespread changes in the social and political orientations of the people who are members of a political system.

Peer Groups :

Childhood play groups, friendship, cliques, small work groups, brothers and sisters, married couples and like are some of the examples of the peer groups. Like the family these groups are also based on primary relationship. But they differ from family in their structure and in the character of the *intra-relationships*. Despite the fact that intercourse among the members of a family rests on a highly intimate and personal relationship, yet all of them are not given an equal status. The parent-child relationship is always hierarchical. In fact, family contains at least two separate generations. Thus, members of a family, namely, parents and the child, naturally have different status positions within their family circles.

On the contrary, peer groups consist of members of about the same age. The members can, therefore, afford to enjoy an equal status in their relations with each other. In short, they can afford to be non-hierarchical. This does not mean that peer groups have no leaders. But they are not given rigidly defined roles as in case of families.

Political socialisation within the family, fulfils a major function, that of establishing a child's basic political orientations and knowledge. But family

influence starts diminishing when a child reaches adolescence. Then one longs for becoming a more autonomous human being. He wants to function independent of family guidance. Political socialisation, however, at this stage, assumes new dimensions. An individual then is confronted with the problem of interpretation of and adjustment to political changes. He had to prepare himself for participating in specifically political roles. In this way, peer groups supplement the socialising functions of the family by preparing the individual for more specific political experiences.

In modern complex society peer groups as socialising agents, perform very useful function. They prepare a child to a full and political status. They enable them to participate in the complex and depersonalised social and political cultures of modern societies. Further, peer group is a reinforcer of political orientations acquired from in family as *a socialiser*. Thus, it does not always work in conflict with the family. In fact, the more static the society the less this peer group will probably conflict politically with family.

1. Members of a peer group have free access and exposure to each other. There is to be found an easy flow of interactions among its members. Its members have relations which are usually of a highly intimate and personal nature. A peer group, receives a very high degree of attention from its members. This is why peer groups play a vital role in the extra socialisation process.
2. Like the family, the peer group is characterised by personalised as well as emotive extra relationships. These tend to facilitate the task of socialising its members. The extent to which a peer group is capable of replacing the family as an agent of political socialisation, however, varies with the degree of parental control. In countries like India, France, Germany and Belgium, the family maintains its control over the adolescent's life for a much longer period. However, this is not so in case of the United States and Britain. This is why the peer group plays a crucial role as an agent of political socialisation in the lives of people of the former countries rather than those of the latter.
3. The extent to which a peer group may perform the role of political socialisation would largely depend on how far politics happens to influence it. For example, in the U.S.A. youth groups generally are not much concerned about politics. Hence, a group of this sort cannot be expected to be an important agent of political socialisation.

Educational Institutions :

Educational institutions are close rivals to the family as major agent of

political socialisation. As a person grows older and is initiated into formal education, schools, colleges and universities start working as important socialising agents. All governments try to set up schools or help in founding them because they are very effective mediums of transmitting such political values and beliefs as are congenial for their working.

The schools are apt to provide most effective channel for shaping the citizen's political attitude and behaviour while they are young and pliable. They socialise both directly and indirectly. For instance; if the school curriculum is imbued with national patriotism and obedience to law, which governments are likely to instill among their citizens, direct socialisation's said to have been the result. Again a student becomes politically socialised not only through what the formal curriculum deliberately teaches him but also by the inference he derives from his school experiences.

Thus, a process of latent political socialisation is at work at the school level. There is to be seen a particular pattern of authoritative decision-making in a school. All the students are subjected to it. In the light of this experience, they may develop a particular type of attitude to political authority. Similarly, participatory process in a school orients an individual not only in modes of participation but also determines his general attitude towards liberal democratic values and institutions. This is more applicable to the colleges and universities than schools. The former may instill among most citizens new values and lead to the formation of more radical political attitudes.

Thus, formal education is certainly powerful in developing children's political selves. Most educated people are found to have the strongest sense of political efficiency. They are found to be the most politically interested and informed and take the most important roles in political affair. For many social scientists, education is the last and best hope for curing social evils. War will never disappear until people are educated to recognize its futility and horror. Likewise racism will not end until white people are educated to recognize blacks as full equals, and so on. But formal education is not the only opinion forming agency for a child or in case of an adult. When children hear one thing in school and quite another at home or from their class-mates, there is no reason to believe that they will believe teachers and text books rather their parents and peers.

It will be much better if schools and families do not work at cross-purposes with each other, but work in harmony, to effect a smooth transition of one political culture to another.

In recent times, student power has emerged on the campuses of the Indian universities. Colleges and universities have been found to have fostered among certain students a political attitude and a love for confrontation with

authorities. The student movement in Gujarat and Bihar at J.P.'s call contributed to strong political socialisation of the students community. The opposition of large number of American students to the Vietnam War is another example of educational institutions acting as agents of the political socialisation.

Secondary Groups

The importance of a secondary group as agents of political socialisation can not be over emphasised. It varies with one society to another. The more highly developed and complex a society is, the greater will be the number of secondary groups, And their role in the process of political socialisation is likely to be a major one. Membership of a secondary group equips one with skill, information and predispositions that are found very useful in the context of political participation. It provides a very good apprenticeship for meeting the challenges in the political world.

Political scientists identify three types of secondary groups which undertake political socialisation. They are as follows :

1. These are secondary groups with a distinctive political characters, political parties, pressure or interest groups come in this category. They aim at disseminating political values, mobilising political action and recruiting political leaders. Evidently groups perform functions which are called international manifest political socialisation.
2. This category comprises those groups which are instituted for non-political purposes. These are found to carry on political education and mobilisation alongwith their other activities. A labour union is a typical example. While a labour union is basically engaged in the task of collective bargaining and looking after material well-being of its members, yet at the same time, it equally tries to involve them in political action, thereby enhancing their political consciousness. This may also be viewed as a direct intertional socialisation.
3. In this category are included those secondary groups which do not have any political character. They never try to impart political education to their members. But the members develop orientations that have political relevance by mere participation in thier routine affairs. For example, a cricket club is not directly an agent of political socialisation, but its activities result in a process of unintentional political socialisation. This is evident from the fact that while participating in its matters are equipped for participation in the political sphere.

Mass Media

Mass media include, radio, television, newspapers, magazines and the like. They provide a good deal of information to the members of political system. They often add their own perception and interpretation of the things they inform about. Hence, their role in political socialisation of citizens is very important. In recent years, the mass media have greatly developed. It is due to advance in technology that the apparatus of mass media has become an effective agent of political socialisation.

In most cases, the mass media are not the actual originator of the messages they transmit, but their interpreter. The social setting determines not only the type of mass media likely to attract a particular type of people, but also the way in which the latter would interpret and react to the performance by the mass media. Since messages generally originate at the level of government officials and political leaders, secondary groups as also the mass media transmit them to the people. From this point of view mass media strictly speaking, are not themselves the agents of political socialisation. Indeed they are only used as an instrument by other socialising agents to perform the task of political socialisation.

Further, the mass media do not generally have a direct impact on the people. The mass media go through two way flows. Initially, the messages they transmit reach only to a small number of opinion leaders like parents, teachers community, activists etc. It is they who then pass on these messages to those over whom they have influence.

Obviously, mass media is not the primary socialiser. They serve the function of reinforcing the already established orientation. More often, the messages transmitted by the mass media are intended to support the existing arrangements. They inform and interpret in order to maintain the status quo or property relation. In this way, they become more an agent of reinforcement rather than an agent of change. A corollary of this is that the attitude to the receiver has direct link with this reinforcement function people's relations are likely to be quite favourable when the messages passed on by the media are in agreement with their established ideas.

Political Socialisation and Political System

No discussion on agents of political socialisation can afford to ignore the role of political parties, election and political system. Some socialising agents, particularly the mass media are under direct control of government who try to spread desirable attitudes and behaviour pattern among their citizens. In contrast, families and peer groups are much free from direct governmental control. Therefore, they tend to pass on values and attitudes, sometimes different from those that government wants their people to absorb.

An individual comes in direct contact with government personnel and its process, and functions. He derives from it the knowledge regarding what the government stands and works for. This is likely either to reinforce his ideas and attitudes acquired through the early socialising influence or to change them substantially. In some political systems, government directly carries on a process of political indoctrination. This indicates a lack of stability of the political system. It also suggests the failure of other agents of political socialisation.

Since a political system is part of a large and comprehensive social system, one's political attitudes and behaviour are a reflection of the political socialisation process. Indeed one's politics is conditioned by the social environment as much the latter is conditioned by the former. Elections do serve more or less the purpose of socialisation. They help to bridge the gap, if any, between the polity and the society, between an individual, social and political world. It serves both social and political purposes and performs important linkage functions.

Similarly, the political party is an important socialising agent. By this people are given a regular opportunity to participate in political actions of the society. This political involvement enables the people to get politically socialised. However, the political party may either reinforce the established political order or may introduce significant changes in the pattern of existing political culture. Its role becomes most crucial when radical political changes in the polity are sought to be achieved. The political party may then become an effective instrument for disseminating ideas in agreement with this change. Hence it may play a significant role in the process of political socialisation. Thus, the various agents of political socialisation, more or less, complement one another. The more they do, the greater is the stability of the political system. This does not mean that the process of political socialisation is always a *homogeneous* one. Some amount of disharmony between the function of the various socialising agents is bound to be there. It is quite natural because political socialisation means a continuous process. It cannot be a completely static one.

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1. Rush and Altraff : Political Sociology.
 2. Austin Ranney : The Governing of Man.
 3. Almond and Powell: Comparative Politics : A Developmental Approach.
 4. Lester W. Milbarth : Political Participation.
 5. Madan G. Gandhi : Modern Political

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

1. Explain the meaning and scope of politics according to the Traditionalists.
2. What are the main features of politics according to the modern interpretation of politics.
3. Define legitimacy and effectiveness. What do you understand by the crisis of legitimacy .
4. Define Political culture and discuss its various types.
5. What do you understand by the traditional and modern interpretations of politics? Discuss the scope of politics according to the modern interpretation.
6. Define power and authority. Discuss the main points of difference between these two concepts and also their importance in modern times.
7. Define Legitimacy. How a government can acquire and retain its legitimacy?

SUGGESTED SHORT-ANSWER QUESTIONS

To be answered in five lines or by just giving headings.

1. Characteristics of politics according to traditional interpretation.
2. Meaning of Psychological power.
3. Secularisation of political culture.
4. Role of political Socialisation.
5. Various methods of political Socialisation.

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM**STRUCTURE****2.4.0 Objectives****2.4.1 Introduction****2.4.2 Dynamics or Features of Politics in India****2.4.3 Summary****2.4.4 Key Concepts/Words****2.4.5 Exercise Questions****2.4.6 Short Questions****2.4.7 Reading Lis****2.4.0 Objectives**

By the end of this chapter, the student shall be able to:

- To understand the features of Indian political system.
- To know the meaning and concept of Indian political system.

2.4.1 Introduction

As a political system of a developing democratic pluralistic society, the Indian political system offers a rich, interesting and fascinating study of an ancient civilization going through a transitional stage and aiming at socio economic cultural development through the democratic process. *N.D palmer* remarks, "Contemporary India is a fascinating laboratory of political, economic and social change. It is clearly a major example of a transitional society. It has a complex political system in an even more complex social order." After emerging as an independent sovereign state in 1947, India has been trying to secure modernization and socio-economic-cultural development through an open democratic system which seeks to reconcile, accommodate and integrate her traditions with modernity. "The model on which India is set, "writes *Rajni Kothari*, "is one of the modernization of an ancient and highly plural society in the context of an open polity." It is still a developing political system.

2.4.2 Dynamics or Features of Politics in India

The nature and dynamics of politics in India can be explained with the help of is several features:

1. A Developing Liberal Democratic Polity: The Indian political system can be legitimately described as a developing liberal democratic system. It satisfies the standards essential for such a system. It accepts the ideology of liberalism in so far as its constitution grants and guarantees civil and political liberties to its people, provides for a constitutional system and a government

which is constituted by and works in accordance with written and enacted constitution. An independent and impartial judiciary acts as the guardian and protector of the constitution and the fundamental right and liberties of the people. It is characterized by a free and open struggle for power. People have the right and freedom to form their groups, associations and parties for expressing their opinions and securing their interests. Equality before law, equality of opportunities, freedom of expression and assembly, equal political right and freedom for all the people, universal adult franchise, free and regular elections etc., are the salient feature of the struggle for power in India. Over the years, it has demonstrated its ability to work as a stable political system characterized by orderly and peaceful political changes including change of power holders. However, it is a developing liberal democratic political system. It is yet to develop fully its democratic institutions. The level of political participation is increasing but it is still characterized by the traditions of caste politics, regionalism, communalism, linguism, terrorism, violence, politics of agitations, combined with the ability to maintain political stability, national unity, territorial integrity and march towards modernization and social economic development which reflect the developing nature of the Indian political system.

2. Democratic, Socialism, Secularism and Liberalism as Ideological

Foundations: The Indian political system has its ideological foundations in the principles of Democratic Socialism, and Liberalism. These constitute the basic qualities of Indian politics. The Preamble to the constitution declares India to be sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic. Democratic socialism stands for the use of democratic process for securing socialism; Democratic Republic involves faith in open struggle for power, decision-making by majority or consensus, and responsibility and accountability of the decision-makers towards the people and the latter stand for rapid modernization and socio-economic development through organized planning at the national level. Mixed economy involving a state controlled strong public sector combined with a private sector, state regulated pricing and distribution system combined with market economy, development through state formulated Five Year Plans, nationalization of key industries and services like banking and insurance were adopted due to faith in socialism. Since 1991, the Indian state has been pursuing privatization liberalization, disinvestment in the Public Sector, competitiveness and globalization. However, Democratic Socialism still continues to be accepted as the goal. Securing of social justice and developing a system of social security continues to be a primary objective. The adoption and successful working of parliamentary democracy and faith in rights and freedoms of the people reflect the liberal democratic nature of Indian Political System. The Faith in liberalism stands reflected in the constitutional provisions regarding guaranteed fundamental right of the people, equal political right and

freedom of the people, rule of law, independence of judiciary and limited government based on public opinion, and successful organization and operationalization of representative democracy. Further, secularism stands writ large in the provisions of the constitution which provides for the absence of a state religion, equality protection to the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other weaker sections of the society. Unity in diversity has been a national motto and it fully reflects faith in secularism.

However, here again, several restraints like casteism, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, linguism, regionalism, regional imbalances, communalism, low and slow process of social economic modernization and development presence of violence and terrorism and politics of agitation, protests and populism, continue to act as limitation on the accepted principles of democratic socialism, secularism and liberalism.

3. Tradition and Modernity: The Indian political system is characterized by both tradition and modernity. On the one hand, modern democratic political institution--- parliament, state legislatures, independent and impartial judiciary, cabined system, neutral bureaucracy, decentralization, organized planning and fast expanding transport, communication and industrial infrastructure reflect the modernity of the system. Along with it, in actual behavior, the leaders and the people working in these institutions depend upon traditions—caste system, religious rituals, saintism and family traditions- for carrying out their work. India 'approach development reflects both tradition and modernity. As *Dr. Rajni Kothari observes:*" The Indian approach to development reflects may be characterized as one in which the exposure to modernity led to a renewed awareness and quickening of traditional identity, its re-interpretation and regeneration and its consolidation in the framework of new institutions and ideas." The march of modernity is being accompanied by a continued faith in traditional values and traditions of Indianness. A student of the Indian political system has to analyze the mixture of tradition and modernity in its political structures and functions. A fusion of modernity and tradition is taking place, which is the natural outcome of the process by which an ancient society, like India, is trying to come to terms with the demands of the new age. But this 'mixture' is unique and a two-way process. Traditionalisation of modernity and modernization of tradition is taking place simultaneously and new features are emerging, through a developing process of socialization, bridging of gaps between tradition and modernity has been taking place in India since 1947.

4. Continuity and Change: Indian Political system reflects both marked continuity with profound and change. This is evident from the fact that despite the adoption of privatization, economic liberalization and competitive market system, the objective of securing of socialism continues to be adhered to. Indian foreign policy in the post-cold war period reflects a definite change towards decision-making on the basis of national interest and a new approach towards

the development of relations with the USA and other developed countries. Yet faith in non-alignment and identification with Third world continue to be the features of Indian Foreign Policy. Several new political structures have been created and are being created in this era of globalization, and yet old structures continue to be present and operational. Judicial Activism continues with judicial delays.

5. Reconciliation and Accommodation: Being a land of social, economic, regional, linguistic, religious and cultural diversities, the organization and evolution of the Indian political system is characterized by continuous process of reconciliation and accommodation. In respect of various policies and decisions. Secularism, Democratic socialism, mixed economy, linguistic pluralism (recognition and evolution of the Indian languages and adoption of the three language formula), nationalization and continuous expansion of the private sector, Unitarian federalism, democratic polity with emergency provisions, flexibility and rigidity of the constitution etc. all reflect the attempt at the reconciliation and accommodation of various interests and diversities. In the interest of Nation-building not only this but also several values and features of other political systems (U.K., U.S.A., France, Australia, Canada, Ireland, USSR, etc) have been adopted and tailored to suit and satisfy India conditions and goals. *N.D. Palmer* observes: "Contemporary Indian political thought stems from many sources, eastern and western, ancient and modern." *K.M. Panikar* praises India's ability to synthesize various values and traditions by observing, "The tradition of India has always been one of synthesis—a singular ability to absorb the culture of others and assimilate it without losing her own identity." The working of the Indian political system in the post-1947 period fully demonstrates the attempts at a synthesis of the best possible values and institutions.

6. Written Constitution as the Legal Framework of the Indian Political System: The legal foundation of the political system and the organization and working of its government rest upon a self-made and enacted written constitution. The representatives of the people of India framed the constitution of India through open, free and fair debates in the constituent assembly. Every decision regarding the organization, powers and functions of the government and its relationship with the people was taken either through majority or through consensus. The Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly drafted the constitutional provisions which were incorporated into the Constitution after copious debates and amendments.

The Constitution of India is a lengthy Constitution with 395 Articles, 12 Schedules and ninety amendments. It has been instrumental in securing the organization and functioning of the government of India and the State Government. It has stood the test of time. It came into operation on 26th January, 1950 and is still working. It has places before the people the

objectives which are to be secured, the nature of the policies which are to be adopted and the process through which the government is to be organized and worked.

As such, a written, lengthy, self-made, enacted and developing Constitution provides sound legal foundations to the Indian political system.

7. Parliamentary Democracy and Republicanism: Party due to the experience of working of a neo-parliamentary system of government during the last three decades of the British rule in India and partly due to her faith in parliamentary democracy as a system of popular, democratic and responsible government independent India decided unanimously in favor of constituting her Government on the British model of parliamentary system, It was done through the adoption of the principles of: (i) a constitutional head of state (nominal executive) exercising all her powers through the real executive-the prime minister and his Council of Ministers; (ii) close relationship between the executive and the legislature instead of a separation of powers between them; (iii) individual and collective responsibility of the real executive before the parliament ; and (iv) leadership of the Prime minister, political homogeneity if the council of ministers, and the right of the PM to dissolve the legislature. Along with it, the democratic features-universal adult franchise, equal political rights for all, freedom to form political parties and organizations, open and free struggle for power, free regular and fair elections, popular sovereignty, limited, responsive and responsible government, rule of law, independent judiciary, decentralization of political power, and equal fundamental right for all were adopted, For the past six decades, parliamentary democracy has been at work, Fourteen General elections have been held, The people have been using their ballot power of effect a change of rulers. In 2004 they replaced the BJP-led NDA rule by the congress led UPA rule.

Along with Parliamentary Democracy, India has adopted Republicanism; the head of state in India is the indirectly elected President who holds office for a fixed term of 5 Years, but with no bar upon his seeking re-election to the office Republicanism is an integral part of India's democratic system, On 25th July 2002 Sh. A.P.J Abdul Kalam took over as the 12th President of India, Next presidential election is scheduled to be held in 2007.

2.4. Multi-Party System and Trend towards the emergence of Party-Groups/Alliances: The people of India have the freedom to form organizations and to freely participate in the struggle for power, In fact several national and regional political parties and behind them several interest\pressure groups have been active partners\competitors in the Indian politics. The pluralist nature of the Indian society has been responsible for the emergence of several national and regional level political parties. The Congress, BJP, CPI, CPM, BSP and NCP are the national level political parties because they are active in almost all parts of India, Along with these, several regional parties, which are

active only in their respective regions are also in existence, Some of the regional parties are: the Akali Dal with all its factions in Punjab, the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) in Assam, the DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, the Telugu Desham in Andhra, PDP and the National conference in J&K, the Mizo National Front (MNF) in Mizoram, the Sikkim Sangram Parishad in Sikkim, INLD in Haryana, RJD in Bihar, BJD in Orissa and other, In fact, the growing presence and important role of the regional parties has been one of the most outstanding aspects of the political development of independent India. These have catalyzed realignment of political forces and their impact on the structure and process of politics has been multi-directional and far reaching, On the one hand, they have played a big role in the regionalization of politics on the other hand some of these have influenced the course of national politics (e.g. the role of the Telugu Desham Party and its leader N.T. Rama Rao in establishing the National Front against the Congress and the role of the TDP, DMK, AGP, TMC and others in forming the United Front government in 1996&1997) the NDA in 1999 and the role of RJD, LJP and left parties in forming the Congress led United Progressive Alliance in 2004. Regional parties have also been active actors behind the centre-state autonomy for, and demands of separate statehoods or regional autonomy within states. They have emerged as key actors in the centre-state relations in Indian Federalism.

The Indian multi-party system now reflects a trend towards the emergence of three political groups\alliance-BJP-led Alliance, Congress-led Alliance and the Left Alliance or the Third front. However while the first two groupings have got materialized the chances for the emergence of the third front continues to be quite weak. In June 2006 the CPM and Samajwadi Party Mulayam Singh decided to form the third front against both the Congress and the BJP.

9. The North-South Distinction. An interesting development in the Indian politics has been the existence of some sort of a political gap between the Northern states and the southern states, At least twice, this gap demonstrated itself in a big way in elections In the 1977 elections, when the Northern states outrightly rejected the Congress (I), the Southern states gave support to the Congress and majority of the seats of the Lok Sabha from the Southern States went to it. This happened again in the 1989 Elections- rejection of the Congress (I) by the Northern states and gainful victories of the Congress (I) in the Southern states. In the South, the regional parties are emerging stronger and stronger, the DMK, TMC and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry, the Telugu Desham Party in Andhra and the Kerala Congress in Kerala have emerged as strong regional parties, In the North, except for the Akali Dal in Punjab, the PDP and National Conference in J&K and the INLD in Haryana, the Congress, the BJP, the CPM, the CPI and the BSP continue to be popular and active political parties. Further, over the issue of language, there exists a strong north-south divide in India, The North is largely anti- English and pro-Hindi

and pro-English. The 1999 and 2002 election results reflected that in the North, the anti-incumbency factor played an important role in determining the outcome of the election in Punjab, Delhi, UP, Rajasthan, Uttaranchal, Assam and other states but in Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu, the pro-incumbency factor acted as a determinant of election outcome. Such a trend also became visible from the election results during 2004-2006

2.6. Combination of Centralism and Decentralism: The Indian political system reflects both centralism and decentralism. While the latter has been the essential outcome of social and cultural pluralism, the former is the result of the need for securing the unity and integrity in India as a nation and nation-state. The adoption of federalism (federal structure) reflects the existence of decentralism, the existence of strong Unitarianism (powerful centre) reflects centralism the institution of Local Self-Government, Panchayati Raj institutions and urban local bodies-are the symbols of the decentralized system of Government, but the strong state control over them reflects centralism. While the need to secure nation-building and national-integration justifies centralism, the existence of diversities and the forces of regionalism demand due decentralization of powers and more powers and resources. On the one hand, there are present demand for more autonomy for the states and more powers and resources for the institutions of local self-Government, on the other hand the threats posed by regionalism, communalism, secessionism, terrorism and violence demand the continuance of a strong centre for maintaining the unity and integrity of the country with an iron hand. Thus, the forces of centralism and decentralism are simultaneously present in the Indian political system. What is needed, however, is the development of cooperative federalism instead the existing conflictual competitive federalism. The emergence of coalition politics (e.g. BJP-led NDA & Congress-led UPA) has raised the possibility of the development of cooperative-collaborative competitive bargaining federalism in India. Power sharing among national and regional parties had given rise to such a possibility.

2.7. Changing Character of Leadership: When India became free, a galaxy of top level national leaders was there to take over the reins of administration and socio-economic-cultural development. In fact, they were all members of the constituent Assembly which had been in existence since December 1946 and which had been busy in framing the Constitution of India. Through it, the leaders of India gave to the nation a Constitution and later on secured its operationalisation. The first general elections were held in 1952 and through these, popular and elected governments took over the reins of administration at the national and state levels. For nearly three decades, this dedicated band of leaders guided the destiny of the nation and achieved the creditable distinction of securing political stability and initiating the process of socio-economic-political development in the state. They exhibited a strong sense of nationalism

and self-sacrifice. They were successful in keeping the nation united. It was under Nehru's leadership that the nation withstood the Chinese betrayal in 1962, and under Lal Bahadur Shastri's leadership, the Pakistani aggression of 1965. The ministers of Nehru's and Shastri's Cabinets acted as responsive and responsible heads of administration. They always owned moral responsibility in case of any failure in their respective departments. Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri resigned as the railway minister owning moral responsibility for the Ariyalpur train disaster. In 1964, N. Sanjiva Reddy resigned from Chief Minister Ship when the Supreme Court passed an adverse remark against him. Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon resigned in the wake of India's inglorious performance in the 1963 War.

But, unfortunately, the second generation of Indian leadership has not been steadfastly committed to certain social and moral values and responsibility. PM Indira Gandhi did to resign when the Allahabad High Court set aside her election and disqualified her. The nation was then forced to live under an emergency during which, the democratic process was derailed in favor of veiled authoritarianism. Yet respect for democratic values had the upper hand when Mrs. Gandhi went to the polls in 1977. She and her Congress 910 were squarely defeated in the polls. But the new Janata Party leadership too failed to rise above petty politics, personality cult politics and internal factionalism. The people brought back the congress (I) Leadership to power in the 1980 election. But the quality of leadership in India kept on going downhill. Leaders were 'promoted' or 'demoted' on the basis of the degree of loyalty and commitment to the leader at the top. In 1984, the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi brought power to her son Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. The period of his rule from November 1984 to November 1989 witnessed a rise in political corruption and the emergence of a band of leaders with narrow and colored visions and during 1991-96, political corruption reached its peak, political came to be scam politics, Use of political power for evading laws came to be a practice with most of the leaders. Laloo Prasad Yadav in Bihar continues to cling to power despite alleged involvement in the fodder scam.

Decline of leadership qualities has been occurring not only in the congress but also in other political parties. Factionalism, personality cult and regionalism have been the determinants of the popularity of their leaders. The new leaders have been more parochial and less cosmopolitan in their approach, MGRMNTR, Karunanidhi, Devi Lal, Bhajan Lal, O.P. Chautala, Mulayam Singh Yadav, Laloo Prasad Yadav, Buta Singh, Balram Jakhar, the 'scam ministers' and many others have been involved in not one but several controversies. Some of them lack ideal leadership qualities. The ability of the cotemporary Indian leadership to maintain an enduringly high level of support, credibility and legitimacy has suffered a decline. Factionalism within Congress has been centering around the personalities of its leaders and this is also true of other political parties. Even

the CPM suffered a split in 2001, in almost every political party; personality-based factionalism has been continuously present.

12. Regionalism in Indian Politics: Regionalism in the form of support of regional goals over and above the national goals has been present in the Indian political system ever since 1947. The party is that despite meaningful efforts towards nation-building and national integration, it has been gaining more and more ground. Its presence is evidenced in demands for secessionism, sub-national loyalties, parochialism, provincialism, demands for separate statehood, and demands for more autonomy of the state, demands for regional autonomy within a state, the tendency to give more importance to local/regional issues, goals and interests over national interests and goals and above all by the presence of centre-state and inter-state disputes. The Kashmir Problem, the Telangana movement, and others have been manifestations of regionalism in India. Regionalism has been also visible in the form of inter-state disputes and demands for state autonomy and even secession. The presence of regional political parties and the support which national political parties have to give to regional groups and parties for gaining electoral supports also reflect the presence of regionalism and regional identities in India. Regionalism has been a big hindrance in the way of the process of national integration and nation-building. However, with the emergence of coalition politics, in which national level political parties join hands with regional/local political parties; regionalism has started getting integrated with the national mainstream politics. Regionalism is giving place to bargaining federalism.

13. Caste Politics: Caste and casteism are predominant features of politics in India. Caste as a strongly entrenched feature of Indian society continues to be a determinant of politics. Political participation and voting behavior studies reveal the presence of caste as a determinant of these two vital processes of politics, so much so that some political parties stand organized on caste basis e.g. the DMK and AIADMK are anti-Brahmin parties, the Kerala Congress is a party of the Catholics, the BSP and the Republican party are parties of the scheduled castes. Brahmins vs. non-Brahmin, Jats vs. Brahmin, Kammas vs. reddy, Jats vs. Rajputs, Banyas vs. pattidars, Ezharas vs. Nayars, Lingayats vs. Bokaliggs, Yadavs vs. Thakurs, Bhumiya vs. Thakurs conflicts are harsh realities of Indian politics and they become aggressively active during election. The issue of reservation of seats and jobs for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes has given strength to caste conflict in the Indian politics. In fact, caste *J.P. Narayan* once observed continues to be a major factor of politics in India. In the words of Rudolph's, "Within the new context of political democracy caste remains a central element of India's society even while adapting itself to the values and methods of democratic politics."

15. Terrorism and Violence: In alarming development in the Indian politics had been a rise in the use of terrorism and violence as means of securing the

desired interests and goals. After independence, insurgents and terrorists became active in the North-eastern parts of the country. Through prolonged operations and political dialogues, they were brought under control and involved in the national mainstream. However, still these continue to be present. Naga hostiles, Mizo hostiles and Tripura rebels continue to remain active in some pockets of Nagaland, Mizoram and Tripura respectively, the Gorkhaland agitation in west Bengal we a militant agitation. So has been the case of the Bodoland agitation in Assam. In Punjab, terrorism had its birth in the early eighties and despite several strong anti-terrorist drives, it continued to remain at work till 1991-92 during 1980-91, the political parties in Punjab remained inactive, because of the continued presence of terrorism, the inability of to law and order machinery to control it fully and the failure of the government to initiate political dialogue for settling the Punjab problem, factionalism within Akali politics prevented the emergence of a unified Akali leadership capable of negotiating and affecting a political solution. Fortunately, however, the installation of a popular democratic government in Punjab in February 1992 paved the easy for a strong drive against militancy in the state. The people of Punjab felt confident about the ability and intentions of the Punjab government and rallied behind it to fight and eliminate the forces of militancy and terrorism, the efforts have been successful. However, terrorism and militancy still continue to be present in J&K and this is posing a big danger to India's territorial integrity and to the cherished national values secularism and egalitarianism. The North-Eastern states continue to suffer from the activates of militant and terrorist groups like ULFA, dodo militants, Naga-rebels and some others. In Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa, the people's War Group (PWG)—the naxalities continue to remain engaged in violence and terrorism. The emergence of terrorism and violence and the strength that these continue to enjoy in some parts pose a big challenge to India's national unity and ability to meet the crisis. Communalism, casteism, regionalism, linguistic regionalism, secessionism, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, felling of deprivation and thwarted aspirations have been the reasons behind the presence of violence in Indian politics. By eliminating/controlling these causes, the problem of terrorism and violence can be successfully handled.

16. Communalism: Forces of communalism are active in Indian politics. Several communal political parties and other communal organizations are actively present in the Indian political system. Periodic outbreaks of communal riots (Gujarat has been the latest victim of communal riots where widespread communal violence has been a sad reality since February 2002) and their frequency have been readily increasing which amply demonstrates the presence of communalism in India, some of its forms of manifestation are religious communalism, factionalism, linguistic communalism, regional communalism, minority communalism, majority communalism, and case communalism has

been acting as a big restraint on India's march towards nation-building and national-integration. It had been the chief destroyer of the desired environment of secular living disputes like Babri Masjid vs. Ram Janambhoomi is adversely affecting the national environment. While many scholars hold mass poverty, unemployment, illiteracy regional imbalances, existence of communal groups and parties, religious fundamentalism, bigotry, provincialism and casteism as the chief reasons behind the growth of communalism, some other scholars hold the weaknesses and decay of the political institutions as the main reasons behind the spread of communalism. *Rajni Kothari* writes, "communalism thrives in India because of the destruction and decay of institutions, the erosion of legitimate authority, the decline of civil society and the collapse of democratic state," whatever maybe the reason, the hard facts that communalism is posing a big threat to India's unity as a nation, Gigantic efforts ---economic, political and administrative—are needed to fight this menace.

17. Language Politics: The language issue too is an important issue in Indian politics. Linguistic pluralism has prevented the emergence of a national language. The constitution recognizes 18 major languages. Hindi is declared to be of official language but along with in, English as an alternative language. The Northern states on the other hand are pro-Hindi and anti- English and support the adoption of Hindi as the national language. Anti-Hindi riots in the south and pro-Hindi riots in the north have been a recurrent phenomenon in India. The three language Formula has failed to solve the language problem. Linguistic regionalism or linguistic communalism continues to characterize politics in India. It is adversely affecting the process of national integration and welding of the people to a strong emotionally united nation.

12.4. Increasing Politicization of the Masses and Political Participation. The evolution of the Indian political system since 1947 clearly reveals increasing politicization of the masses leading to increasing political participation. The democratic processes, particularly the elections, have played a key role in the process of politicization of the masses. Even casteism, linguism and regionalism have served as means for increased political participation of the people in functioning of the Indian political system, this has been on the one hand, a source of increasing political maturity but on the other hand, a source of strains upon the processes of nation-building and national integration, increased conflicts and disputes reflect the increasing awareness among the masses and their struggle to resolve these. But the accompanying violence and terrorism are causes for grave national concern because the way these have been spreading had been posing serious threats to India's unity as a nation.

19. Emergence of the Era of Coalition Politics: Between 1991-99, the government making exercise at the national and state levels reflected the emergence of the days of coalition politics in India. In these years of Hung

Parliaments, the formation of government by several parties acting as a coalition has become a reality. In June 1996, a coalition of 13 parties—the United Front—came to power in India. The congress I and CPM extended their support from the outside. In April 1997, a new UF government led by PM Inder Kumar Gujral came to power with the outside support of the congress I and CPM. During March 1998 to October 1999, the BJP- led coalition of 13 parties' exercised power at the centre. On 13th October,1999, the National Democratic Alliance (the BJP plus 23 other parties) came to power as it was successful in securing a working/ simple majority in the 13th lok sabha, the TDP supported the NDA government from outside. In 2004 the congress-led UPA alliance came to power and since then a new coalition government has been working. The left coalition continues to rules West Bengal. Kerala, Orissa, Goa, UP, Bihar, Mizoram, J and K, Karnataka and Maharashtra have been living with coalition government. It appears that the era of coalition government has finally dawned in India. Indian political system has successfully got transformed form one-party dominant rule to a large coalition rule. This has demonstrated India's ability to live as a stable and continuously developing liberal democratic political system.

CHECK YOUR KNOWLEDGE

1. Discuss in detail the salient features of the Indian political system?

2.4.3 Summary

All these features of the Indian political system leads us to the conclusion that it is a developing liberal democratic system trying to synthesize tradition and modernity, socialism and market economy and eastern and western values. Indian union of states continues to develop as Unitarian federal state.

The nature of Indian politics can be described in term of its following characteristics:

- 1) Liberal democratic politics;
- 2) Welfare State and welfarism;
- 3) Unitarian Federalism;
- 4) Social and political pluralism;
- 5) A democratic socialist system now developing on basis of the principles of economic liberalization, privatization and market economy;
- 6) Bureaucratic regime, because of the continued strong presence and role of bureaucracy;
- 7) Secular State and developing secular political culture;
- 8) Fast developing economic system;
- 9) World's largest working and stable representative democracy;
- 10) Multi- party coalition rule;
- 11) A state having the potential to develop into a super by the year 2025;

12) A state characterized by both modernity and traditions, prosperity and poverty, development and underdevelopment, peace and violence, unity and pressures on unity, rule of law and personality cult politics, democratic and bureaucratic administration, secularism and communalism—indeed a stable, democracy with fast developing economy living with several unhealthy pressures. A complex and pluralistic political system working in a complex and pluralistic society. These words fully reflect the nature of Indian politics.

2.4.4 Key Concepts/Words

Developing Liberal Democratic Polity: The Indian political system can be legitimately described as a developing liberal democratic system. It satisfies the standards essential for such a system. It accepts the ideology of liberalism in so far as its constitution grants and guarantees civil and political liberties to its people, provides for a constitutional system and a government which is constituted by and works in accordance with written and enacted constitution. An independent and impartial judiciary acts as the guardian and protector of the constitution and the fundamental right and liberties of the people. It is characterized by a free and open struggle for power. People have the right and freedom to form their groups, associations and parties for expressing their opinions and securing their interests. Equality before law, equality of opportunities, freedom of expression and assembly, equal political right and freedom for all the people, universal adult franchise, free and regular elections etc., are the salient features of the struggle for power in India. Over the years, it has demonstrated its ability to work as a stable political system characterized by orderly and peaceful political changes including change of power holders. However, it is a developing liberal democratic political system. It is yet to develop fully its democratic institutions. The level of political participation is increasing but it is still characterized by the traditions of caste politics, regionalism, communalism, linguism, terrorism, violence, politics of agitations, combined with the ability to maintain political stability, national unity, territorial integrity and march towards modernization and social economic development which reflect the developing nature of the Indian political system.

Democratic, Socialism, Secularism and Liberalism as Ideological Foundations: The Indian political system has its ideological foundations in the principles of Democratic Socialism, and Liberalism. These constitute the basic qualities of Indian politics. The Preamble to the constitution declares India to be sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic. Democratic socialism stands for the use of democratic process for securing socialism; Democratic Republic involves faith in open struggle for power, decision-making by majority or consensus, and responsibility and accountability of the decision-makers towards the people and the latter stand for rapid modernization and socio-economic development through organized planning at the national level.

Mixed economy involving a state controlled strong public sector combined with a private sector, state regulated pricing and distribution system combined with market economy, development through state formulated Five Year Plans, nationalization of key industries and services like banking and insurance were adopted due to faith in socialism. Since 1991, the Indian state has been pursuing privatization liberalization, disinvestment in the Public Sector, competitiveness and globalization. However, Democratic Socialism still continues to be accepted as the goal. Securing of social justice and developing a system of social security continues to be a primary objective. The adoption and successful working of parliamentary democracy and faith in rights and freedoms of the people reflect the liberal democratic nature of Indian Political System. The Faith in liberalism stands reflected in the constitutional provisions regarding guaranteed fundamental right of the people, equal political right and freedom of the people, rule of law, independence of judiciary and limited government based on public opinion, and successful organization and operationalization of representative democracy. Further, secularism stands writ large in the provisions of the constitution which provides for the absence of a state religion, equality protection to the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other weaker sections of the society. Unity in diversity has been a national motto and it fully reflects faith in secularism. However, here again, several restraints like casteism, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, linguism, regionalism, regional imbalances, communalism, low and slow process of social economic modernization and development presence of violence and terrorism and politics of agitation, protests and populism, continue to act as limitation on the accepted principles of democratic socialism, secularism and liberalism.

Written Constitution as the Legal Framework of the Indian Political System: The legal foundation of the political system and the organization and working of its government rest upon a self-made and enacted written constitution. The representatives of the people of India framed the constitution of India through open, free and fair debates in the constituent assembly. Every decision regarding the organization, powers and functions of the government and its relationship with the people was taken either through majority or through consensus. The Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly drafted the constitutional provisions which were incorporated into the Constitution after copious debates and amendments. The Constitution of India is a lengthy Constitution with 395 Articles, 12 Schedules and ninety amendments. It has been instrumental in securing the organization and functioning of the government of India and the State Government. It has stood the test of time. It came into operation on 26th January, 1950 and is still working. It has places before the people the objectives which are to be secured, the nature of the policies which are to be adopted and the process through which the government is to be organized and worked. As such, a written,

lengthy, self-made, enacted and developing Constitution provides sound legal foundations to the Indian political system.

Parliamentary Democracy and Republicanism: Party due to the experience of working of a neo-parliamentary system of government during the last three decades of the British rule in India and partly due to her faith in parliamentary democracy as a system of popular, democratic and responsible government independent India decided unanimously in favor of constituting her Government on the British model of parliamentary system, It was done through the adoption of the principles of: (I) a constitutional head of state (nominal executive) exercising all her powers through the real executive-the prime minister and his Council of Ministers; (ii) close relationship between the executive and the legislature instead of a separation of powers between them;(iii) individual and collective responsibility of the real executive before the parliament ; and (iv) leadership of the Prime minister, political homogeneity if the council of ministers, and the right of the PM to dissolve the legislature. Along with it, the democratic features-universal adult franchise, equal political rights for all, freedom to form political parties and organizations, open and free struggle for power, free regular and fair elections, popular sovereignty, limited, responsive and responsible government, rule of law, independent judiciary, decentralization of political power, and equal fundamental right for all were adopted, For the past six decades, parliamentary democracy has been at work, Fourteen General elections have been held, The people have been using their ballot power of effect a change of rulers. In 2004 they replaced the BJP-led NDA rule by the congress led UPA rule.

Multi-Party System and Trend towards the emergence of Party-Groups /Alliances: The people of India have the freedom to form organizations and to freely participate in the struggle for power, In fact several national and regional political parties and behind them several interest\pressure groups have been active partners\competitors in the Indian politics. The pluralist nature of the Indian society has been responsible for the emergence of several national and regional level political parties. The Congress, BJP, CPI, CPM, BSP and NCP are the national level political parties because they are active in almost all parts of India, Along with these, several regional parties, which are active only in their respective regions are also in existence, Some o f the regional parties are: the Akali Dal with all its factions in Punjab, the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) in Assam, the DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, the Telgu Desham in Andhra, PDP and the National conference in J&K, the Mizo National Front (MNF) in Mizoram, the Sikkim Sangram Parishad in Sikkim, INLD in Haryana, RJD n Bihar, BJD in Orissa and other, In fact, the growing presence and important role of the regional parties has been one of the most outstanding aspects of the political development of independent India. These have catalyzed realignment of political forces and their impact on the

structure and process of politics has been multi-directional and far reaching, On the one hand, they have played a big role in the regionalization of politics on the other hand some of these have influenced the course of national politics (e.g. the role of the Telugu Desham Party and its leader N.T. Rama Rao in establishing the National Front against the Congress and the role of the TDP, DMK, AGP, TMC and others in forming the United Front government in 1996&1997) the NDA in 1999 and the role of RJD, LJSP and left parties in forming the Congress led United Progressive Alliance in 2004. Regional parties have also been active actors behind the centre-state autonomy for, and demands of separate statehoods or regional autonomy within states. They have emerged as key actors in the centre-state relations in Indian Federalism. The Indian multi-party system now reflects a trend towards the emergence of three political groups\alliance-BJP-led Alliance, Congress-led Alliance and the Left Alliance or the Third front.

Regionalism in Indian Politics: Regionalism in the form of support of regional goals over and above the national goals has been present in the Indian political system ever since 1947. The party is that despite meaningful efforts towards nation-building and national integration, it has been gaining more and more ground. Its presence is evidenced in demands for secessionism, sub-national loyalties, parochialism, provincialism, demands for separate statehood, and demands for more autonomy of the state, demands for regional autonomy within a state, the tendency to give more importance to local/regional issues, goals and interests over national interests and goals and above all by the presence of centre-state and inter-state disputes. The Kashmir Problem, the Telangana movement, and others have been manifestations of regionalism in India. Regionalism has been also visible in the form of inter-state disputes and demands for state autonomy and even secession. The presence of regional political parties and the support which national political parties have to give to regional groups and parties for gaining electoral supports also reflect the presence of regionalism and regional identities in India. Regionalism has been a big hindrance in the way of the process of national integration and nation-building. However, with the emergence of coalition politics, in which national level political parties join hands with regional/local political parties; regionalism has started getting integrated with the national mainstream politics. Regionalism is giving place to bargaining federalism.

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castes. Brahmins vs. non-Brahmin, Jats vs. Brahmin, Kammas vs. reddy, Jats vs. Rajputs, Banyas vs. pattidars, Ezharas vs. Nayars, Lingayats vs Bokaliggs, Yadavs vs. Thakurs, Bhumiya vs. Thakurs conflicts are harsh realities of Indian politics and they become aggressively active during election. The issue of reservation of seats and jobs for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes has given strength to caste conflict in the Indian politics. In fact, caste *J.P.Naraya* once observed continues to be a major factor of politics in India. In the words of Rudolph's, "Within the new context of political democracy caste remains a central element of India's society eve while adapting itself to the values and methods of democratic politics."

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India. It is adversely affecting the process of national integration and welding of the people to a strong emotionally united nation.

2.4.5 Exercise Questions

1. Write a detailed note on features of Indian Political System.
2. Explain multi party system and trend towards the emergence of Party Groups/ Alliances?
3. How politics is related to caste, language and region?

2.4.6 Short Questions

1. A Developing Liberal Democratic Polity
2. Democratic, Socialism, Secularism and Liberalism as Ideological Foundations
3. Parliamentary Democracy and Republicanism
4. Multi-Party System
5. Emergence of Party groups/ Alliances
6. Caste Politics
7. Regionalism in Indian Politics
8. Communalism
9. Language Politics

2.4.7 Reading List

- Ghai, U.R. and Lall, N. 1992. *Indian Political System*. New Academic Publishing Co. Jalandhar

ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM**STRUCTURE**

- 2.5.0 Objectives**
- 2.5.1 Introduction**
- 2.5.2 Ethnicity and ethnic identity**
- 2.5.3 The concept of ethnics**
- 2.5.4 Approaches to ethnicity**
- 2.5.5 Ethnicity in history**
- 2.5.6 Ethnicity in the modern world**
- 2.5.7 The Politics of Ethnicity in India**
- 2.5.8 Nationalism (in detail)**
- 2.5.9 Summary**
- 2.5.10 Key Concepts/Words**
- 2.5.11 Exercise Questions**
- 2.5.12 Short Questions**
- 2.5.13 Reading List**

2.5.0 Objectives

By the end of this chapter, the student shall be able to:

- To understand the meaning of ethnics, ethnicity and ethnic identity.
- To know the different approaches to ethnicity.
- To explore the relationship between politics and ethnicity.
- To understand in detail the concept of nationalism.

2.5.1 Introduction

Though the term 'ethnicity' is recent, the sense of kinship, group solidarity and common culture to which it refers is as old as the historical record. Ethnic communities have been present in every period and continent and have played an important role in all societies. Though their salience and impact have varied considerably, they have always constituted one of the basic modes of human association and community. The same is true of the sense ethnic identity. Though more elusive, the sense of a common ethnicity has remained to this day a major focus of identification by individuals.

Ethnic conflict can be considered under several headings. Here we are mainly concerned with the political impact of ethnicity, and conversely, the impact of political conflicts on ethnic community and identity. There are, of course, many other forms and sources of ethnic conflict. Economic inequalities and

transformations are particularly important. Quite obviously, the perennial struggle for scarce resources exacerbates cultural differences; when economic inequalities are superimposed on ranked ethnic groups, severe conflict often results, especially when societies are undergoing rapid industrialization.

There are, however, other major sources of ethnic conflict. One is associated with cultural, notably linguistic and religious, differences. A second is concerned with distribution of political rewards within polytechnic states; these often give rise to particularly bitter conflicts. Closely linked to such conflicts are those associated with the creation and maintenance of nations and national states in the modern world; here the influence of nationalist ideology is paramount. Finally, there are international conflicts triggered by ethnic differences: conflicts between national states which are caused or exacerbated by ethnic movements of secession and irredentism. There are the dimensions of ethnicity and ethnic conflict that our readings attempt to illuminate.

2.5.2 Ethnicity and ethnic identity

The term 'ethnicity' first appeared in the 1950s in the English language. It is first recorded in a dictionary in Oxford English Dictionary of 1953, and one of the earliest compilations of articles under those heading states. Ethnicity seems to be a new term (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). The meaning of the term is equally uncertain. It can mean 'the essence of an ethnic group or the quality of belonging to an ethnic group' or what it is you have if you are in "ethnic group" (Chapman et al., 1989), generally in the context of 'self-other' distinctions (Eriksen, 1993)

The term 'ethnicity' is, quite clearly, a derivative of the much older term and more commonly used adjective 'ethnic' which in the English language goes back to the middle ages. The English adjective 'ethnic' in turn derives from the ancient Greek term *ethnos*; it was used as synonym of gentile, that is non-Christian and non-Jewish pagan (itself a rendering of the Hebrew *goy*) in New Testament Greek. In French, for example the Greek noun survives as *ethnic*, with an associated adjective *ethnique*. As the English language has no concrete noun for *ethnos* or *ethnic*, the French term is used here to denote an 'ethnic community' or 'ethnic group'.

The ancient Greeks used the term *ethnos* in a variety of ways. In Homer we hear of *ethnos hetairon*, a band of friends, *ethnos Lukion*, a tribe of Lycians, and *ethnos melisson* or *ornithon*, a swarm of bees or birds. Aeschylus calls the Persians an *ethnos*, Pindar speaks of the *ethnos aneron* or *gunaikon* a race of men or women, Herodotus of the *Medikon ethnos*, the Median people, and Plato of *ethnos kerukikon*, a caste of heralds. All this became, in the New Testament writers and church Fathers, *ta ethne*, the gentile peoples. (Liddell and Scott, 1869).

From these terms certain key concepts for a study of ethnicity (conceived as a field of social phenomena) emerge. Apart from ethnic we have, such concepts as

'ethnic identity', 'ethnic origin', 'ethnocentrism' and ethnicism. 'Ethnic identity' and 'ethnic origin' refer to the individual level of identification with a culturally defined collectivity, the sense on the part of the individual that she or he belongs to particular cultural community. 'Ethnic origin' likewise refers to a sense of ancestry and nativity on the part of the individual through his or her parents and grand-parents; although the concept may also have an even more problematic collective dimension, referring to the (usually diverse) cultural groups and migration origin of ethnies.

'Ethnocentrism' is often used in social psychology on an individual or interpersonal level as synonym for disdain of the stranger. But it can also have a collective historical referent, as the sense of uniqueness, centrality, and virtue of and ethnies in its relations with other ethnies. This has been an important feature of most ethnies in history, helping to sustain their members in times of adversity. The term 'ethnicism' is more rarely used. It refers to movements of protest and resistance by and on behalf of ethnies against oppressive or exploitative outsiders, and again such movements have frequently punctuated the historical record (De Vos and Romanucce-Rossi, 1974).

While each of these concept may be used on both individual and collective levels, it is important to bear the distinction between them in mind and avoid the problems of attempting to read off individual ethnic behavior from the collective character or trajectory of ethnies and vice versa. This is very clearly illustrated by the fate of diaspora groups such as the Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and overseas Chinese, It is, after all, quite possible for large numbers of individual of a diaspora ethnies to assimilate to their host societies, and yet leave the ethnies in question intact. Conversely, the ethnies may experience political destruction and cultural marginalization, yet, as occurred with so many minorities like the Frisians, Wends, and Huguenots, individuals bearing the culture may persist for many generations (Armstrong, 1982 and Sheffer, 1986).

2.5.3 The concept of ethnies

The key term in the field is that of 'ethnic group' or 'ethnic community' but it is one for which there is no agreed stipulative or ostensive definition. The issue is complicated by the levels of incorporation which named human culture communities display. Handelman has distinguished four such levels: that of ethnic category, the loosest level of incorporation, where there is simply a perceived cultural difference between the group and outsiders, and a sense of the boundary between them. In the next stage, that of ethnic network, there is regular interaction between ethnic members such that the network can distribute resources among its members, In the ethnic association the members develop common interests and political organizations to express these at a collective, corporate level. Finally, we have the ethnic community which possesses a permanent; an example would be an ethnies in command of a national state (Handelman, 1977).

In fact, most people would tend to equate the latter with are termed 'nations', and to simplify these levels by opposing the ethnic category to the ethnic community. The former is much as Handelman describes, but the latter conflates the ethnic network and the ethnic association. An ethnic community or ethnic then is one where the members interact regularly and have common interests and organizations at a collective level.

Handelman's typology is useful, but it fails to capture the specifically 'ethnic' content of an 'ethnic community' or ethane. We need to consider other elements, and Schermerhorn's well-known definition points us in the right direction.

An ethnic group is defined here as a collectivity within a larger society having real of putative common ancestry, memories of a shred historical pasts, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their people hood. Examples of such symbolic elements are" kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation , language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation nationality, phonotypical features, or any combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group (Schermerhorn, 1978)

If we drop Schermerhour's insistence that ethnic groups are only to be construed as 'parts of al larger society', and exchange his long list of symbolic elements for 'elements of common culture', we arrive at the following definition of the term ethnic: a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members.

In other words ethnies habitually exhibit, albeit in varying degrees, six main features:

1. a common proper name, to identify and express the 'essence' of the community;
2. a myth of common ancestry, a myth rather than a fact a myth that includes the4 idea of a common origin in time and place and that gives an ethnies a sense of fictive kinship, what Horowitz terms a 'super-family'(Horowiz,1985);
3. shared historical memories, or better shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration;
4. one or more elements of common culture. which need not be specified but normally include religion, customs, or language;
5. a link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethane, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with diaspora peoples.

6. a sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the ethnics' population (A.D. Smith, 1986).

This brings out the importance of shared myths and memories in the definition of ethnics, and the subjective identification of individuals with the community; without the shared myths and memories, including myths of origin and election, and the sense of solidarity they engender, we would be speaking of an ethnic category rather than a community. The second key element is the orientation to the past: to the origins and ancestors of the community and to its historical formation, including its 'golden ages', the periods of its political, artistic, or spiritual greatness. The destiny of the community is bound up with its ethno-history with its own understanding of a unique, shared past.

2.5.4 Approaches to ethnicity

The phenomena of ethnicity are not only empirically very varied, they are characterized by paradox. On the one hand, we encounter highly durable ethnics, some of them indeed tracing their origins over several centuries, even millennia. On the other hand, we observe the rise of new ethnics and the dissolution of older ones, as well as the many transformations of culture that existing ethnics have undergone. Moreover, as we come closer to the object of investigation we discern the many fissures in ethnics and shifts in ethnic identification; the literature is full of examples of 'multiple identity', which include not only the many different affiliations of individuals with other kinds of grouping such as gender, region, class, religion, and the like, but also the many shifting identifications between different ethnics or ethnic categories. In ancient Greece, for example, one could identify with one's polis (city-state) with one's ethno-linguistic group (Ionian, Boeotian, Dorian, Aeolian), or with one's ethnic (all Hellas). In modern Nigeria, one can identify with one's clan, one's ethnic (Ibo, Yoruba, Tiv, Hausa, etc), one's religious community (Christianity, Islam), and with the national state of Nigeria, not to mention with African culture (Alty, 1982; Coleman, 1958) It is no wonder, then, that we find such conflicting approaches to the study of so kaleidoscopic and seemingly paradoxical a set of phenomena.

For convenience, we can divide the existing approaches to 'ethnicity' into two broad camps, and a number of alternative approaches:

First come the so-called 'primordialists'. This is a term that was first used by Edward Shils (1957), who was influenced by his readings in the sociology of religion. He sought to distinguish certain kinds of social bond- personal, primordial, sacred, and civil ties- and to show how even in modern, civic societies the other kinds of social bonding persisted. It was an idea taken up by Clifford Geertz (1903), who spoke of the 'overpowering' and ineffable quality' attaching to certain kinds of tie, which the participants tended to see as exterior, coercive, and 'given'. It is important to note here that 'primordiality' is attributed by individuals to the ties of religion, blood, race, language, region,

and custom; it does not in here in these bonds. Geerta suggests that the drive for an efficient dynamic modern state interacts with the other great drive for personal identity, which is based on the 'primordial ties'. This is not so far from Weber's belief that political action is the single most effective source of a 'belief in blood relationship, unless gross differences of anthropological type impede it' (Weber, 1978).

'Primordialism' as such has come in for a good deal of criticism for presenting a static and naturalistic view of ethnicity and for lacking explanatory power (Eller and Coughlan, 1993). Scholars frequently point to the malleability of ethnic identity, its overlapping with other kinds of social identity, and people's capacity to assume various identities in different situations. Frequent migration, colonization, and intermarriage, particularly in the modern world have undermined the view of ethnic communities as immemorial, discrete, persisting units.

Recently, however, sociobiologists have proposed a more radical primordialism, which regards genetic reproductive capacity as the basis, not only of families and clans, but of wider kinship-based groupings like ethnies. They suggest that these groups are bonded through mechanism of 'nepotism' and 'inclusive fitness', and that the myths of descent which underpin ethnies correspond with such nepotistic reproductive strategies. This line of argument has been attacked for reducing cultural and social behavior to biological drives, and for failing to account, except rather speculatively, for the bonding of large ethnies and nations (Reynolds, 1980 and Van den Berghe, 1986)

In stark contrast to 'primordialists', the 'instrumentalists' treat ethnicity as social, political and cultural resource for different interest and status-groups. One version focuses on elite competition for resources and suggest that the manipulation of symbols is vital for gaining the support of the masses and achieving political goals (Brass, 1991/ Cohen, 1974), Another version examines elite strategies of maximizing of maximizing preferences in terms of individual 'rational choices' in given situations; here it is assumed that actors generally desire goods measured in terms of wealth, power, and status, and that joining ethnic or national communities helps to secure those ends either by influencing the state or in certain situations, through secession (Banton, 1983 and 1994; Hechter, 1986 and 1992)

One of the central ideas of 'instrumentalists' is the socially constructed nature of ethnicity, and the ability of individuals to cut and mix from a variety of ethnic heritages and cultures to forge their own individual or group identities. (A. Cohen, 1969; Bhabha, 1990; Hall, 1993; R. Cohen, 1994). This risks divorcing the quest for individual cultural identity from its institutional bases. There is also the danger, common to instrumentalist approaches, of neglecting the wider cultural environment in which elite competition and rational preference maximization take place.

Instrumentalists can also be criticized for defining interests largely in material terms, for failing to take seriously the participants' sense of the permanence of their ethnies (which might be termed 'participant's primordial's), and above all, for underplaying the affective dimensions of ethnicity. This is well brought out by Connor's subjectivist and Fishman's historical critiques. Throughout history ethnies and nation have clearly aroused collective passion of a quasi-physical kind in ways that even classes failed to do (Fishman, 1980; Connor, 1993).

Few scholars in practice adhere to either the primordialist or the instrumentalist pole tout court. But there have been few systematic attempts to synthesize the two types of approach. Both McKay and Scott have demonstrated that this can be done on a theoretical level, the question is rather how far such syntheses can be done on a theoretical level, and the question is rather how far such syntheses can be empirically helpful (McKay, 1982; Scott, 1990).

Three alternative traditions of enquiry into ethnicity are Barth's 'transactionalist', Horowitz's 'social psychological', and Armstrong's and Smith's 'ethno-symbolic' approaches. For Barth, ethnic groups must be treated as units of ascription, where the social boundaries ensure the persistence of the group. It is not the cultural content enclosed by the boundary, but the boundary itself and the symbolic 'border guards' (language, dress, food, etc.) that perpetuate the community and require intensive anthropological study. Nevertheless, Barth regards the boundary as permeable; indeed, transactions across the boundary help to render the boundary more durable. Barth has been criticized for assuming the fixity of bounded ethnic identities and failing to differentiate types of ethnic allegiance, the resources open to various ethnic groups, and their individual subjective dimensions (Francis, 1976; Wallman, 1986; Epstein, 1978).

Horowitz (1985), by contrast, uses the group psychology of Henri Tajfel and focuses on differential estimations of group worth, and on their collective stereotypes. Arguing that ethnic groups in Africa and Asia, included in modern territorial states, have different cultural and economic resources, he suggests that we can explain their strategies, including secession and irredentism, in terms of the 'backward' or 'advanced' nature of the group's resources and of the region they inhabit. Underlying his approach is the assumption that ethnic affiliation is ultimately based on kinship myths and on a sense of group honour in relation to other groups. Horowitz's account provides a welcome antidote to reductionist approaches. It can be supplemented by a historical perspective, particularly in non-colonial contexts that includes other factors like the role of the intelligentsia, collective memories and preexisting group antagonisms.

The main concern of 'ethno-symbolists' is with the persistence, change, and resurgence of ethnies, and with the role of the ethnic past or pasts in shaping present cultural communities. Armstrong (1982) applies Barth's

general approach to pre-modern ethnic communities, notably in medieval Christendom and Islam, but infuses it with a concern for the cultural forms that Barth had discounted. For Armstrong, as for A.D. Smith (1986), myths and symbols play a vital role in unifying populations and ensuring their continuity over many generations. Armstrong consider a range of factors, like nostalgia for past life style, religious civilizations and organization, imperial mythomoteurs, and language fissures, in creating shifting ethnic identities. Smith examines some of the causes of ethno-genesis distinguishes between 'horizontal' (aristocratic) and 'vertical' (demotic) ethnies, and traces the patterns by which they give rise to modern nations. He also emphasizes the cultural contents of myths, memories, and symbols, notably myths of origin and ethnic election, and memories of the golden age. There has, he argues, been a resurgence of ethnicity in the modern world, as intelligentsias have rediscovered ethnic roots as an antidote to the impersonality of bureaucratic rationalism (Smith, 1981 and 1991). Though clearly differing from 'primordialist' accounts, ethno-symbolism has been criticized for failing to identify sufficiently the mass bases of ethnic phenomena, relegating their material aspects, and privileging the contents of myths and memories.

2.5.5 Ethnicity in history

Ethnic phenomena have varied in importance and salience throughout history. We find records of 'tribes' and ethnic groups in the Middle east in the third millennium BC , with the advent of the ancient Egyptians, Summerians , and Elamites. The subsequent history of inter-state conflict in the area is interwoven with ethnic migrations, invasions, and conflicts, as indo-European groups came into contact with native Semitic-speaking groups. The Bablyonian, Assyrian, and Persian empires dominated large number of ethnies, who were accorded varying degrees of autonomy but who intermarried and mingled freely. Certain ethnic groups stand out in the ancient world, notably the ancient Greeks and Jews, who have left copious historical records. Under the Hellenistic and Roman empires, ethnic elites were encouraged to adopt Greek and Roman mores and to participate in the social and political institutions, though ethnic prejudice remained widespread (Sherwin-white, 1952; Balsdon, 1979; Finley, 1986; Mendels, 1992).

In the Far East we can discern the outlines of ethnic states in china, Japan, and Korea, despite considerable internal disunity. In south and south-east Asia the ethnic components of social life and political order are less visible, given the frequent intermingling of peoples and cultures. However, n medieval Java, Kandy (Sri Lanka), Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam a sense of common ethnicity based on Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim cultures emerged over long periods. In ancient and medieval India Hindu diversity and the segmentation of the caste system diluted a sense of common ethnicity, but in the Middle fragmentation of the Caliphates. In medieval Africa and Latin America the

fluidity of ethnic affiliations and the fragility of empires largely prevented the emergence of ethnically based polities, and make it difficult to discern the impact of ethnicity on social life (Oliver and Atmore, 1981; Lehmann, 1982; Dikotter, 1992; Lapidus, 1988).

With the renewed migrations of Indo-European peoples into the Europe under the late Roman empire, ethnically based Kingdoms (regna) emerged in what is now France (Franks), Spain (Visigoths), Italy (Lombards), Germany (Saxons), and England (Anglo-Saxons), and later Scandinavia (Viking Kingdoms) and Hungary (Magyars). Arguably, these became the prototypes and frameworks for the medieval kingdoms of France, Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden, and Hungary which formed the cultural basis of subsequent, modern nations. In Eastern Europe Slavic speaking peoples settled and became differentiated in the early medieval period into the familiar ethnic communities and states (Croatia, Poland, Serbia, Bulgaria, Kiev, Muscovy) that subsequently formed the basis of modern nations (Seton-Watson, 1977; Pearson, 1983; Reynolds, 1984; Llobera, 1994; Portal, 1969).

2.5.6 Ethnicity in the modern world

With the appearance of the modern bureaucratic state and capitalism, ethnic communities take on a new political importance, like the millets of the Ottoman Empire. In the modern rational state there was no room for an ethnic autonomy that conflicted with the requirements for all citizens to integrate into the new national state. The new ideologies of political nationalism required all the members of a 'nation-state' to be united and homogenous, and this produced quite new conflicts in most states which were, after all, composed of several ethnic communities (McNeill, 1986).

This can be most strikingly illustrated in the attitude of the French revolutionaries to minorities within the borders of the new nation of 'France'. In their view, France constituted an homogenous cultural nation a "republic one and indivisible"; minorities, therefore, though they might practice their customs and religion in private, had to assimilate as individuals into the French body politic and become equal citizens. Unlike the German ethnic conception as Brubaker describes, The French embraced a 'civic' nationalism; as Clermont-Tonnerre put it in the French Assembly in 1791: 'To the Jews as a nation we give nothing; to the Jews as individuals we give everything'. This 'civic' ideal has become the source of a vigorous debate about different bases of citizenship, with 'ethnic' and genealogical source being treated as illiberal and anti-democratic (Brubaker, 1992; Breton, 1988; Smith, 1995).

From this debate there has emerged a wider concern for the elements of both ethnic and national identities. For many, the influx of immigrants, Gastarbeiter, asylum -seekers and ex-colonials has decomposed received narratives of national-identity into their 'hybridized' cultural components.

Multi-culturalism has become the political expression of a more pluralistic approach to nationhood in Western polyethnic expression states, though such tendencies have also generated nationalist reactions to ethnic minorities (Hammar, 1990; Husbands 1991; Rex, 1995). At the same time, anti essentialist anthropologists and others have sought to deconstruct ethnicity itself, suggesting not only that all ethnic communities are deeply divided, but also that ethnicity itself is an optional identity and is often overshadowed by other (gender ,class, regional) identities. The role of woman, in particular, in ethnic and national reproduction has in the last decade begun to attract considerable scholarly attention (see the essays in Tonkin et al, 1989; Welby, 1992; Eriksen, 1993).

These approaches have received support, not only from liberal reactions to the exclusive and destructive tendencies of some expressions of ethnic conflict, such as those in Bosnia, the Caucasus, and the Indian Subcontinent, but also from cultural expectations of cultural assimilation of smaller ethnies into wider national communities. This is especially marked in North America, where observers like Glazer and Moynihan (1963 and 1975), Bell (1975), Gans (1979 and 1994) and others have engaged in strenuous debate about the long-term prospects for minority ethnic communities in a melting-pot culture. For some, ethnicity has become largely 'symbolic' in modern societies, whereas other regard the wider 'ethnic revival' in both the west and the former soviet Union as demonstrating the economic and political modernizing potential of ethnic loyalties, as, for example, in the case of middlemen minorities' (Stone, 1979; A.D. Smith, 1981; Taras and Bremmer, 1993). This also ties with the recent politicization of diaspora communities who engage in an overseas 'vicarious nationalism' such as the Greeks, Irish, Jews, Poles and others in North America and Australia (Landau and Esman, in Sheffer, 1986; Zenner, 1991).

In non-Western societies ethnicity has a much more direct influences on the creation of nations and the distributions of resources in post-colonial states. Imperialism and colonialism drew the boundaries of new sates in Africa and Asia without much regarded for ethnic identities, yet also encouraged the ethnic classification for population and required some ethnic communities to play special roles in the colonial polity; such as, for example, the 'martial races'(Enloe, 1980a). The new, urbanized, indigenous elites soon found it necessary to compete for power using ethnic constituencies and symbols as their bases of mass support (Horowitz, 1985; Brass, 1991). In Africa and Asia, as well as in parts of Europe, ethnicity continues to deeply divide the national state, with or without a return to 'fundamentalist' religion or alternatively through the modernization of languages and languages rivalries (Enloe, 1978; Edwards, 1985; Landau, 1986).

Ethnicity has also become allied to issues of 'race' especially in so-called 'plural societies' (Furnivall, 1948; M.G. Smith, 1969). Some states and regimes have gone even further, and employed racist ideologies to harden cultural cleavages so as to exclude and dehumanize minorities on the basis of colour, culture and physical stereotypes. This has brought about a century of forced population transfers, mass murders, and genocides (Polikov, 1974; Kuper, 1981; Fein, 1993). Even without racist categorization, ethnicity in the context of the modern state frequently provides the basis for conflicts over the distribution of resources, with grave regional and geopolitical consequences. This helps to account for the periodic recourse to ethnic secession and irredentism on the part of marginalized ethnic minorities. This is a phenomenon that has encouraged scholars and statesmen to examine various strategies for ethnic conflict regulation from partition to consociationalism and federalism, in the hope of peaceful accommodation of the different demands of ethnies and national states (McGarry and O'Leary, 1993; Smooha and Hanf, 1992).

2.5.7 The Politics of Ethnicity in India

India's linguistic, religious, ethnic, and cultural diversities are proverbial. So are the political mobilizations and the violent conflicts and antagonisms which have arisen from time to time among and between persons from its distinctive cultural groups. However ' it is important to note that neither political mobilization nor ethnic and cultural antagonisms flow naturally out of India's diversities. The 1971 Census of India enumerated 33 languages with speakers of more than one million, but only 15 of them have achieved any form of significant political recognition.

The 1981 census enumerates a tribal population of more than 50 million persons divided into hundreds of distinct groups. Many political mobilization have occurred among several of the tribal groups from the nineteenth century up to the present, of which a few have developed into bitter, violent, and secessionist movements directed against non - tribals , On the other hand , many tribal groups have not mobilized and have not rebelled. Moreover, the forms which tribal mobilizations have taken have been diverse. Some have focused on economic grievances, have appeared to be class -based, and have drawn support from Marxist political organization. Others have focused on political demands and have been organized and led by tribal leaders and exclusively tribal political organizations.

The whole modern history of India has been deeply affected and badly scarred by conflict between separatist Muslim political leaders and organization and the Indian National Congress and by continuing Hindu -Muslim riots and pogroms against Muslim minorities in some cities and towns . Even with respect to these conflicts and the associated violence, however, they must be contrasted against periods of Hindu - Muslim cooperation. Moreover , it must be noted and needs to be explained why such conflicts have occurred more

intensely in some parts of the country and have been less intense or non-existent on others where Hindus and Muslims also live side-by-side.

In the 1980s India has faced an extremely violent movement among militant Sikhs, some of whom have become secessionist. The Punjab, where most Sikhs live, has become virtually an embattled ground in which a violent guerrilla war is being waged between Sikhs militants and the Indian police. Yet Sikhs and Hindus have cooperated politically in the past and were never before considered to be hostile communal groups.

India had also been generally characterized as a society divided by caste and caste antagonism. Various Indian censuses before the 1930s enumerated thousands of local castes and dozens of large caste clusters within each linguistic region. Caste mobilization and inter-caste conflict between so-called backward and upper caste groups became intense in several states. Once again, however, it needs to be stressed that such mobilizations and conflicts have occurred among specific groups in specific regions at particular times and not others.

First state recognition in the both the pre- and post-Independence periods itself has been a critical factor in explaining the rise of some ethnic and cultural movements rather than others. The British gave official preference and cultural movements rather than others. The British gave official preferences to the Bengali language in the east rather than to Assamese and Oriya and to Urdu in the political concessions to Muslims and Sikhs. They allowed migration of plains people into tribal areas in the central India but forbade it in south India when Brahmans were leading the Indian National Congress there.

In the post-Independent period, the government of India and the state government sought to change the balance of the country and of the north Indian states, definitively displacing Urdu from its remaining bastions in U.P. Assamese was adopted as the sole official language of Assamese against the wishes of the large Bengali-speaking minority and many tribal groups. Separate electorates for Muslims and Sikhs were done away with, but reservations of legislative seats and administrative and educational places for scheduled Castes and Tribals were retained or introduced.

State recognition sometimes worked in contrary ways. On the one hand, it strengthened some of the groups. The best examples of this type are the numerous movements among unrecognized 'backward castes' who have sought systems of reservations in various life opportunities do not usually come from those most oppressed but from persons from groups who have some resources but not others or from groups among whom processes of social change have begun such as to make elites conscious of disparities between the life chances of persons from the dominant groups.

2.5.8 Nationalism (in detail)

A nation is the product of a concrete historical process and is therefore a long time in the making consequently, the way political science in general (and or Stalin) has looked at nationhood via definition or deduction from theory is analytically barren, it inevitably results in either existing psychology of a people or their fixed, permanent, unchanging ethnicity becoming the determinants of nationhood, it may, therefore, be suggested that the question of the formation or lack of formation of a nation can only be answered by making a study of the concrete historical development.

In case of India, both the Indian nation and nationalism were products of history: to study their evolution is to study the economic, political and ideological development of to Indian people.

As soon as we see the making of the nation in India as a result of a concrete historical process, it becomes clear that the manner in which it was formed in India (or other colonies) was different for that of Europe's for the two historical processes were very different in India nation and nationalism were basically the result not of ethnicity or the historical formation of the nation around language and culture but of a movement against colonialism, the basic contradiction which led to the national movement and nationhood in India was also totally different form that in Europe. For one, it potted not one section of the people, which formed into a nation, against another but the entire colonial people against colonialism and the colonial state. For the latter suppress not one class or the bourgeoisie and/or the monarchy fought for a unified market and state or tried to unify the people around imperialism and chauvinism and jingoism in the era o imperialist rivalry, the colonial people fought primarily for national liberation form colonial economic and political domination.

The process of nation-formation is both an objective and a subjective, i.e. emotional, intellectual and ideological process. No nation can come into being without the objective process, that is, the process of its economic and political integration but such integration may not suffice; it can always be disturbed due to subjective, political factors, hence, whether the process of nation-formation will be initialed or not and whether it will develop or will be interrupted depends on concrete, historical development.

Looked at form this point of view, the people or India have been getting unified into a 'people 'or welded into a nation since to middle of the 19th century: objectively, Indian were increasingly sharing common interests and common conditions of existence. But the Indian nation was also the product of the painstaking, conscious effort of the struggle against colonialism during which the Indian people acquired the necessary collective consciousness and identity of being one nation.

Objectively, Indians were for centuries in developing common interests and sharing common elements of existence and common consciousness. Even

though pre-19th century Indian was cultural diverse, there had also come into being over the centuries certain unifying strands of a common cultural heritage. Both at the level of the elites and the common people elements of a common composite culture as also common values, had been growing and thus knitting the people together common mythology, common pilgrimage, and common religions and religious reform movement such as the Bhakti and Sufi were some of the aspects of this phenomenon. India was thus becoming, as Jawaharlal Nehru was to grasp, a “Durable entity” on the basis of commonality of culture. Moreover, Indian cultures have historically functioned on the basis of discrimination and subordination. This has tended to lead to ‘cleansing’ moreover; even the politics of the rulers had revolved around most ambitious, sub-continental in their reach. The concepts of Bharat Varsha and Hindustan were a reality of Indian history. As S. Gopal has put it: “The sense of unity was an emotional reality rooted in history even more than in geography”.

The colonization of the Indian economy society and polity further strengthened the objective process of India’s unification. The process of Indian developing into a unified people was very much quickened from the middle of the 19th century. Growth of internal and external trade, the destruction of the relative self-sufficiency of the rural economy of different regions, creation of an all-India market and the introduction of modern trade and industries on an all-India scale increasingly made India’s economic life a single whole and inter-linked the economic fate of people living in different parts of the country. Building upon the Mughal structure, the British gradually introduced a uniform system of law and administration which penetrated down to the village and thus further unified the county and created a single administrative and political entity.

Above all, however, it was the common enemy in the form of colonialism and the experience of colonial oppressions and domination and the struggle against them which provided new uniting bonds to the Indian people. The very existence of foreign rule that oppresses all Indian people irrespective of their social class, caste, religion or region acted as unifying factor. Consequently, the anti-imperialist struggle and the feeling of solidarity born in its course contribute powerfully to the making of the Indian nation.

The aspect may be dieted upon further. Over time, a basic contradiction between the interests of the Indian people and British colonialism developed as the latte began to hinder development in every aspect of Indian life and society. This contradiction and its cognitions were basic to the formation of the Indian nation, or they greeted national sentiments and created the material moral, intellectual and political conditions for the rise and development of a powerful anti-imperialist movement which in turn promoted the process of nation-making. The study of Indian nation formation, therefore, inevitably involves a study of the anti-imperialist movement. For above all it’s was this movement

which, basing itself on the objective reality, made Indian into a nation. Perhaps, there would have –been no Indian nation objectively without the anti-imperialist struggle, though this struggle was inherent in the nature of colonial domination, in one sense, therefore, this part of the historical process of the formation of Indian nation, that is, the anti-colonial struggle, was also as much an objective as a subjective factor.

The consciousness of nationhood of being a people did not flow automatically from the objective reality. It was the product of painstaking, conscious effort of the movement against colonialism. It was during this movement that the Indian people acquired the necessary collective self-consciousness and identity of being one nation looked at from this point of view, nation was not a datum prior to the national movement or provided to the national movement, it had to be formed through intense political and ideological struggle. It was in part to be a product of the effort to counter colonial hegemony. This is where the effort of political science and Stalin lies. They both pre-suppose a static society. They assume that first a nation is formed and then the struggle for its emancipation takes place. I may therefore, repeat that there is perhaps no such thing as a nation in abstract. Nation is a process of becoming; or, in India's case. The formation of the nation and the struggle for its emancipation are simultaneous. They are interdependent; their relationship is dialectical. National consciousness motivates struggle and struggle spurs on consciousness. Thus, also the very disputation over whether Indians are a geographical expression or a nation becomes a part of the struggle between forces of colonialism and nationalism. Both sides fight hard over a seemingly academic question for the same reason the idea of nation and the ideology of nationalism were not a 'mere ideology' or ideological covering for 'elite' or 'class' or some other narrow interest. They represented something real in the life of the people.

The nationalist political and ideological struggle played an active role in the making of the Indian nation in another sense. As Marx and Engels repeatedly pointed out, social reality is not given directly to our senses, we can't grasp it empirically. "It is in the realm of ideology that people becomes aware of social relations." Contradiction with colonialism or even the character of colonialism was the objective processes forming the nation. Both anti-colonialism and anti-colonial movement and the Indian nation were therefore, in part, the result of the political and ideological struggle by the nationalist movement. Thus, only through the process of the national movement did the people forming Indian get formed into a nation or acquired the consciousness of being a people or a nation. Without this movement, they would have been nothing but the inhabitants of a region on the map and India would have remained a geographical expression.

It was common for colonial administrators and ideologues to assert that India was not a nation but a geographical expression, a mere congeries of hundreds of

diverse races and creeds. What is perhaps even more important, they denied that India was undergoing the process of nation-formation or was ever capable of doing so.

The founders of the Indian national movement accepted that India was not yet a nation despite a common history and the elements of a common culture. But they asserted that it had not entered the process of becoming a nation that it was now becoming a nation. India they said, was a nation-in-the-making, India's becoming a nation was not to be carefully promoted and nurtured. The process faces many obstacles and was constantly challenged. It could not be taken for granted and had to be constantly developed and consolidated consequently, one of the major objectives they set out before the national movement was that of welding Indians into a nation and the promotion of the process of nation-making through active ideological, political, economic and cultural efforts. One reason why many of them favored continuation of British rule was because under it Indians were becoming a nation and they were afraid that this process might be interrupted if British rule disappeared prematurely. Simultaneously, the early leaders realized that strength of the national movement depended on the extent to which the people became conscious of their being part of a nation whose essential interest required a struggle for the overthrow of imperialism irrespective of region, caste or religion.

The promotion of national unity was not only one of the major objectives of the early nationalists but also their major achievement. For example, Panama Charley in his presidential address to the Indian national congress in 1891 described it "as a mightily nationalize" and said that this was its most "glorious" role. Among the three objectives the congress laid down by its first president, W.C. Bannerji was that of "the fuller development and consolidation of those sentiments of national unity". The Russian traveler, I.P. Minayeff, wrote in his diary that, when travelling with Bannerji, he asked, "what practical results did the congress leaders expect from the congress" Bannerji replied: "growth on national feeling and unity of Indians". Similarly, commenting on the first, 1885 session of the congress, the *Indu Prakash* of Bombay wrote: "it marks the beginning of a new life... it will greatly help in creating a national feeling and binding together distant people by common sympathies, and common ends

The Indian nationalist leaders also recognized that the size and diversity of India was such that special efforts different from those in other parts of the world would have to be made, special measures undertaken, and national unity carefully nurtured.

To reach out to the followers of all religions, a rule was made at the 1888 session of the congress that no resolution was to be passed which an overwhelming majority of Hindu or Muslim delegates objected. In 1889, the congress adopted a minority clause according to which wherever Paris,

Christians, Muslims or Hindus were a minority their number elected to the legislative councils would not be less than the proportion in the population, the reason given by the mover of the resolution was that India was not yet a homogenous country and political methods here had, therefore, to differ from those in Europe.

The early nationalists set out to formulate popular demands on a country-wide basis so that the emerging public opinion might have an all-India focus. Their economic and political demands were formulated with a view of making the Indian people conscious of the bonds of common political, economic, social and cultural interests and of existence of a common enemy and unifying them on the basis of a common political and economic program around which they could wage a common political struggle. Consequently, only those issues, rights and demands were taken up which Indians had in common in relation to the colonial rulers. For the same reason, the Congress did not initially take up questions of social reforms which would divide the orthodox from the unorthodox and the reformers.

Leaders of the Indian national movement realized that Indian nation had to be built on every broad foundation. India could be unified and its segmentation overcome only by recognizing and accepting its immense diversity. The Indian leaders did not counterpoise the process for nation in the making to the diverse regional linguistic and ethnic identities and loyalties in India.

On the contrary, the emergence of a strong national identity and the flowering of other narrower identities were seen as processes deriving strength from each other. The differences in language, culture, religion and ethnicity were to be seen not as obstacles to be overcome but as positive features that were sources of strength to Indian culture, civilization and nation and were, therefore, to be integrated with the emerging common nationhood. Consequently, regional cultural identities developed but they did not grow in conflict with or opposition to the national movement and all India identity instead colonialism was seen as the common enemy which suppressed both and prevented their flowering.

Indian national movement was therefore, committed to religious freedom, diversity of cultures, reorganization of Indian administration and political units or states on linguistic lines, removal of economic disparity among regions and full protection to and development of the cultures, economic autonomy, and life-styles of the tribal people. The movement accepted that a federal polity, a strong center, a unified economy and composite culture had to be evolved on the basis of the principle of unity in diversity.

To counter communalism and give expression to its secular commitment, the national Congress declared in 1931 in its famous Karachi resolution, that in free India every citizen shall enjoy freedom of conscience and right to freely profess and practice his religion, that no disability would attach to any citizens on grounds of creed or caste in regard to public employment, office of

power or honors, and in the exercise of any trade or calling and that the state shall observe neutrality in regard to all religions

Gandhiji, a deeply religious person, not only moved the Karachi resolution but in turn began underline what may be described as the secularization of religion, thus for example, he wrote in 1942, "religion is a personal matter which should have no place in politics."

A few other aspects of the national movement were germane to the making of the Indian nation. For one, it was based on a well-developed critique of colonialism in its economic aspect and on an economic programme leading to independent economic development in fact, the nationalist leaders based the movement ideologically essentially on economic nationalism. Though developing a critique of colonialization of culture, language and culture at no stage became central to the definition of the nation and nationalism in India. The movement was also fully committed to political democracy and civil liberties which were seen as basic building blocks of nation-making. As Jawaharlal Nehru was to repeatedly stress without democracy India could not be held together what is even more important. The concepts of democracy and civil liberties were propagated among the masses of the people, both in rural and urban areas, by the nationalist political workers after 1919, it was also seen to be necessary that all kinds of minorities should be able to articulate their the Indian national movement was in many ways innovative and original. Basing itself on the historical experience of the Indian people, it was also fully open, and in fact related meaningfully, to contemporary world currents lastly, it united broadest section, of the people and diverse ideological currents to struggle together of a common objective, even while encouraging open contentions between different political ideological trends and paradigms without such a consensual approach a diverse people like these of India could neither have been united into a powerful anti-materialist mass movement, nor formed into a nation or a people.

The Indian national movement from the beginning that is even when it was based primarily on the intelligentsia defined the nation as nation people. This was reflected in a broad pro-poor orientation. Moreover, the movement constantly defined itself in a more and more radical manner. The coming of Gandhiji strengthened to pro-poor orientation. It is the poor, the Daridranayan, he said, who constituted the nation, and consequently nationalism must be judged in terms of how it affected their life, in fact, no strand of the national government supported the maintenance of social status quo, and increasingly, with the passage of the time, the movement acquired, in the Gramscian sense, a national-popular character, this was also reflected in the fact that after 1935, the movement was primarily based on the Gandhi-Nehru paradigm, thus determining the political ethos of post independence India. The Indian national congress was not founded in 1885 as federation of pre-existing regional associations such as the Indian Association of Bengal, Madras Mahajan Sabah,

Poona Sarvajanik Saha or the Bombay presidency association, many of the leaders of these associations were among the founders of the national congress, but they were not federating or merging their associations in it; they were founding a new all-India body, later, when class associations such as the all India trade union congress or the all India kisan sabha were founded, they too started as all India bodies. The communist party, the congress socialist party, the women's federation, the Muslim league, and the Hindu Mahasabha were all started as all India organizations.

The anti-colonial struggle had produced a new nation. The task of consolidating it and of building it up was continued after 1947 by a highly imaginative and dedicated team of political leaders who had been earlier active in the national liberation struggle. Every one of the leaders had a contribution to make for example, Sardar Patel's role in integrating hundreds of the princely states with the Indian union and in facing up administratively to the trauma of the partition and the partition-riots was outstanding. It however, what Jawaharlal Nehru's name that the post-1947 strategy of nation building is associated. It was Nehru's fate to define and lay down the basic contours of the nation-building effort, for he, more than any other leader, was aware that after independence, the process of the making of the Indian nation had to be Indian nation had to be pushed forward, and the foundations of a democratic, equitable and socialist India had to be, firmly laid.

Nehru had no readymade blue print for nation building even while himself being a socialist, he did not believe that the partly he led or the country should be sharply divided on left right lines. A newly liberated, underdeveloped country existing in a world dominated by developed capitalist countries could not be built up around a single, rigid economic and political programme. Millions could be united around a common vision of nation building but not around a clear cut political economic line moreover, he saw nation building as a process which would be defined as it moved forward nation building required a broad which united the country rather than try to implement his own maximum programs which would divide the people. His success lay in the fact that by the time he departed he had succeeded in evolving such a societal consensus and a minimum programme. Nehru rejected capitalist economic development and bourgeois civilization perspective and was committed to socialism, but he would not define socialism in rigid, schematic and statist terms. In broad, general terms socialism meant social justice and ending social and economic inequality and wide disparities in income. It also meant opposing the acquisitive instinct and capitalist competitiveness and promoting the cooperative tendency, it meant gradual ending of class distinctions and class domination and increasing social ownership or control over the means of production.

At the same time, Nehru believed that for a long time to come India must have a mixed economy. Similarly within the broad framework of planning, reliance will have to be placed for a long time on private enterprise and other market forces. Nehru initiated the process of the rapid, independent and self-reliant economic development of India thus breaking the vicious circle of underdevelopment imposed on India by colonialism. His success can be measured by the fact that even those who accused him earlier of initiating neo-colonial development today accept that under his leadership India made the structural transition from a colonial to an independent economy.

It was tragic that the national movement could not fully counter communalism and India was partitioned in 1947 but the founding fathers of independent India, led by Nehru, Sardar Patel and Rajendra Prasad remained loyal to the secular vision and set out to build a secular society and state, undaunted by the partition and the partition riots.

One of Nehru, and his colleague's greatest achievements lay in the consolidation of the nation and the building of a strong state, the strong state alone could defend India's unity and independence and lay the foundations of an independent economy and a just society, "we live in a dangerous age." He wrote, "where only the strong and united can survive or retain their freedom."

The making of the Indian nation was a slow, partial and highly differential process it was and it moreover a prolonged historical process. The formation of new social classes and strata and impact of colonialism also occurred in a differential manner the result was the extremely uneven development, both in time and space, of national and anti-imperialist consciousness among different social classes and strata as well as people belonging to different religions, castes, linguistic areas etc. The different and partial character of nation-making created detours and divisions which were real but which can also be best understood and studied in the context to nation-making rather than as aspects of the denial of the emerging and growing nationhood or as separate nationalisms or even as sub-nationalisms.

CHECK YOUR KNOWLEDGE

2. Elaborate the concept of nationalism?

3. Discuss in detail the concept of ethnicity?

2.5.9 Summary

Nation and nationalism are a historical phenomenon. Indian nation was not a datum prior to the national movement or provided to it. Indian nation was in part the result of the political and ideological struggle waged by the movement it was during this movement that the Indian people acquired the necessary self-

consciousness and identity of being one nation. Perhaps, without this movement, Indians would have remained nothing more than the inhabitants of a geographical region on the map.

An ethnic group is defined here as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples of such symbolic elements are" kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group (Schermerhorn, 1978)

In other words ethnics habitually exhibit, albeit in varying degrees, six main features:

1. a common proper name, to identify and express the 'essence' of the community;
2. a myth of common ancestry, a myth rather than a fact a myth that includes the idea of a common origin in time and place and that gives an ethnic a sense of fictive kinship, what Horowitz terms a 'super-family'(Horowitz,1985);
3. shared historical memories, or better shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration;
4. one or more elements of common culture. which need not be specified but normally include religion, customs, or language;
5. a link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethnic, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with diaspora peoples.
6. a sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the ethnic's population (A.D. Smith, 1986).

2.5.10 Key Concepts/Words

Ethnicity and ethnic identity: The term 'ethnicity' first appeared in the 1950s in the English language. It is first recorded in a dictionary in Oxford English Dictionary of 1953, and one of the earliest compilations of articles under those heading states. Ethnicity seems to be a new term (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). The meaning of the term is equally uncertain. It can mean 'the essence of an ethnic group or the quality of belonging to an ethnic group' or what it is you have if you are in "ethnic group" (Chapman et al., 1989), generally in the context of 'self-other' distinctions (Eriksen, 1993)

The term 'ethnicity' is, quite clearly, a derivative of the much older term and more commonly used adjective 'ethnic' which in the English language goes back to the middle ages. The English adjective 'ethnic' in turn derives from the ancient Greek term *ethnos*; it was used as synonym of *gentle*, that is non-

Christian and non-Jewish pagan (itself a rendering of the Hebrew goy) in New Testament Greek. In French, for example the Greek noun survives as ethnic, with an associated adjective ethnique. As the English language has no concrete noun for ethnos or ethnic, the French term is used here to denote an 'ethnic community' or 'ethnic group'.

'Ethnic identity', 'ethnic origin', 'ethnocentrism' and ethnicism: 'Ethnic identity' and 'ethnic origin' refer to the individual level of identification with a culturally defined collectivity, the sense on the part of the individual that she or he belongs to particular cultural community. 'Ethnic origin' likewise refers to a sense of ancestry and nativity on the part of the individual through his or her parents and grand-parents; although the concept may also have an even more problematic collective dimension, referring to the (usually diverse) cultural groups and migration origin of ethnies.

'Ethnocentrism' is often used in social psychology on an individual or interpersonal level as synonym for disdain of the stranger. But it can also have a collective historical referent, as the sense of uniqueness, centrality, and virtue of and ethnies in its relations with other ethnies. This has been an important feature of most ethnies in history, helping to sustain their members in times of adversity. The term 'ethnicism' is more rarely used. It refers to movements of protest and resistance by and on behalf of ethnies against oppressive or exploitative outsiders, and again such movements have frequently punctuated the historical record (De Vos and Romanucce-Rossi, 1974).

Ethnie and Ethnic Group: *An ethnic group is defined here as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical pasts, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their people hood. Examples of such symbolic elements are" kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation , language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation nationality, phonotypical features, or any combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group (Schermerhorn, 1978)*

In other words ethnies habitually exhibit, albeit in varying degrees, six main features:

1. a common proper name, to identify and express the 'essence' of the community;
2. a myth of common ancestry, a myth rather than a fact a myth that includes the idea of a common origin in time and place and that gives an ethnies a sense of fictive kinship, what Horowitz terms a 'super-family'(Horowitz,1985);
3. shared historical memories, or better shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration;

4. one or more elements of common culture. which need not be specified but normally include religion, customs, or language;
5. a link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethane, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with diaspora peoples.
6. a sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the ethnies population (A.D. Smith, 1986).

Nationalism: A nation is the product of a concrete historical process and is therefore a long time in the making consequently, the way political science in general (and or Stalin) has looked at nationhood via definition or deduction from theory is analytically barren, it inevitably results in either existing psychology of a people or their fixed, permanent, unchanging ethnicity becoming the determinants of nationhood, it may, therefore, be suggested that the question of the formation or lack of formation of a nation can only be answered by making a study of the concrete historical development.

In case of India, both the Indian nation and nationalism were products of history: to study their evolution is to study the economic, political and ideological development of to Indian people.

As soon as we see the making of the nation in India as a result of a concrete historical process, it becomes clear that the manner in which it was formed in India (or other colonies) was different for that of Europe's for the two historical processes were very different in India nation and nationalism were basically the result not of ethnicity or the historical formation of the nation around language and culture but of a movement against colonialism, the basic contradiction which led to the national movement and nationhood in India was also totally different form that in Europe. For one, it potted not one section of the people, which formed into a nation, against another but the entire colonial people against colonialism and the colonial state. For the latter suppress not one class or the bourgeoisie and/or the monarchy fought for a unified market and state or tried to unify the people around imperialism and chauvinism and jingoism in the era o imperialist rivalry, the colonial people fought primarily for national liberation form colonial economic and political domination.

The process of nation-formation is both an objective and a subjective, i.e. emotional, intellectual and ideological process. No nation can come into being without the objective process, that is, the process of its economic and political integration but such integration may not suffice; it can always be disturbed due to subjective, political factors, hence, whether the process of nation-formation will be initialed or not and whether it will develop or will be interrupted depends on concrete, historical development.

2.5.11 Exercise Questions

1. Define the term ethnicity; discuss the approaches to ethnicity in detail?
2. Elaborate the concept of nationalism?

3. Highlight the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism?

2.5.12 Short Questions

1. Ethnic
2. Ethnic identity
3. Ethnic origin
4. Ethnocentrism
5. Ethnicism
6. Approaches to Ethnicity
7. Nationalism

2.5.13 Reading List

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COMMUNALISM: CONCEPT, SOCIO-ECONOMIC ROOTS**STRUCTURE****2.6.0 Objectives****2.6.1 Concept of Communalism****2.6.2 Socio-Economic Roots of Communalism****2.6.3 Summary****2.6.4 Key Concepts/Words****2.6.5 Exercise Questions****2.6.6 Short Questions****2.6.7 Reading List****2.6.0 Objectives**

By the end of this chapter, the student shall be able to:

- To understand the concept of communalism.
- To explore the socio-economic roots of communalism.

2.6.1 Concept of Communalism

Communalism is the belief that because a group of people follow a particular religion they have as a result common social political and economic interests. It is the belief that in India Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs form different and distinct communities which are independently and separately structured or consolidated; that all the followers of a religion share not only a community of religious interests but also common secular interests; that is common economic political social and cultural interests; that Indians inevitably perceive such interests through the spectacles of the religious grouping and are bound to possess a sense of identity based on religion. i.e. religion has to become the basis of their basic social identity and the determinant of their basic social relationships; that they possess the inherent tendency to act and function as a separate group or entity or unit in these fields; that they constitute separate 'organic wholes' or homogeneous and cohesive communities especially in the political field; that each such religious 'community' has its own separate history; that communal identity and division have always pervaded Indian society, though they may have been reinforced in modern times; that the religious 'community' has become the basis of the organization of modern politics in India and of the perception of economic, political and cultural issues by the Indian people; that a 'real' Hindu or Muslim can belong only to a party of the community and cannot differ politically from other Hindus or Muslims; that all Hindus or Muslims must think alike in

politics because they are Hindus or Muslims; that, in fact, each religious 'community' constitutes a homogeneous entity and even a distinct 'society' in itself; that there is and can be no such thing as an Indian nation-India has been is, and has to be, a mere 'confederation of religious communities.'

Thus, the communal view asserts that the religious distinction is among Indians the most important or fundamental distinction or cleavage or distinguishing mark. This distinction overrides all other distinctions. On the other hand, all other social identities and distinctions are either denied or when accepted in theory, either negated in practice or subordinated to the religious identity. For the same reason in communal politics as also in communal historical writing it is only the aspect of religious community that is emphasized all other issues-political, economic, social, linguistic, cultural and even purely religious-are ignored, confused and even suppressed.

Inherent in communalism is the second notion that the social, cultural, economic and political interest of Hindus and Muslims and Christians and the Sikhs are dissimilar and divergent. Interestingly, this divergence and dissimilarity, as also the notion of common secular interests on the basis of religion are never sought to be demonstrated empirically or logically in any of the fields. They are always either assumed as self-evident truths or are blandly asserted needing no proof.

We have to distinguish between communal tension and communal politics.' The first, that is, communal tension, was spasmodic and usually directly involved the lower classes only. During the period when and in the area where, communal tension prevailed, all mutual relations between the followers of different religions were snapped following the arousal of religious and communal passions through vicious propaganda, oral as well as written, inflammatory accusations and wild rumours often involving some religious issue such as cow-killing or music before mosques. An atmosphere and climate of excitement and frenzy were generated and often actual violence also took place. The communal riot was a typical example of communal tension. The participants in and the victims of a communal riot-though not necessarily its instigators-were usually the urban poor and lumpen and goonda elements, though in a few cases the peasants were also involved. There was seldom any physical participation by the middle and upper classes, though they often lent material and moral support to the lumpen and goonda participants. However, once the frenzy abated and the excitement disappeared and the climate of immediate fear no longer existed, tension rapidly disappeared and normal relations were restored among the persons involved. Though each episode left behind a certain legacy, in general the tensions involving or generated by a

communal riot rapidly and on the whole disappeared. The significance of communal riots should also not be exaggerated. Communal tension and riots began to occur only from the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Moreover, they did not prevail in India on a significant scale till 1946-47. The overwhelming majority of Indians, especially in the rural areas, were unaffected by communal tensions. Thus, during 1923-26, the four-year period of maximum communal tension in India before 1946, there were 72 major communal riots, which gives an average figure of one riot every 20 days for the vast continent-sized and heavily populated country. Communal politics, on the other hand, were long-term, persistent and continuous. They involved, in the main, the middle classes landlords and bureaucratic elements. They represented communal ideology in its political form and found expression in the political field and not in overt physical acts against the members of the 'other community' on a personal or even communal basis, even when their basis was mere personal political rivalry or promotion of personal interest. On the personal plane, friendly relations could prevail among the communal politicians as well as their middle and upper class supporters. In fact, the communal leaders quite often cooperated with each other in municipal committees, district boards and provincial cabinets, after having been elected to these bodies through communal politics and rivalry. Quite often, at least till 1945, they also maintained friendly social and economic relations. Communal politics and ideology for communal riots are not the main form or content of communalism. They were in the main its reflection, its active episodic expression its bitter and virulent manifestation and consequence and one of the instruments and agencies for its spread. The communal riot was sudden and spasmodic, was an aspect of social pathology, and its causation lay either in the prevalence of a communal atmosphere generated by communal politics and communal ideology or in conjunctural causes, involving religious feelings alone or combined with some particular local interests, which could be effectively handled by efficient administrative or police action and secular public opinion. It is communalism as politics and ideology which can be and perhaps should be the subject of analysis as also of ideological-political struggle. Let us at this stage clarify certain points regarding our basic approach to communalism in modern India. Communalism was not a remnant of the past—a hangover from the medieval period, a 'language of the past.' It was a modern ideology that incorporated some aspects and elements of the past ideologies and institutions: and its historical background to form a new ideological and political discourse or mix. Because it used many elements inherited from the past, it has been wrongly described as a revival or continuation of a medieval ideology or theory or at least as having 'roots' in the medieval period. Communalism is also often falsely equated with revivalism because the communalists are also often revivalists. That is however not always so. Furthermore, the use of earlier elements to fashion new theories and

ideologies is a well-known historical phenomenon; and many a modern ideology claims to be reviving the past. The modern ideology of Meiji authoritarianism and later militarism in Japan was based on medieval Shintoism and emperor worship. The Fascist New Life Movement of Chiang Kai-shek in the 1930s was based on Confucianism. Hitler and Mussolini made appeals to old and conservative elements of the past ideologies and drew upon the most distant past for ideological sustenance. Anti-Semitism certainly dated back to the medieval period; but in Nazi Germany, it was not a revival but a structured part of one of the most modern of ideologies. The modern Catholic Church, the basis of much of the ruling party ideologies in Germany and Italy after the Second World War and in Spain and Portugal from the 1930s till recently, borrowed almost its entire theology from the medieval past. Yet, no one will think of describing Christian Democracy as a remnant of the past or of being 'rooted' in the past. It is as modern as the IBM or the multi-nationals. Nationalism was used as a basic component of imperialist ideology by France and other imperialist powers from the middle of the nineteenth century, yet it would be sheer nonsense to ascribe the origins of imperialism to the French Revolution, which first generated the ideology of nationalism.

In India, the basis of communal politics, that is, the notion of religion serving as the basis for the new political process based on popular participation, was something new, though religious distinction and religion as one principle for social grouping had previously existed. But medieval politics were not communal, though religious suppression and oppression occurred during the medieval as also the ancient period. Communalism was a modern phenomenon that arose as a result of British colonial impact and the response of different Indian social classes, strata and groups. Communalism was a modern ideology that used the popular traditional consciousness of Hindus and Muslims forming separate groups for religious, marriage and inter-dining purposes in its effort to base modern politics of popular sovereignty on a religious identity. To grasp the new, modern character of the basic features of communalism, it is necessary to realize that in history, as in all fields, there are continuities but there are breaks and innovations as well—and usually the breaks and innovations are the more important aspects of social development whether positive or negative in their consequences.

Communalism emerged as a consequence of the emergence of modern politics which marked a sharp break with the politics of the medieval or ancient or pre-1857 period. Communalism, as also nationalism and socialism, could emerge as politics and as ideology only after a structural break had occurred in the nature of politics, that is, after politics based on the people, politics of popular sovereignty, politics of popular participation and mobilization, politics based on the creation and mobilization of public opinion had been introduced, even if the term people was defined narrowly. In the previous politics, which

were based entirely on the upper ruling classes in which the people either played the role of cannon-fodder or were compelled to rebel outside the political system with successful rebel leaders being incorporated into the old ruling classes, there was no need to take politics to the people and to unite and mobilize the people as a people. Thus the notion of Hindus or Muslims uniting as Hindus or Muslims for politics-or Indians uniting as Indians for politics-could come only with the entry of people as a constitutive element of politics, with politics based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The colonial authorities tried to keep Muslims apolitical as Muslims till 1905, and encouraged their political mobilization, though on a rather narrow social base, only after 1905 when popular political could no longer be avoided. Similarly, communalism could take an extreme or fascist form only when the people had to be appealed to and mobilized on a larger scale after 1937 because of the spread of democratic feelings, extension of the franchise and the rapid advance of the national movement.

Similarly, it is wrong to look upon communalism as a revival of traditional ideology or as an aspect of traditional India that has now to be discarded. The communal view was not present in our tradition; it was nor a primordial feeling. Communal antagonism was nor a problem inherited from the past. It was not an inevitable product of our history. Communalism is nor only in the present; it is of the present. It did nor serve, nor does it now serve, the past or decaying social groups and formations. It did nor try to restore the past. It did not represent 'antiquated social and cultural Forces which would rather bring back the social institutions and culture which date back to a couple of millennia.' It responded to and expressed the social urges and served the social needs and purposes of certain contemporary social groups strata or classes. Above all, it became a cog in the politics of colonialism which can by no stretch of imagination be described as a remnant of the past. Thus the social roots of communalism as also its social economic and political objectives were modern in the present and of the present. It is the present contemporary social structure which sustained communalism. To say this is, of course, nor yet to explain its rise and spread. To do so is the task of the historian and other social scientists.

There exists one particular difficulty in the scientific study of communalism (and communal ideology). The very tools of analysis have been contaminated by it as a result of the ideological conditioning of the last 100 years, when the middle classes and the intelligentsia were perpetually surrounded by a communal outlook in politics, in the Press in literature and particularly in the educational system. Consequently, communalism has often been viewed in the social sciences as in real life through conscious or unconscious communal assumptions. This is particularly so in the disciplines of political science and history where, traditionally, emphasis has been laid on

ideas and ideologies and not on their social soil.' Moreover, many social scientists echo the communal ideology, though unconsciously and with secular intentions because of lack of theoretical and conceptual clarity or a fuller historical study. This is also often due to an empiricist approach, where ideological and political Statements are uncritically treated as empirical data. "But clearly, where phenomenal forms are deceptive merely to describe them will not yield adequate concepts of the essential relations at issue. For here, categories grounded in observation alone will reproduce precisely the misleading features of the forms they describe." Consequently a great deal of present-day sociological and political science writing on the subject becomes an unconscious reproduction of the old liberal communal outlook. As a result the effort to provide a secular and scientific analysis becomes in fructuous. Several recent studies of communalism both in India and abroad, act as examples of the dangers of well-meaning persons writing on this question when their grasp of the social origins and role of ideology, both in theory and its historical communal form in India, is, to say he least, inadequate. Many of them start with the assumption that communal homo and structured communities hosed on religion exist, whereas these assumptions have themselves to he examined and proved or disproved before one can seriously proceed with the discussion of the problem. Similarly, many secular writers today, following in the footsteps of many of the earlier nationalist leaders, adopt or adapt the basic communal digits and assumptions and then proceed to reject the communal argument. This is to analyses communalism in terms of its own political practice and to fight it on its own terrain, to be its hostage." Instead both the communal ideology and the Ideology of its investigator have to be investigated thoroughly and critically before the communal question can be scientifically studied. Here the concept of the 'educator who must himself be educated' has to apply. Similarly, the communal terminologies current during the last 100 years, especially from 1922 to 1947, must be rejected or at least examined critically before use. Otherwise one is going to be led willy-nilly, up the communal path. For example, if one's analysis starts by accepting the communal leaders as leaders and representatives of their communities-and if one refers to the Hindu, Muslim or Sikh communalists as Hindu leaders, Muslim leaders or Sikh leaders-or if one accepts that communal political activity is the political activity of their 'communities,' one is already accepting the basic communal framework of thought and analysis. On the other hand, if no communal economic, political and social interests exist, the communalists cannot be representing such interests and are net therefore 'representatives' of their 'communities.' They are then clearly serving some other interests; their politics arise to serve interests other than those of their 'communities.' In other words, there is need to distinguish between Hindu or Muslim communal definition of Hindu and Muslim interests and the interests of Hindus and Muslims as parts of Indian

people: and Hindu or Muslim communal politics and the political activity of Hindus and Muslims. Similarly, those who talk of Hindu mind or Muslim mind are already assuming the full Structuring of Hindus and Muslims as communities.

K.P. Karunakaran has written recently: "Communalism in India meant that philosophy which stood for the promotion of the interests of a particular religious community or the members of a particular caste." "In the Hindu Mahasabha," he says, the Hindu communalists "had a separate organization which was completely devoted to the promotion of Hindu interests." Similarly, S.R. Mehrotra writes: "The Congress stood for democracy, secularism and a common Indian nationality. The Muslim league existed primarily to safeguard and promote the interests of the Indian Muslims as a separate political entity." He goes on to describe the League "as the champion of Muslim interests." Louis Dumont has said: "As if the allegiance that should normally go to the nation were given by the communalist to his community instead?" Similarly, many secular nationalists quite often advised the communalists to subordinate their group or communal interests to the larger national interests. Because these writers and leaders have no theoretical grasp of what communalism is, in their analysis or empirical treatment they often accept the Communists at face value.

Communalism involved 'either conscious deception or unconscious self-deception'; the communalist was either deceiving others or, more likely, he was deceiving himself as well- He was deceiving himself and others because the interests he claimed to represent did not exist in real life and the demands he undertook to fulfill were incapable of being fulfilled in the way he had posed them and in the way he proposed to fulfill them.

The concept of false consciousness can play a crucial role in our understanding of communalism. All objective reality is grasped through its cognition by the human mind. But not all human thought, consciousness, or ideology are equally valid 'reflections' or cognition of reality. Certain ideas and ideologies are objectively more valid than others to the extent that they reflect the objective reality more truly that they are more deeply and truly rooted in social reality that social and political action can be organized around them more 'non-arbitrarily,' i.e., with a more long-term effect and a more lasting conviction- Nothing comes into politics without subjective cognition or consciousness; but not all politics or political understanding are on par; the differences between them are not mere questions of psychology or personal preference- 'The politics of men and women are guided by and ultimately based on objective social factors, but these Factors can find reflection in politics in numerous symbols and ideologies. It then becomes necessary to distinguish between these Factors and the ideologies in which they are represented.

Because objective reality exists, therefore the possibility of its correct cognition or consciousness and of political organization based on this correct consciousness also exists. But where correct consciousness does not develop adequately, false consciousness does so to fill in the gap. The origins of false consciousness often lie in the efforts of men and women to grasp and change reality. Many false consciousnesses emerge in the process, partially because men and women try to grasp the new reality in the context of, with the aid of and in terms of inherited social ideas and institutions and more familiar traditional identities which were the producer of an older different social reality and which might be to a lesser or greater extent unsuitable for understanding the new social situation. There is often a lag between the emergence of new social relations and the birth and spread of new social ideas and identities with the aid of which these relations have to be grasped. Also objective relations do not necessarily get transformed into subjective consciousness. The new kinds of consciousness correctly representing reality develop inadequately and often lag behind reality, leading to the rise and spread of many false consciousnesses but not all false consciousnesses grow and prosper. Their staying power often depends not on their inherent strength or closeness to reality but on the working of other social forces and structures. Most of the false consciousness that emerge because of this lag is rapidly displaced unless they serve the urges and needs of some social groups, classes and interests. On the other hand, the spread of the more valid consciousness may be checked because powerful vested interests oppose it for their own reasons.

In India both nationalism and communalism were recent i.e. modern, phenomena. Both of them were the products of social change, of the same historical process—the transformation of India under the impact of colonialism. They are reflections of a new widening reality that was being born out of the ashes of the pre-colonial social structure. The growing economic, political and administrative unification of the country and the people the process of the making of India into a nation the developing basic contradiction between colonialism and the Indian people and the formation of modern social classes and strata made it imperative to have wider links and loyalties among the people and to look for wider unities and identities. This also followed from the very newness of the modern politics that arose in India in the nineteenth century. Modern politics were the politics of mass participation of the emergence of public opinion and of the revolutionary and unprecedented notion of popular sovereignty. The new political life and loyalties had to be based on new uniting principles new political identities.” The process of cognition of the new reality and the need to operate with it and upon it produced different kinds of consciousness for the Indian people and the modern intelligentsia had no precedents except those from Europe, to guide them and no clear conception of the socio-political order which was being born before their eyes.” It was

inevitable that they would use pre-modern categories of self identity such as caste (jati) locality, region, 'race' religion sect and occupation to make wider connections and that some of the new identities and ideologies would be based on them.

The demand for linguistic states reflected the valid consciousness of a common cultural heritage and the needs of common cultural development and it is interesting that it was easily accommodated within nationalism. Similarly modern class consciousness reheated correctly the common interests of the modern social classes and strata on the all-India plane. It is however to be noted that in all three cases the growth and the spread of the consciousness would be a difficult and prolonged process since the consciousness was entirely new based on new concepts and new modes of thought. On the other hand one reason why communalism developed in certain areas and sections of Indian society was because of their failure to adequately develop the new national consciousness linguistic-cultural homogeneity and class identities. This failure was also related to the high degree of opaqueness of the very complex emerging social structure and the historical process and therefore its imperfect understanding by sections of the early intelligentsia." Communalism was the false consciousness of the historical process of the last 150 years because, objectively, no real conflict between the interests of Hindus and Muslims existed. Of course, religion as a social diversity or differentiation existed in real life; but making this diversity the basis of political organization, mobilization, and action or seeing it as the main inner contradiction in social, economic and political life was certainly an aspect of false consciousness. Communalism was not, like anti-imperialism or class consciousness, based on real conflict but on a distorted reflection of real conflict or 'replacement' of real conflict. Nor was there any objective basis for the other aspect of communalism, that is, the myth of the solidarity of interests of all members of a religious community or the myth of the existence of a religion-based community.

It may also be noted that communalism or identity formation around religion was not the only false consciousness to arise in modern India. Caste identity was another; and there were many others. An interesting example of the emergence of false consciousness in response to the need for wider unity and links among the Indians is to be found in the first version of the song *Bande Matram* in the novel *Anand Math* by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee. The author invoked the image of seven crore voices singing in unison and fourteen crore hands rising in unison. What principle of unity, loyalty and patriotism was being invoked? Seven crores was not the population of India, nor that of Hindus, nor even that of Bengalis. It was the population of the British-created contemporary Presidency of Bengal which included Oriyas, Assamese and Biharis as well! Similarly, the birth and spread of communalism in India were not due to the exceptional nature of the Indian character or Indian historical

development. In Other societies, similar conditions have produced communalism or communal-type ideologies and politics on a significant scale, though with variations and characteristic features specific to those societies; for example. Ireland, Malaysia, Philippines, Lebanon and Sri Lanka-Another way of viewing the lack of historical validity of communalism is to see that communalism was not its own inherent truth, that it was not the 'logical and inevitable producer of India's historical development-' It had historical and social roots and causation but it was not historically or socially inevitable- It was not a natural or an inevitable social phenomenon, given the existence of different religions, in the same way as nationalism and class struggle were given the existence of colonialism and social classes- In other words communalism was not a conceptualization of social reality but its false consciousness.

2.6.2 Socio-Economic Roots of Communalism

Basically, communalism was one of the byproducts of colonialism, of the colonial character of the Indian economy, of colonial under- development. Colonialism provided the social structure which produced communalism and in which it could grow. Historically, the rise of modern politics and social classes occurred in the same period in which the full impact of the colonialization of the Indian economy began to be more completely felt and the crisis of the colonial economy began to emerge Colonial economy under development and economic stagnation produced conditions which favored internal division and antagonism within society as also its radical transformation. This was particularly true of the impact of colonialism on the middle classes, which were, in particular, torn by fears, jealousies and frustration.

Throughout the twentieth century in the absence of the development of modern industries and modern social and cultural services, such as education, health services, the Press, libraries, music, dance, drama, radio and films, and because of shrinking governmental expenditure, there existed extremely poor and worsening economic opportunities and increasing unemployment, especially for the educated middle and lower middle classes who could not fall back on land and who found government jobs to be getting scarce and the professions overcrowded. Even youngmen with a sound academic record found that the possibilities of economic achievement and success were getting narrowed down. This aspect was further heightened during the years of Depression and recession from 1929 to 1941 and the years after World War II. The period of World War II witnessed a massive rise in prices and filled the middle classes with anxiety and fear as to what would happen after the War. Furthermore, the distorted pattern of the colonial economy, which continues in some aspects till this day, produced a large middle or service or tertiary sector which was neither integrated with the productive sectors nor capable of being productively absorbed by the colonial economy or by underdeveloped capitalism. In other words, the growth of the middle classes constantly

outpaced economic development. There was, moreover an acute shortage of superior jobs carrying high salaries and social status, most of these being reserved for the Europeans till the 1920s. This led to intense competition for the remaining.

Consequently, the middle classes in general and the lower middle classes and the newly educated in particular suffered constant deterioration in their socio-economic conditions and prospects and were continually haunted by the specter of unemployment. Moreover, the lower middle class was oppressed by all, including the indigenous merchants, money-lenders and capitalists. Above all, after 1929, during the Depression years, its members underwent a serious crisis and were filled with disappointment, despair, insecurity and vague fears and anxieties. Social development was breaking down the existing class identities and status system. Many lower middle class individuals faced becoming *déclassé* while others found their hard won upward mobility checked too soon. Existing opportunities and traditional sources of livelihood were disappearing. There arose new opportunities for some, but they were often immediately threatened sometimes within one or own generations. There was a lack of correlation between status and new position for some and a complete breakdown of status position for others. There was a constant contradiction between expectation and as aspiration and opportunities. In other words, the lower middle classes were increasingly placed in a position of economic misery, lack of opportunity, constant threat to their existing position and increasing breakdown of their class position and social status and value systems. A certain edge and urgency were imparted to their wordly struggle to maintain their class position and identity. In fact, this struggle beanie increasingly sharp and even bitter though often also frustrating. This frustration, a sense of social deprivation and a constant fear of loss of identity and status often created an atmosphere of violence and brutality which when triggered off by a religious issue led to communal riots. The petty bourgeois identity and ego got tied up with the cow or pew tree protection and music before a mosque; protection of such supposed rights-a cow must not be sacrificed, a music procession before a mosque must become silent-was seen as a life-and-death question because it came to represent symbolically the preservation or destruction of the petty bourgeois ego.

Because of economic stagnation, the middle class Indians were compelled to compete with each other for the scarce opportunities and resources. There existed a perpetual and increasingly intense, tough and unhealthy competition among individuals for jobs, in professions, and among traders and shopkeepers for customers. Nor did the problem end with the entry into a job or profession or trade; for then came the lifelong individual quest and competition for promotion, betterment and success. Every available means was used in this competition, and no weapon was too lowly if it could bring success

within one's grasp. There was the individual struggle through educational qualification and personal merit-and middle class parents, and sometimes other relations, would make tremendous sacrifices to provide educational opportunities to their children. Nepotism, corruption and familism were used on a large scale. The net of extended family connections could stretch over a wide territory and sometimes involve hundreds of government servants. The acceptance and payment of bribes in return for appointments to jobs and offices became increasingly common. To private business, family connection was the chief mode of recruitment.

Communalism was only one of the weapons used by the middle classes in their effort to bolster their individual opportunities. Simultaneously, other similar weapons such as caste, religious sect, language, locality, province and region were also freely used. In fact, having successfully used communalism to improve one's chances, one's 'community' was quickly forgotten and other weapons such as nepotism, familism and corruption and communal-type ideologies of casteism, regionalism, etc., were used freely and with no holds barred against members of one's own 'community.' Often the struggle for jobs or promotions within one's own 'community' was no less sharp, ruthless and virulent. Witness, for example, the struggle between Shias and Sunnis, Arya Samajists and Sanatanists, urbanites and ruralites, Jat and non-Jat, Brahmin and Kayastha, Brahmin and non-Brahmin, Baniya and Jat, Bhumihaar and Kayastha, Reddy and Kamma, Jat or Kurmi and Rajput, residents of eastern and western UP, North and South Indians, Bengali and Bihari, Maharashtra and Gujarati, Sindhi and Gujarati, Sindhi's and Punjabi's and ex-U.P. *wallas* in Pakistan, Bengalis and Biharis in Bangladesh, northern and southern Biharis. The most recent example is the struggle between the 'forwards' and 'backwards' in Bihar and reservation of vertically all jobs, including those of teachers and doctors, in Kerala, on the basis of caste-communal quotas.

Communalism and communal politics also served the interests of the landlords, bureaucratic elements and colonialism. But the landlords and the colonial authorities were too distanced from the lower middle classes and the masses to be in a position to politically organize and mobilize them. Nor could the *Ulama* be the leaders or creators of communal politics organized and developed on modern lines- Their main role was to arouse religious fanaticism in support of communal politics and movements- They could act in the main as the mobilizers of the masses and the lower middle classes. The tasks of organizing and leading a communal movement and of incorporating the low middle classes and sections of the peasantry in it had to be performed by the modern educated sections of the middle classes, including the intellectuals. The relative weakness of Hindu communalism in drawing intellectuals to itself and the relative backwardness of the Muslim middle classes and intellectuals and therefore their greater absorption into communal groups and parties were to be

important reasons for the different fates and degrees of success of the two communalists in modern India.

The middle classes formed the main mass social base of communalism for one other reason. The middle class individuals alone had the capacity to move up or down socially as individuals; in their case alone could personal motives and social questions be integrated. Other numerically significant social class could do so only on the basis of class. Thus, workers and peasants could not benefit from communalism in any way. Communalism could not be an inherent property of these social classes. In fact, Hindu and Muslim workers Peasants, artisans, craftsmen and even sections of the lower middle class were able on the whole to see that there was no rivalry among themselves on a communal basis. Therefore, except for rare communal tension or riots organized entirely on the basis of religious prejudices, communalism could not spread to these classes till 1937-39. On the other hand, they could be, and were, successfully mobilized against imperialism in the two non-cooperation movements and in the trade union and peasant movements of the 1920s and 1930s.

In the Pabna agrarian riots of 1873 both Hindu and Muslim tenants fought zamindars together, just as the Bengal Rent Bill of 1885 was opposed both by the Hindu and Muslim zamindars. Mymensingh agrarian riots of 1906 assumed a communal form. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Muslim peasants' discontent against money-lenders and zamindars increasingly took on a communal colour,' just as the Hindu zamindars and money-lenders put increasing pressure on the Bengal Congress to defend 'Hindu' interests.

In western Panjab and Sind, while the small cultivators as well as the big landlords were Muslim, their creditors and the buyers of their producers were Hindu or Sikh. The Muslim peasantry was moreover heavily indebted to the latter, "and all the feeling of the impoverished debtors against the creditor, out for his pound of flesh, went to swell the communal tide." One aspect of the growth of communalism in Panjab was the effort of the big Muslim landlords to protect their economic and social position by using communalism to turn the anger of their Muslim tenants against Hindu traders and money-lenders and the use of communalism by the latter to protect their threatened class interests by raising the cry of Hindu interests in danger. Repeatedly, as in 1915 and 1922 in Multan division, in 1926 in Rawalpindi district and in 1930 in Ferozepur and Multan districts, the Muslim peasants arose under the communal banner, directing their anger against the money-lender and his *bahis* (account books), where the evidence of their indebtedness was recorded. On the Other hand, the enactment of the Panjab Alienation of Land Act in 1901, which debarred the traditional money-lender-merchant Hindu castes from buying up peasants' and landlords' land, led many of them to turn to communalism. Thus, the Hindu Sabhas came into existence in Panjab during

1903-09 to agitate against the Act, since the National Congress refused to lead such an agitation because of its secular character and pro-peasant stance. Later too, the Hindu traders and money-lenders provided a solid base for Hindu communalism, especially during periods when agrarian legislation was debated or enforced. In turn, the Hindu Mahasabha stoutly opposed all measures for the reduction of the burden of rural debt and restriction on land transfers.

The Mappila peasant uprising of 1921 against landlords and colonial authorities could be given a terrible communal twist by the mulla: primarily because the class cleavage and antagonism in Malabar ran along religious lines-the rebellious (Muslim) Mappilas were tenants and their landlords and money-lenders Hindu.

The Bombay City communal riot of 1929 had features of a class war by proxy, a conflict between strikers and blacklegs. To break a strike in two oil companies, the owners brought in Pathan strike breakers, leading to a fight between the blacklegs and the strikers and their worker supporters. Additionally, in Bombay City the workers were in many cases indebted to Pathan money-lenders who charged usurious rates of interest. The struggle between the striking workers and the Pathan blacklegs, however, soon acquired a communal character.

In UP and Bihar, both Hindu and Muslim communalisms were encouraged by landlords and money-lenders-merchants during the 1920s and 1930s to divert the rapidly growing peasant movements. In many of the northern Indian towns the weavers and other craftsmen were quite often Muslims while the middlemen, controllers of their products and of the overall conditions of production, were Hindus. Similarly, Muslim litigants (as also Hindu litigants) were often fleeced by Hindu lawyers and other professional men. In Maharashtra and South India, anti-Brahmin and anti-upper caste movements tended to weaken Hindu communalism. At the same time, particularly in Maharashtra, the upper caste Hindu communalists tried to promote communalism as a method of providing an alternative to the anti-Brahmin and anti-upper caste movements.

For the masses, communalism was sometimes a 'substitute' for class struggle. Moreover, a large number of the urban poor, victims and producers of colonial under development, were declassed, roofless, lumpen social strata and persons whose social anger and acute sense of deprivation invariably found expression in senseless violence or in a tendency to loot and plunder. A communal riot was tailor-made to serve as an outlet for their social and psychological urges, as also economic needs. A communal riot was to them both an economic and psychological opportunity and an occasion to lodge their blind protest against society and their social condition. This is one reason why communal riots were mostly an urban phenomenon and why they tended to break out on the pettiest of grounds. Interestingly, in these distorted class

struggles, especially in the countryside, the main sufferers were men of property; the lower class individuals of the 'attacked community' or their meager property were seldom attacked.

Secondly, it partially explains why communalism could become so strong and dangerous. As the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie it would always lack 'teeth.' But it could become a ferocious force when it acquired a mass base and the energy and commitment that class conflict could impart to it even in its distorted form.

Thirdly, it partially explains why Hindu communalism could not become, outside a communal riot, a mass or popular movement or why anti-Muslim sentiments could not be aroused among Hindus on a sufficiently large scale, or why Hindu communalism on the whole remained weak, for Hindus were seldom in the oppressed class position vis a vis Muslim exploiters. Even in Panjab, where Hindu communalism was rather strong, its strength lay among the middle classes and not among the Hindu peasants who could not see the 'enemy' among

Muslims but saw him in the Hindu money-lenders. For this reason, Chhoru Ram, an ardent Arya Samajist and even a communalist to a certain extent, organized the Haryana Jats against the 'non-agriculturist' Hindus and not against Muslims-Hindu communalism, in Panjab as elsewhere, could seldom appeal to the class feeling of workers, peasants and artisans; it could only arouse feeling of petty bourgeois jealousy and deprivation, on the one hand and the upper classes' fear of loss of property and class position, on the other. In fact, one reason why even after the partition of India on communal lines and with vast resources at its command Hindu communalism has found it difficult to arouse anti-Muslim sentiments on a large scale lies in the fact that Muslims do not occupy any positions of class dominance vis a vis Hindus in today's India. It is therefore difficult to cast them in the role of the 'Jews' of the Nazi movement. There is hardly any section of the Indian people which can be made to see Muslims as exploiters or even rivals, except in isolated spots where commercial rivalry may develop. This is of course not an insurmountable barrier as the growth of communalism and the increase in communal riots show.

Fourthly, this analysis does highlight the need for struggle against landlordism, usury, etc., if communalism was to be successfully opposed. This struggle by the secular forces remained weak all over India, but especially so in the two crucial provinces of Panjab and Bengal where this weakness was to prove fatal to nationalism and secularism. In these two provinces, the provincial-level Congress leadership, at least partly because of the large influence wielded by the landlords and money-lenders on the leadership, not only failed to fight for agrarian reform and to organize the peasantry, but sometimes opposed or vacillated over even the hesitant and paltry pro-peasant

legislation initiated by the colonial authorities or the non-nationalist parties during the 1920s and 1930s. Nor did any left alternative to Congress in activity on the agrarian front in the Muslim majority areas emerge. Not that there did not exist the awareness of this need the contemporary writings of Nehru, communists and socialists constantly emphasize it; the failure lay in the realm of action or implementation. This was seen clearly even by middle-level political workers as is brought out by the following letter written by Mangal Singh, MLA, to Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress President, on 9 April 1937.

At another level, communalism represented the struggle between two exploiting classes or strata for as large a share as possible of economic power and privileges. Belonging to different religions (or castes), these classes or strata used communalism to mobilize the popular support of their co-religionists behind themselves in their mutual struggles. Sometimes, it has been said that communalism also represented the struggle between the Hindu bourgeoisie and the Muslim bourgeoisie. Hindus and Hindu castes, it is said, had acquired a monopoly in the field of modern capitalist enterprise and they would not let others enter. The Hindu capitalist class wanted to dominate the country and curb the Muslim capitalist class; consequently, the Muslim bourgeoisie had to struggle against the Hindu bourgeoisie's domination in the same manner as the latter had to struggle against the British bourgeoisie. This so-called Marxist explanation or justification of Muslim communalism was articulated most clearly by W.C. Smith in 1943 at a time when the Communist Party of India was arguing that the demand for Pakistan represented bourgeois nationalism of the Muslim nationalities.

CHECK YOUR KNOWLEDGE

4. Discuss in detail the concept of communalism?

5. Elaborate the socio-economic roots of communalism?

2.6.3 Summary

To sum up: Firstly, communalism was, thus, in one of its basest aspects under conditions of underdevelopment and limited opportunities for individual advancement, one of the forms through which individuals of the middle and lower middle classes, including the fresh entrants into these strata from the landlords, peasantry and the working class, could group and struggle to maintain and improve their individual positions.

Secondly, communalism, or some other communal-type movement, was, in a sense, inevitable in a stagnant economy and in the absence of alternative rallying points in the form of adequate anti-imperialist and class movements. If the activity of the middle classes, and even the masses, was not turned against

imperialism and into movements of social transformation, their desperate urges, passions and longing; and political energy would find expression in other, socially regressive and tragic channels. In a social situation which is ripe for social revolution and transformation, if revolution and transformation would not occur, some other form of social division and struggle would.

Thirdly, if the middle class scramble for jobs created communalism, middle class base and domination of politics made it difficult and even impossible to fight it successfully.

Lastly, it follows that there could be no final solution to the communal problem within the colonial situation and the existing social order. This does not mean that communalism and such other social phenomena should not be opposed. They should be and can be opposed successfully but with a clear recognition that they will not totally disappear from the social scene so long as the social soil for them remains fertile. Till the economy starts developing and the petty bourgeoisie loses its predominance over the political and social ethos, such phenomena and ideologies would continue to appear and grow, and, when not vigorously opposed politically and ideologically, even prevail.

2.6.4 Key Concepts/Words

Communalism: Communalism is the belief that because a group of people follow a particular religion they have as a result common social political and economic interests. It is the belief that in India Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs form different and distinct communities which are independently and separately structured or consolidated; that all the followers of a religion share not only a community of religious interests but also common secular interests; that is common economic political social and cultural interests; that Indians inevitably perceive such interests through the spectacles of the religious grouping and are bound to possess a sense of identity based on religion. i.e. religion has to become the basis of their basic social identity and the determinant of their basic social relationships; that they possess the inherent tendency to act and function as a separate group or entity or unit in these fields; that they constitute separate 'organic wholes' or homogeneous and cohesive communities especially in the political field; that each such religious 'community' has its own separate history; that communal identity and division have always pervaded Indian society, though they may have been reinforced in modern times; that the religious 'community' has become the basis of the organization of modern politics in India and of the perception of economic, political and cultural issues by the Indian people; that a 'real' Hindu or Muslim can belong only to a party of the community and cannot differ politically from other Hindus or Muslims; that all Hindus or Muslims must think alike in politics because they are Hindus or Muslims; that, in fact, each religious 'community' constitutes a homogeneous entity and even a distinct 'society' in

itself; that there is and can be no such thing as an Indian nation-India has been is, and has to be, a mere 'confederation of religious communities.'

Communal tension: Communal tension was spasmodic and usually directly involved the lower classes only. During the period when and in the area where, communal tension prevailed, all mutual relations between the followers of different religions were snapped following the arousal of religious and communal passions through vicious propaganda, oral as well as written, inflammatory accusations and wild rumours often involving some religious issue such as cow-killing or music before mosques. An atmosphere and climate of excitement and frenzy were

generated and often actual violence also took place. The communal riot was a typical example of communal tension. The participants in and the victims of a communal riot-though not necessarily its instigators-were usually the urban poor and lumpen and goonda elements, though in a few cases the peasants were also involved. There was seldom any physical participation by the middle and upper classes, though they often lent material and moral support to the lumpen and goonda participants. However, once the frenzy abated and the excitement disappeared and the climate of immediate fear no longer existed, tension rapidly disappeared and normal relations were restored among the persons involved. Though each episode left behind a certain legacy, in general the tensions involving or generated by a communal riot rapidly and on the whole disappeared. The significance of communal riots should also not be exaggerated. Communal tension and riots began to occur only from the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Moreover, they did not prevail in India on a significant scale till 1946-47. The overwhelming majority of Indians, especially in the rural areas, were unaffected by communal tensions. Thus, during 1923-26, the four-year period of maximum communal tension in India before 1946, there were 72 major communal riots, which gives an average figure of one riot every 20 days for the vast continent-sized and heavily populated country.

Communal politics: Communal politics were long-term, persistent and continuous. They involved, in the main, the middle classes landlords and bureaucratic elements. They represented communal ideology in its political form and found expression in the political field and not in overt physical acts against the members of the 'other community' on a personal or even communal basis, even when their basis was mere personal political rivalry or promotion of personal interest. On the personal plane, friendly relations could prevail among the communal politicians as well as their middle and upper class supporters. In fact, the communal leaders quite often cooperated with each other in municipal committees, district boards and provincial cabinets, after having been elected to these bodies through communal politics and rivalry. Quite often, at least till 1945, they also maintained friendly social and economic relations.

Communal Riot: The communal riot was sudden and spasmodic, was an aspect of social pathology, and its causation lay either in the prevalence of a communal atmosphere generated by communal politics and communal ideology or in conjunctural causes, involving religious feelings alone or combined with some particular local interests, which could be effectively handled by efficient administrative or police action and secular public opinion. It is communalism as politics and ideology which can be and perhaps should be the subject of analysis as also of ideological-political struggle.

Socio-Economic Roots of Communalism: Basically, communalism was one of the byproducts of colonialism, of the colonial character of the Indian economy, of colonial under- development. Colonialism provided the social structure which produced communalism and in which it could grow. Historically, the rise of modern politics and social classes occurred in the same period in which the full impact of the colonialization of the Indian economy began to be more completely felt and the crisis of the colonial economy began to emerge. Colonial economy under development and economic stagnation produced conditions which favored internal division and antagonism within society as also its radical transformation. This was particularly true of the impact of colonialism on the middle classes, which were, in particular, torn by fears, jealousies and frustration.

Because of economic stagnation, the middle class Indians were compelled to compete with each other for the scarce opportunities and resources. There existed a perpetual and increasingly intense, tough and unhealthy competition among individuals for jobs, in professions, and among traders and shopkeepers for customers. Nor did the problem end with the entry into a job or profession or trade; for then came the lifelong individual quest and competition for promotion, betterment and success. Every available means was used in this competition, and no weapon was too lowly if it could bring success within one's grasp. There was the individual struggle through educational qualification and personal merit-and middle class parents, and sometimes other relations, would make tremendous sacrifices to provide educational opportunities to their children. Nepotism, corruption and familism were used on a large scale. The net of extended family connections could stretch over a wide territory and sometimes involve hundreds of government servants. The acceptance and payment of bribes in return for appointments to jobs and offices became increasingly common. To private business, family connection was the chief mode of recruitment.

2.6.5 Exercise Questions

1. Write a note on communalism?
2. Discuss the socio-economic roots of communalism?

2.6.6 Short Questions

1. Communalism

2. Socio-Economic Roots of Communalism

2.6.7 Reading List

- Chandra, Bipin. 2008. *Communalism in Modern India*. Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd.
- Ghai, U.R. and Lall, N. 1992. *Indian Political System*. New Academic Publishing Co. Jalandhar
- Haralambos, M and Heald, R.M. 1997. *Sociology: Themes and Perspectives*. Oxford University Press. New Delhi

POLITICAL VIOLENCE: MEANING, NATURE AND TYPES**STRUCTURE****11.0 Objectives****2.7.1 Meaning and Nature of Political Violence****2.7.2 The Forms of Political Violence****2.7.3 Types of Political Violence****2.7.3.1 Violence and the State****2.7.3.2 Ethnic and Religious Violence****2.7.3.3 Secular Violence****2.7.3.4 Religious Violence****2.7.4 Summary****2.7.5 Key Concepts/Words****2.7.6 Exercise Questions****2.7.7 Short Questions****2.7.4 Reading List****2.7.0 Objectives**

By the end of this chapter, the student shall be able to:

- To understand the meaning and nature of political violence.
- To know different forms and types of political violence.

2.7.1 Meaning and Nature of Political Violence

The term violence is derived from the *Latin* force and *lotus*, the past participle of *faro* meaning, to carry. This means to carry force towards something or someone. The oxford dictionary defines violence in its mild form as an outrage injury or act contrary to one's feelings or principles, and in its strong sense as (law) unlawful exercise of force. The Webster's dictionary lists no less than seven meanings for the term that range between physical forces used to injure. Raymond Williams also views violence varying from use of physical force to unruly behaviors. These wide ranging conceptions of violence only affirm its multiple forms and all pervasiveness in human society.

Violence can be exercised by a state, can be used by agencies sanctioned by the state's legal order and can be employed by citizens against the state and its apparatus, therefore, following Niebuhr, we define political violence as 'acts of disruption, distraction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims surrounding implementation, and or effect have political significance, that is end to modify the behavior of other in bargaining situation test has consequences for the social system. As Engels pointed out, with the rise of industrialism the major means of violence become more expensive and

technically sophisticated so that only governments can afford them and have the available skills to operate them, so violence, far from being the prerogative of dissident groups, is also used more or less frequently by the state and its agencies.

The students of society first differentiated the human society from the animal world, that is, nature considered as chaotic and characterized by the 'rule of the jungle' then they went on to differentiate the human society itself, high from the low, elite from the masses, civilized from the masses, civilization from the uncivilized, and the modern, from the traditional and primitive. In the recent past we have witnessed a classification of the continents the first, the second and the third worlds, on to basis of economic development. The uncivilized savage societies are believed to be afflicted with the violence both within the society and between them that is why these people are classified as barbaric, deemed on better than animals. They are considered at a lower level of development. Hence the need to 'humanize' them. This would happen gradually as these societies would at modernize under the influence of the civilized world. Such were the premises often evolutionary thinkers of society who still hold the ground firmly. Montesquieu and Morgan suggested the course of development of human society from savagery to the civilized society, and Spencer delineated similar movement from simple homogeneous to triply compounded heterogeneous society. And Comte with his positivistic understanding, stressed change from theological (fictitious) to the positive (scientific) society, this is the projected course of development of both the humankind, and the evolutionary theory is that numerous afflictions of the stage societies, including violence would be taken care of by the process of modernization and development.

The enlightenment project raised tremendous hope in the minds of philosophers and thinkers to salvage humankind not only from obscurantism, and irrational belief systems of the dominant religious ideology but also see riddance from poverty, hunger and violence which afflict human existence, the development of modern science and technology is considered as an essential medium for this change. The new mode of thinking and acting came to rest on reason and rationality which is opposed to the metaphysical thought and philosophy, the other world stands demystified. This worldly pursuits in objective reality are given primary and legitimacy over the other worldly achievements based on subjective experience. The enlightenment and subsequent modernization are deemed to eradicate dogmatism and irrational belief system entrenched in the human psyche. This enlightenment with the help of reason and rationality would also wipe out violence committed in the names of religion it is also hoped that humankind would live in comfort and peace due to abundance of goods in the market and would be relieved of physical labor and drudgery following the machination of instruments of production.

But, the history did not move on the projected course. The reality turned out to be its converse. The comforts of technology and abundance of goods were expropriated only by a minority class within a society and a few nations amongst others of the world. The majority population remained deprived off on both the counts the afflictions of human society also could not be dispensed with the poverty and latter became more violent than; 'primitive other' these development raised question in the minds of theorists and philosophers of enlightenment and modernity. Some of them have started questioning the very premises of these concepts. They have begun to look for the bases of violence inherent in the very processes and institutions of modern society. They argue that violence is rooted in the modern western science. Reason and rationality; and the much sought after notion of development.

One stream of enlightenment also looked forward to emancipate the oppressed and exploited majority class. The proletarian liberation is a project of modernity itself. The development of capitalism is also considered progressive since it is expected to awaken the sleeping static societies. But both the Marxist and anarchist philosophers argued against the skewed character of modernity that had been expropriated by a minority ruling class. The liberation of the oppressed classes could only be achieved through the revolution theory and its praxis, and if necessary with violence too, in the last instance.

Such liberation is not the concern of modern philosophy alone. The pre-modern theories of religion have also forcefully argued in favor of the oppressed people. All the major religions of the world-Semitic and non-Semitic, theistic and atheistic-have not only held this struggle for justice legitimate, but declared it a holy or just war. In the present chapter we will focus on the Sikh theory of violence to understand the problem of Sikh militancy

The problem of political violence may then be seen within this broad framework. But what is this political violence? How does is we differentiate it from other types? Simply put, political violence is that force or power that may be deployed as a means to an end. Which is to retain one's power position? Those in power want to retain it, and those deprived of it take to violence for the sake of justice. In the latter case it is a project for the empowerment of the oppressed and the4 exploited. This type has a definite goal to achieve and is never an end in itself. The philosophers have defined these concepts differently. For instance, Sorel calls proletarian revolt as violence that is creative and liberation, while force is used by the state hence oppressive. Arendt poses reverse relationship. For her violence is destructive which is different from power and authority, its common sense perception that violence refers to a situation when dialogue has ruptured. It has come to an end without any possibility of exchange of views in future. I beg differ on this count. To my Mino Violence is not an end of the dialogue but a different mode of carrying out the discourse in an altogether new way, and at a different plane. This differences lies in the changes of the medium in which

and through which dialogue is carried forward and brought to a logical culmination. And this is the end of violence itself. The discourse breaks off when one of its constituting elements is subjugated finally that is the moment of the death of the dialogue what is emphasize here is that violence is a means to carry out the dialogue reaches a end exhausting all possible means of communication.

Such a communication through violence does not use words and figures but real life actions whose nature and types could be deciphered in a given socio-cultural context. These ideological actions used as symbols with definite meanings could be interpreted usefully for political analysis. It is evidently clear from an observation of such acts of violence that make an inseparable part of a militant movement. These meanings are not only clearly understood by the two participants in a violent discourse but also the common people of the land. For an illustration let me suggest that the when the Punjab police started fortuning and eliminating the close relations of the militants thus coercing them to surrender, the militant used similar strategy of elimination the relatives of policemen. This brought an end to the police strategy of fitting and torturing militants' relations. Prior to this all statements, resolutions and threats on paper given by the militants and human rights groups were not needed. Therefore, using in this project, acts of violence perpetrated by the police and the militants during the decade ling turmoil in Punjab to make sense of the whole phenomenon. It is in this sense that violence is said to constitute a meaning full discourse whose analysis would reveal new dimensions of the Punjab problem.

2.7.2 The forms of political violence

Turing to the problem of the variety of forms of political violence, the following forms have been identified. The basis of the classification depends upon who participates, whether. Elite or mass, and whether or not the violence is highly organized.

- (1) Turmoil, which may be defined as relatively spontaneous and unorganized violence with quite widespread (popular support and participation which includes strikes, riots and localized rebellions. This form of violence is associated with relatively intense deprivations among the mass of people or a particular mass of people, who tend to be rather badly organized, lacking highly articulated political, lacking access to state bureaucracies' and who are generally badly integrated into the society. Typically, this form of violence is associated with economic transition when economic and social forms of deprivation are intense. But as the ghetto violence of America demonstrates, this is not always the case. During the 1960's after protracted legal and quasi-legal attempts to relieve the generally unfavorable social and economic position of the American blacks they turned to violence, especially in the

ghetto. A strong sense of relative deprivation, of being excluded from a generally antipathetic society and the arrival of belief countering white racism as combined to create a potential for violence. The actual violence would then be precipitated by events which previously had met with only resignation- the arrest of a black. A shop refusing a black customer or treating him badly, rumors of police brutality, and so on. Lacking control over the political machines and access to the decision- maker in their localities, the blacks began to organize their own small parties, to attack the local political machines as Cleveland, to demand control of school boards as in new York and to riot, shoot back and burn.

- (2) Conspiratorial violence is exercised in a highly organized manner usually, but not necessary, by segments of the elite such as the army and the bureaucracy. It manifests itself normally in minimal violence, which may include small-scale but directed terrorism, coups d'etat, palace revolts and organized political assassination, it is associated with intense, dissatisfaction by elite groups about their lack of political influence, and normally the masses are bypassed and their degree of involvement extremely limited. Conspiratorial violence may, however, have a mass reference, as was the case in Russia where the attempt was to isolate the government by terror which would 'demoralize' disorganize and weaken' the autocracy so that it became 'powerless' to take any kind of measures, to suppress ideas and activities directed towards the people's welfare. But, even with a popular reference, the weakness of the conspirator is that having no popular roots or support he can be eliminated by his own methods without evoking widespread outrage unless he can provoke the authorities into indiscriminate repression. if he succeeds in provoking the legal authorities into excessive or indiscriminate counter violence (Brazil is a case in point) then this alone may help to convince of the people that only active opposition to the authorities can succeed. As with other forms of violence, this one is also strongly associated with transitional economics. The masses are not so much deliberately excluded as not even considered; nor are they capable of intervening since they play no normal part at all in governing. The masses are normally passive objects for government and will accept any change in government, whether legal or not'.

When the coup is attempted in the more economically and politically advanced polity its success is greatly more problematic and, indeed, is unlikely to be even attempted unless the country has been seriously weakened in a war(as in the Kapp putsch of 1919), or has a weak party system and suffers a period of economic crisis, or any combination of these (as in the abortive generals plot in France in 1958)in such countries the population is likely to be politically integrated and to be

politically organized, most of the military and police loyal to the state and the population may well resist, as in the Kapp, putsch, or can be mobilized: franchise Françoise, aidez-moi.

- (3) Internal war, which if successful in replacing a regime, is always associated with a high degree of organization and with at least the tacit approval of wide sections of the population, it includes large-scale Terrorism, civil wars and revolutions. Internal war is generally associated with progressive deprivation of many conditions of social existence and also with struggle against foreign occupation, if the dissidents are able to concentrate in a geographically peripheral area or areas outside effective regime control, and if foreign support is available, this may strengthen the possibility of civil war. Internal wars, such as guerrilla-type insurrections, often develop, as for example in Cuba, from a conspiracy. If a regime possesses a loyal and reasonably efficient military force and is confronted by a dissident group with no corresponding assets, then if the latter is to succeed in overthrowing the regime, necessarily it must find other sources of strength. Whether, this is possible depends upon the amount of institutional support it can generate among the mass of the population. In other words, to circumvent the military superiority of the regime the guerrilla tries to win the support of the people. As that successful guerrilla leader Mao Tse-tung wrote, the mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for an inferiority in arms and other things....here the guerrilla enlists the aid of an ideology offering interpretations of people deprivations and ways of alleviating them: land reform for the landless. Regional autonomy for ethnic minorities, political equality, and so on. The failure of the Greek insurgents, 1945-50 to win such popular support, or of the Hukbalabap in the Philippines, illustrates the importance of the insurgent being able to focus discontent and thereby generate popular loyalty. In china, in insurgent controlled areas the peasants were organized into local soviet where the poor and landless peasants were given a voice for the first time. Land was equitably distributed and attempts made to increase the efficiency of farming methods. Education and industry were started and there is little doubt that the Chinese communist party's synchronization of reform and the revolutionary pursuit of power was a great source of strength. This close cooperation between the guerrilla and a sympathetic population provides the guerrilla with means to overcome the military superiority of the regime's forces- near perfect intelligence, extreme mobility, and freedom from fixed logistic bases and surprise.

2.7.3 Types of Political Violence

2.7.3.1 Violence and the State

Broadly there are two major conceptions of the place of violence in the state. One school of thought emphasizes that politics is about power and its distribution and that, as Wright Mills put it. The ultimate kind of power is violence. Punishments and legally sanctioned violence is an ever-present reality and is the ultimate binding agent of the state, the other school emphasizes that legal acts of violence are possible but places for more emphasis on the voluntary assent, won by persuasion and concession, of the population, governors normally gain authority by winning the voluntary consent of the population and it follows that the successful polity can be judged by the extent to which violence is avoided and other substitutes discovered' McIver, putting the same point more positively, vindicating the demands of an order that force alone never creates; however, even those most insistent on the residual nature of force violence do accept that violence has a place, even if it is a small one, since they do concede that the state may have on occasion, albeit reluctantly and temporarily, to exercise coercion.

It seems to be widely agreed that the exercise of violence by political authorities stems from the problems associated with political integration and is often associated with the process of economic development. Political integration refers initially to the process of amalgamation of distinct cultural groups into a single political entity. The possibility that such a process also involves the creation of a national political consciousness, historically, this process has, varied from the physical murder of whole sections of cultural minorities, the forced deportation, their forced religious and cultural conversion, and large-scale population transfers, most significant for our purpose, however, is that this violence has been exercised by states upon its citizens- or those it claims are its citizens- and the violence has been employed as an instrument of policy, being the extension of the influence of the political authorities upon those who for the reason or another do not accept the authority as legitimate, looked at in this perspective, the modern state is built upon the violent demise of locally autonomous entities- feudal or tribal and it, in fact, a concentration and monopolization of the means of violence. As Professor Stone writes of this process in Britain the greatest triumph of the Tudors was the ultimately successful assertion of a royal monopoly of violence both public and private; when this process had been accomplished in western societies, the next state was the attempt to set limits upon the arbitrary exercise of this violence potential by curbing the instruments of violence, police and armies, and their immediate controllers, kings, legislators, bureaucracies- by means of constitution, balance, separations of power, bill of rights, courts of law, and so on. Latterly, the attempt has been made to curb the exercise of this violence not merely intra-nationally but also internationally through the League of Nations,

the UN, the Hague, treaties also on, but whatever name we give to the latter stages, control of violence for its gradual elimination, the fact is that violence is the normal process by which states are initially integrated.

In an already classical exposition of this process, Walter has demonstrated that in a number of African societies terror and violence were used to solve crises of social integration by crushing the sources of actual and potential resistance to the emergent political centre, the amount of violence employed differed, and sometimes the variegated groups integrated under one central leadership were organized in a constitutional order that balanced, mediated and stabilized conflicting forces. But even in these cases the exercise of violence, although devolved upon sub-ordinate authorities was rarely far in the background. In the case of Shaka, who took over the Zulu state in about 1818, violence was deliberately kept right in the foreground because terroristic despotism depends on the impact that violence makes on the consciousness of witnesses and on the communication of their fear to others more remote, in uniting a previously diverse state, Shaka struck at all 'individuals' and groups who, if left unchecked, would naturally act to limit or challenge his powers, he slaughtered the old and redefined their status from one of honor to that of being nuisances, countered the potential influence of his higher officers by terrorizing them and prohibiting their meeting outside his presence, and executed anybody whose loyalty was in any way suspect and many who were by no stretch of the imagination guilty of anything. All this to weld a politically diverse state into a remorseless machine of military conquest supported by a completely controlled and restructured polity and an economy whose major function was to supply the army.

Shaka, then, employed terror to fulfill his political purpose, and terror is a type of violence characterized by its completely arbitrary and capricious character. All can, at any moment, incur the despot's wrath, all are potential victims and all are potential victimizers. Terror is the extreme case of the instrumental employment of violence for political ends. Normal violence if one may employ the term, can also be used instrumentally but is deployed against categories of the objectively 'guilty' who stand in the way of the state's hegemony. As we have said previously, in the new state there are quite likely to be just such objectively guilty groups whose language, religion, culture, economic interests and so on do lead them to form, anti-national, political parties, normally such groups are violently integrated or violently disintegrated, but as the case of Shaka shows, there is another way, that of terror.

Another classical occasion for the state to employ violence or to threaten violence is during the early period of economic development from a handicraft system, based on agriculture, to a relatively labor-intensive factory system, during the period, which is always one of suffering for the great majority of the population, the state will exercise or threaten to exercise violence in two ways. If

the economic development is mainly directed by private initiative, then the state will normally act so as to unions illegal or semi-legal, by introducing effective national police systems, by outlawing radical propaganda and often by stationing troops in or near the new industrial complexes. During the 'captain swing' troubles in rural England in 1830 when agricultural machines were destroyed, animals killed, crops destroyed and ricks burned, 1976 people were arrested, 481, of them were transported and 19 executed, as well, it should be added, government frequently and belatedly interfere in a more ameliorative fashion by passing wage legislation, by enforcing better conditions in factories, by child protection law, and so on. What happens with this mode of economic development is that the government provides a system of explicit coercion which protects the implicitly coerced emergent social structure. A system is implicitly coercive 'where the structure of and the values symbols by, social institutions restrain the behavior of individuals'. Of course, the whole emergent ethos and structure of the new factory system was implicitly coerced, the new working-class having to change its leisure, consumption and working patterns almost totally.

2.7.3.2 Ethnic and Religious Violence

There are few countries in the developed world which do not have either significant ethnic or religious, minorities, and where such minorities are present the possibility of violence is also present. Since the religious are present the possibility of violence is also present. Since the religious or ethnic minority may well also be an economically deprived group Walloons in Belgium, catholic in northern Ireland, non-whites in the US and UK, Bretons in France- it is difficult to sort out the relative influences of each factor. What appears to happen is that such groups historically have either opposed the formation of the nation in its present form- Belgium, northern Ireland and France- or in the case of colored minorities in the UK and US, takes no part in its foundation and are badly integrated. When the conflict assumes a religious form this lack of integration may be exacerbated by demands for parochial educations that children grow up separately; separate political parties may be established to cater of the minority, as with the numerous nationalist parties of Europe. In part, they attempt to work within the system, as in the case of the welsh and Scottish nationalist movements, but since a major assumption of any political system is that its territorial integrity remains inviolate it follows that success by this method is extremely problematical at most, a measure of regional devolution will be concede. Hence, the politics of parliamentary compromise is for the nationalist the politics of frustration and there is always a tendency for a more military direct-action wing to emerge, as happened with the IRA after year of peaceful parliamentary speech making and as is happening on a limited scale in a both Scotland and Wales.

In these situations, where a multi-national state has succeeded, but not completely in homogenizing the population, the nationalist an irritant to the regime and is unlikely to be more than that, but when, as was the case with Ireland, the ethnic minority is also a religious minority the situation may well be literally explosive. In the US the religious factor has not overlain the ethnic one since Negroes are, if they are religious, organized ore dominantly in protestant go and, wily, Nelly, they must stay in the us hence, the overall emphasis, until rather upon political and economic integration into a nation in which they are already attitudinally integrated in the sense of sharing common aspirations to wealth, assimilation and actual rejection by the white society, together with failure t achieve by political methods what other immigrant groups had achieved, status , upward methods, economic prosperity-or at least to advance relatively as fast as the rest of the society led to the political violence.

But itself the religious minority which is simply a religious minority evinces little religious minority which is simply because the modern state is a secular one which, qua religious, treats beliefs as on a par and rarely discriminates legally. This is more especially the case in the pro-test ant states where church and state are separated for historical reasons, whilst commonly in the catholic states religious and political freedom were won at the same time and tends to be associated together and the historical link is maintained by religious political parties. Religions is a source of diversity in the modern state, but religious interests are only important as sources of violent conflict when the religious element coincides with a racial or a linguistic or a class element-assert the case in Quebec. The normal situation is that religious affiliation is cross- cut by other affiliations and hence muted.

Looked at from the point of view of relative deprivation, it appears that even in modern states ethnic groups when subjected to economic or political deprivation form a source of potential and actual violence, whilst the religious connection with deprived is by itself a weak one. Nevertheless, when religious also coincides with low social class, or as in Northern Ireland, with political inequality and economic distress, in can be a potent source of political violence. In a broad sense we may see these sources of violence as stemming from ascribed characteristics which are more or less visible and more or less cumulative. Thus, the most visible and most socially cumulative characteristic is ethnicity especially bleach ethnicity, which as a matter of fact does in the modern state very frequently coincide with class and political weakness. Religions, although only in a weak sense ascribed, is not a very visible characteristic but can become more so when it coincides (in aggregate) with class and even more so when ethnicity is added. Most of the less visible characteristic can, with difficulty, be shed but pigmentation normally and, given the fact of racialism, acts as a constant and frustration. The more visible

the minority is the easier it is to exclude member from the normal processes of a accommodation typical of the modern society, and this leaves them- if they do not fall into apathetic resignation with only violence and loud protest as a political bargaining resources.

2.7.3.3 Secular violence

The revolutionary thinkers trace the emancipating role of violence from the French revolution for the establishment of peoples parliament in comes' words, 1789 is the starting point of modern times, because the man of that period wished, among other things, to overthrow the principle of divine right and to introduce to the historical scene the forces of negation and rebellion which have become the essence of intellectual discussion in the previous centuries. He argues, the social contract amplifies and dogmatically explains the new religion where god is reason, confused with nature, and whose representative on earth, in the place of the king. The people considered as an expression of the general will. This notion of rebellion and violence was lauded by the bourgeoisie of as emancipating; it is Marx who exposed the real class characters of this pseudo-emancipation. It is his assignment of the historic role to the proletariat to liberate not only itself but the whole humankind, if necessary, by violence or bloodshed that brings tremors in the established and conservation intellectuals. Marx himself is not an arch votary of bloodshed and violent revolution. He visualizes the possibility of a peaceful revolution in America, England and Holland etc. But he also foresees its converse at majority places where the forces of production have not developed to that extent. He warns: but in most of the continental countries it is force that will have to be the lever of our revolutions: and it is force that we shall someday have to resort to in order to establish the reign of labor. And, that

...the peaceful movement could become a "violent" one on countering the resistance of those interested in the old state of affairs... in fact the government tries to crush by force development which is inimical to it although legally invulnerable. This is the necessary introduction to violent revolution. It is an old story but it remains eternally true.

Violence to Marx is not destructive, it is creative, and it is educative and moralizing. He says that man finds and makes himself in his own activity. A proletarian revolution will not only authenticate the human in the proletariat but liberate the whole humankind. Revolution is educative because by passing through this process only that enlightenment will dawn on the revolutionaries. It is a state of heightened self-consciousness that will gradually usher the whole humankind towards liberation. Lenin too argues on the same lines, that mass consciousness is neither attained form the books nor form theoretical induction in socialist seminar groups. It will come from the struggle against capital, and eventually the state that is by definition an instrument of violence. This is why the struggle of the proletariat will ultimately assume a violent form.

The anarchists too, unlike the reputations that have, though considered violence necessary and inevitable do not eulogize violence per se, but only as a means to an end, as the last alternative. Their greatest enemy is the state. All its institutions and organizations should be changed to liberate humankind so that natural instincts may be released freely. This is possible by organization a society from below upwards' composed of small, voluntary communities federating into larger associations for larger purposes. Unlike Marx's Bakunin pins hopes for revolution on the most alienated segments of the society, the most destitute and desperate toilers, the lumpen-proletariat, including such elements as brigands and band. These are for him social rebels and not deviants who would establish a new free society based on the real spirit of the revolution. He forcefully asserts. The passion for destruction is a creative passion too. Kropotkin's attitude to terror is highly ambiguous. A man of angelic humanism and high ethics was disgusted with assassin-actions and bombings. Though he finds violence abhorrent as a tactic, he frequently accepted it in the context of desperate acts committed by men responding to unbearable condition. He writes to a friend that the guilt and responsibility for the crime belong to society: Individuals are not to blame; they are driven mad by horrible conditions. Such acts will go on so long as for human life shall be taught to men and so long as they will be told that it is good to kill for what one believes to be beneficial for mankind.

Lenin suggests that one who accepts the class struggle cannot fail to accept civil wars, which in every class society are the natural, at time inevitable continuation and intensification of the class struggle. He asserts: guerrilla warfare is intensification from of struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large intervals over between the "big engagements" in the civil war. Lenin strongly believes that a Marxist bases himself on the class struggle, and not social peace. The proletarian warfare neither disorganizes the movement nor demoralizes the cadre. This happens only when guerrilla acts are carried out by individuals or irregular no-party bands. It is for this reason that Lenin criticizes the revolutionary activities the anarchists.

It is Mao's slogan that power comes out of the barrel of the gun which gained currently and universal acclaim amongst the protagonists and practitioners of guerrilla warfare. The revolutionaries in the backward economics and pre-modern societies of the world take to the Maoist practice of laying siege of the strategic areas, rural or otherwise and ambushing the enemies' strongholds with the help of small armed bands comprised of peasants, the unpin-proletariat and other marginal sections of the society

Sorel is the twentieth century advocate of violence who does not believe that violence is a relic of barbarism. He suggests that the violence of the strike not only keeps the revolutionary spirit alive, but also kindles the middle class. It is

here that the role of violence in history appears to us singularly great for it can, in an indirect manner, so operate on the middle class as to awaken them to a sense of their own class sentiment according to him:

Proletarian acts of violence have no resemblance these proscriptions; they are purely and simply acts of war; they have the value of military demonstrative and serve to mark the separation of classes everything in war is carried on without hatred and without spirit of revenge.

To Sorel proletarian violence is both educative and emancipating. Proletarian violence carried on as pure and simple manifestation of the sentiment of the class war, appears thus as every fine and very heroic thing; it is at the service of the immemorial interests of the civilization. And it is violence that socialism owes those high ethical values by means of which it brings salvation to the modern world. If he inspires the working class to take to violence for the just cause he also advises them to exercise restraint. He asserts not only must violence be used with discretion but the workmen's demands also must not exceed certain limits.

Fanon also argues that the creation of new man is not possible till we achieve decolonization, which is always a violent phenomenon. And the native who decides to put the program me into practice, and to become its moving force, is ready for violence at all times. Form birth s is clear him that narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can be called in question by absolute violence. He suggests:

Violence alone violence committed by the people. Violence organized and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge to the practice of action, there is nothing but a fancy dress parade and the blare of the trumpets

Sartre also reverberates fanon's words to caution the fellow Europeans: you said they understand nothing but violence: of course; first, the only violence is the settler's but soon they will make it their own; that is to says, the same violence is thrown back upon us a s when our reflection comes forward to meet us when we go towards a mirror. Further, for at first it is not their violence, it is ours, which turns back on it and rends them... in the period of their helplessness', their mad impulse t murder is the expression of the natives' collective unconscious.

Sartre also justifies fanon's contentions concerning the baling character of the native's violence it, like, Achilles' lance can heal the wounds that it inflicts. He affirms

...the irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage instincts, nor even the effect of resentment: it is man re-creating himself. I think we understood this truth at one time. But we have forgotten it-

that no gentleness can efface the marked of violence, only violence itself can destroy them. The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he rediscovers his lost innocence and he comes to know himself in that he himself craves his self... when the peasant takes a gun in his hands, the old myths grow dim and prohibition are one forgotten, the rebel's weapon is the proof is humanity for in the first days the revolt you must kill to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time, there remains a dead man, and a free man, the survivor, for the first time, feels an national soil under his foot.

2.7.3.4 Religious violence

The pre-enlightenment philosophies of all the major religions of the world have also advocated the use of violence when all other modes redressing a wrong have failed pacifism and radicalism, no-violence and violence. The latter is never invoked in the first instance, be it the just war of radicals Christianity, jihad in Islam and dharamayudha in Hinduism and Sikhism, all these religions do preach and practice no-violence in society

According to the Encyclopedia of Religion, violence may be religious in form, an end in itself or a dramatic symbol. It may be enacted with awe, as if its instigator or perpetrator has encountered the 'mysterious tremendous; violence as a means, may serve religious values or, more typically, a blend of religious and economic religious and political ends.... Violence may be rationalize by the perpetrator's claims to have exhausted the alternative of social negotiation, if further notes that, despair can feed an urge to the worlds of pollution and sin. As enthusiasm, religious promotes hope and celebration ideologically; religions invoke violence and also demand peace.

The encyclopedia further notes that religious culture abets social violence in three ways.(1) it helps convert mundane issues into matters of life and death. Religious culture offers an arsenal of ideational and ritual symbols that can adhere to and inflate economic and social difference into life death crises. Because religion is, in Paul Tillich's words, a matter of 'ultimate concern, it can for resolving a matter for life and death than it is for resolving a conflict over, for instance, resource allocation. (2) Religions culture helps identify the evil to be attacked a conflict requires an antagonist for its protagonist. (3) Religious culture helps provide the appointed violent. Champion individual or collective with rationales for help or her act. Juergensmeyer explains that both religion and violence need each other. These are complementary rather than contradictory, as often perceived. He mentions five tenets of religious commitment whenever acts of religious violence occur. These are: (a) the cosmic struggle is played out in history;(b) the believers identify personality with the struggle (c) the cosmic struggle continues in the present; (d) the struggle is at a point of crisis, and (e) the acts of violence have a cosmic meaning. He argues

that since the religious language is about the tension between order and disorder, it is frequently about violence. And by indentifying a temporal social struggle with the cosmic struggle of order and disorder, truth and evil, the political leaders are able to avail themselves of a way of thinking that justifies the use of violent means.

The religious image are mechanisms through which peace and order conquer violence and chaos so it is understandable that the violence religious portrays is in some way controlled he suggests that in the Sikh tradition, as in other religious too, the image of a double- edge words is an example of the domestication of violence.

The development of modern theories of violence and Christianity is a western phenomenon. Both violence and Christianity preceded modern theorists, long ago. The radical streak in Christianity is a strong votary of violence. The growth of capitalism and the rise of socialism have given birth to liberation theology in the modern times. The streak of violence and no-violence characteristic of Christianity is also true of all other religious philosophies. The notion of holy or just war has parallels like jihad inn Islam and dharamayuddha in Hinduism and Sikhism.

A dharmayuddha according to Mehendale may mean two things a warm fought as a duty (dharma) by a Ksatriya' on a war fought according to the rules (dharma) of the war, the former depends on the ends and not the means adopted in the war, while converse is true for the latter *Mahabhart*a is a *dharamayuddha* of the latter type. Lord Krishna's advice to Arjuna at the battlefield to wage war against the *Kauravas* should be seen in the sun text of Hindu cosmology. He begins by reminding him of his *Ksatriyadhrma*, followed by elaboration of *karma yoga*, and finally yoga to become a ma of steady wisdom ' *sthitaprajan* ' which culminates in brahmasthiti, thus enlightened. The warrior plunges into the battlefield.

The Sikh religion also preaches on similar lines though adding significantly new dimensions to the concept of dharma yuddha (as inn Punjabi) over two centuries Sikhism enjoys the privileged guardianship of ten gurus starting form Guru Nanak to Guru Gobind Singh. The popular conception is that pacifism and nonviolence of the former gave way to militancy and violence of the latter. This seems true only at the surface level. But the deeper structure quite different. The last guru addresses himself as the tenth Nanak who only practiced the philosophy of the first guru. The ban (hymns) of Nanak is radical and violent which has been put into practice by the last guru.

The second martyrdom of the ninth Guru Tegh Bahadur and increasing state oppression led to the institutionalization of Khalsa by the tenth guru in 1699, the Khalsa was baptized with Khanda, the double-edged sword in the true spirit of a holy warrior, Guru Gobind Singh created the valiant fighter conceived as a synthesis of polar opposites like the fire and coolness saint, and soldier, a

wielder of arms and worshipper of weapons yet modest and humble, combining shakti (power) with bhagti (devotion) and a sanyasi (renouncer) yet a grihasthi (family person). Guru Gobind Singh was himself called a sant-sipahi (saint soldiers) who was also a guru and a chela (disciple) – a pe gur-chela-simultaneously. According to Uberoi:

The primary meaning of five symbols when they are taken together lies in the ritual conjunction of two opposed forces or aspects. The unshorn hair the sword and the uncircumcised male organ express the first aspect. They are assertions of forceful human potentialities that are of themselves amoral, even dangerous, powers. The comb, the steel bracelet and the loin and thigh breeches express the second aspect. That of moral constraints and discrimination... The aspect of assertion and the aspect of a better word the spirit of affirmation, characteristic of Sikhism.

The Dasam Granth has a large section on the typology of instruments of violence used during the war along with their legends and history. It is titled 'Shastarmala. The Guru in Krishnavatar hails the holy war. He says: 'Dhan jiyo tehko jag mein, mukh te Hari chitt jadh vichar', that is, blessed is the existence of a person who recites the name of his lips while harbouring the idea of war in his heart. The Khalsa always fights against oppression and exploitation with similar sentiments. It wages war in the name of the almighty and resorts to this ultimate mean only when all modes of redressing the wrong have failed.

CHECK YOUR KNOWLEDGE

6. Discuss in detail the meaning, nature and types of political violence?

2.7.4 Summary

On the basis of the above discussion one may draw an inference that it is not violence per se which is condemned but the ultimate goal that determines its character, as good and desirable, or evil and detestable. All the major religions of the world have had their sojourn with violence. Why is it inevitable? Why is it condemned unanimously yet held unavoidable and necessary under certain circumstances? The answer lies in resorting to this ultimate weapon not so for the sake of a few but for emancipating the masses. Hence the significance of violence is a mean to attain for the welfare of all. Thus, we find sanction for legitimate violence both in the revolutionary theory inspired by modernity and the pre-modern theories of religion. In the twentieth century these theories have given rise to, what Juergensmeyer calls, secular and religious nationalism. And, both are the competing ideologies for order, as alternatives to the existing bourgeois democracy.

2.7.5 Key Concepts/Words

Violence: The term violence is derived from the *Latin* force and *lotus*, the past participle of *faro* meaning, to carry. This means to carry force towards something or someone. The oxford dictionary defines violence in its mild form as an outrage injury or act contrary to one's feelings or principles, and in its strong sense as (law) unlawful exercise of force. The Webster's dictionary lists no less than seven meanings for the term that range between physical forces used to injure. Raymond Williams also views violence varying from use of physical force to unruly behaviors. These wide ranging conceptions of violence only affirm its multiple forms and its pervasiveness in human society.

Turmoil: Turmoil may be defined as relatively spontaneous and unorganized violence with quite widespread (popular support and participation which includes strikes, riots and localized rebellions. This form of violence is associated with relatively intense deprivations among the mass of people or a particular mass of people, who tend to be rather badly organized, lacking highly articulated political, lacking access to state bureaucracies' and who are generally badly integrated into the society. Typically, this form of violence is associated with economic transition when economic and social forms of deprivation are intense. But as the ghetto violence of America demonstrates, this is not always the case. During the 1960's after protracted legal and quasi-legal attempts to relieve the generally unfavorable social and economic position of the American blacks they turned to violence, especially in the ghetto. A strong sense of relative deprivation, of being excluded from a generally antipathetic society and the arrival of belief countering white racism as combined to create a potential for violence. The actual violence would then be precipitated by events which previously had met with only resignation- the arrest of a black. A shop refusing a black customer or treating him badly, rumors of police brutality, and so on. Lacking control over the political machines and access to the decision- maker in their localities, the blacks began to organize their own small parties, to attack the local political machines as Cleveland, to demand control of school boards as in New York and to riot, shoot back and burn.

Conspiratorial violence: is exercised in a highly organized manner usually, but not necessarily, by segments of the elite such as the army and the bureaucracy. It manifests itself normally in minimal violence, which may include small-scale but directed terrorism, coups d'etat, palace revolts and organized political assassination, it is associated with intense dissatisfaction by elite groups about their lack of political influence, and normally the masses are bypassed and their degree of involvement extremely limited. Conspiratorial violence may, however, have a mass reference, as was the case in Russia where the attempt was to isolate the government by terror which would 'demoralize' disorganize and weaken' the autocracy so that it became 'powerless' to take any

kind of measures, to suppress ideas and activities directed towards the people's welfare. But, even with a popular reference, the weakness of the conspirator is that having no popular roots or support he can be eliminated by his own methods without evoking widespread outrage unless he can provoke the authorities into indiscriminate repression. If he succeeds in provoking the legal authorities into excessive or indiscriminate counter violence (Brazil is a case in point) then this alone may help to convince of the people that only active opposition to the authorities can succeed. As with other forms of violence, this one is also strongly associated with transitional economics. The masses are not so much deliberately excluded as not even considered; nor are they capable of intervening since they play no normal part at all in governing. The masses are normally passive objects for government and will accept any change in government, whether legal or not.

2.7.6 Exercise Questions

1. Write a brief note on the meaning and nature of political violence.
2. Discuss different types of political violence?

2.7.7 Short Questions

1. Political Violence
2. Secular Violence
3. Religious Violence
4. State Violence

12.4 Reading List

- Singh, Birinder Pal. 2002. *Violence as Political Discourse*. Indian Institute of Advanced Study. Shimla.